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From what has been said above it is clear that according to 叠丑腻蝉办补谤补 the world of matter and the selves consists only in real鈥� modifications or transformations (辫补谤颈峁嚹乵补) of Brahman鈥檚 own nature through His diverse powers. This naturally brings in the question w hether the world and the souls are different from Brahman or identical with him. 叠丑腻蝉办补谤补鈥檚 answer to such a question is that 鈥渄ifference鈥� (bheda) has in it the characteristic of identity (abheda-dharma艣 ca)鈥攖he waves are different from the sea, but are also identical with it. The waves are manifestations of the sea鈥檚 own powers, and so the same identical sea appears to be different when viewed with reference to the manifestations of its powers, though it is in reality identical with its powers. So the same identical fire is different in its powers as it burns or illuminates. So all that is one is also many, and the one is neither absolute identity nor absolute difference^[1].

The individual souls are in reality not different from God; they are but Ilis parts, as the sparks of fire are the parts of fire; but it is the peculiarity of these parts of God, the souls, that though one with Him, they have been under the influence of ignorance, desires and deeds from beginningless time^[2]. Just as the 腻办腻艣补, which is all the same everywhere; and yet the 腻办腻艣补 inside a vessel or a house is not just the same 腻办腻艣补 as the boundless space, but may in some sense be regarded as a part of it; or just as the same air is seen to serve different life-functions, as the five 辫谤腻峁嘺蝉, so the individual souls also may in some sense be regarded as parts of God. It is just and proper that the scriptures should command the individual souls to seek knowledge so as to attain liberation; for it is the desire for the highest soul (辫补谤补尘腻迟尘补苍) or God or Brahman that is the cause of liberation, and it is the desire for objects of the world that is the cause of bondage^[3].

This soul, in so far as it exists in association with ignorance, desires and deeds, is atomic in nature; and, just as a drop of sandal paste may perfume all the place about it, so does the atomic soul, remaining in one place, animate the whole body. It is by nature endowed with consciousness, and it is only with reference to the knowledge of other objects that it has to depend on the presence of those objects^[4]. Its seat is in the heart, and through the skin of the heart it is in touch with the whole body. But, though in a state of bondage, under the influence of ignorance, etc., it is atomic, yet it is not ultimately atomic in nature; for it is one with Brahman. Under the influence of buddhi, 补丑补峁僰腻谤补, the five senses and the five 惫腻测耻蝉 it undergoes the cycle of rebirths. But though this atomic form and the association with the buddhi, etc., is not essential to the nature of the soul, yet so long as such a relation exists, the agency of the soul is in every sense real; but the ultimate source of this agency is God Himself; for it is God who makes us perform all actions, and He makes us perform good actions, and it is He who, remaining within us, controls all our actions.

In all stages of life a man must perform the deeds enjoined by the scriptures, and he cannot rise at any stage so high that he is beyond the sphere of the duties of work imposed on him by the scriptures^[5]. It is not true, as 艢补峁卥补谤补 says, that those who are fit to have the highest knowledge are beyond the duties of life and courses of ritualistic and other actions enjoined by the scriptures, or that those for whom these are intended are not fit to have the highest knowledge; in other wrords, the statement of 艢补峁卥补谤补 that there cannot be any combination (samuccaya) of knowledge (箩帽腻苍补) and necessary ritualistic duties of life (karma) is false. 叠丑腻蝉办补谤补 admits that pure karma (ritualistic duties) cannot lead us to the highest perception of the truth, the Brahman; yet knowledge (箩帽腻苍补) combined with the regular duties, i.e. 箩帽腻苍补-samuccita-karma, can lead us to our highest good, the realization of Brahman.

That it is our duty to attain the knowledge of Brahman is also to be accepted, by reason of the injunction of the scriptures; for that also is one of the imperative duties imposed on us by the scriptures鈥攁 vidhi 鈥攖he self is to be known (腻迟尘腻 v膩 are dra峁ａ弓avya岣�, etc.). It is therefore not true, as 艢补峁卥补谤补 asserted, that what the ritualistic and other duties imposed on us by the scriptures can do for us is only to make us fit for the studv of 痴别诲腻苍迟补 by purifying us and making us as far as possible sinless; 叠丑腻蝉办补谤补 urges that performance of the duties imposed on us by the scriptures is as necessary as the attainment of knowledge for our final liberation.

叠丑腻蝉办补谤补 draws a distinction between cognition (箩帽腻苍补) and consciousness (caitanya), more particularly, self-consciousness (腻迟尘补-caitanya). Cognition with him means the knowledge of objective things, and this is a direct experience (anubhava) arising out of the contact of the sense organ, manas, and the object, the presence of light and the internal action of the memory and the sub-conscious impressions (蝉补峁僺办腻谤补). Cognition is not an active operation by itself, but is rather the result of the active operation of the senses in association with other accessories, such that whenever there is a collocation of those accessories involving the operation of the senses there is cognition^[6]. 叠丑腻蝉办补谤补 is therefore positively against the contention of 碍耻尘腻谤颈濒补 that knowledge is an entity which is not directly perceived but only inferred as the agent which induces the intellectual operation, but which is not directly known by itself. If an unperceived entity is to be inferred to explain the cause of the perceived intellectual operation, then another entity might be inferred as the cause of that unperceived entity, and another to explain that and so on, and we have a vicious infinite (补苍补惫补蝉迟丑腻).

Moreover, no unperceived entity can be inferred as the cause of the perceived intellectual operation; for, if it is unperceived, then its relation with intellectual operation is also unperceived, and how can there be any inference at all? Thus, cognition is what we directly experience (anubhava) and there is no unperceived entity which causes it, but it is the direct result of the joint operation of many accessories. This objective cognition is entirely different from the subjective consciousness or self-consciousness; for the latter is eternal and always present, whereas the former is only occasioned by the collocating circumstances. It is easy to see that 叠丑腻蝉办补谤补 has a very distinct epistemological position, which, though similar to 狈测腻测补 so far as the objective cognition is concerned, is yet different therefrom on account of his admission of the ever-present self-consciousness of the soul. It is at the same time different from the 艢a峁卥arite epistemology, for objective cognition is considered by him not as mere limitation of self-consciousness, but as entirely different therefrom^[7].

It may also be noted that, unlike Dharmar膩j膩dhvar墨ndra, the writer of the Sanskrit epistemological work, 痴别诲腻苍迟补-paribh膩峁Ｄ�, 叠丑腻蝉办补谤补 considers manas as a sense-organ^[8]. On the subject of the self-validity of knowledge 叠丑腻蝉办补谤补 thinks that the knowledge of truth is always self-valid (蝉惫补迟补岣�-辫谤补尘腻峁嘺), whereas the knowledge of the false is always attested from outside (parata岣� 辫谤补尘腻峁嘺)^[9].

As has already been said, 叠丑腻蝉办补谤补 does not think that liberation can be attained through knowledge alone; the duties imposed by the scriptures must always be done along with our attempts to know Brahman; for there is no contradiction or opposition between knowledge and performance of the duties enjoined by the scriptures. There will be no liberation if the duties are forsaken^[10]. The state of salvation is one in which there is a continuous and unbroken consciousness of happiness^[11]. A liberated soul may associate or not associate itself with any body or sense as it likes^[12]. It is as omniscient, omnipotent and as one with all souls as God Himself^[13].

The attachment (谤腻驳补) to Brahman, which is said to be an essential condition for attaining liberation, is further defined to be worship (蝉补尘腻谤腻-dhana) or devotion (bhakti), while bhakti is said to be attendance on God by meditation (dhy膩n膩din膩 paricary膩). Bhakti is conceived, not as any feeling, affection or love of God, as in later 痴补颈峁ａ箛补惫补 literature, but as 诲丑测腻苍补 or meditation^[14]. A question may arise as to what, if Brahman has transformed Himself into the world, is meant by meditation on Brahman? Does it mean that we are to meditate on the world? To this 叠丑腻蝉办补谤补鈥檚 answer is that Brahman is not exhausted by His transformation into the world, and that what is really meant by Brahman鈥檚 being transformed into the world is that the nature of the world is spiritual. The world is a spiritual manifestation and a spiritual transformation, and what passes as matter is in reality spiritual.

Apart from Brahman as manifested in the world, the Brahman with diverse forms, there is also the formless Brahman (ni峁�prapa帽ca brahman), the Brahman which is transcendent and beyond its own immanent forms, and it is this Brahman which is to be worshipped. The world with its diverse forms also will, in the end, return to its spiritual source, the formless Brahman, and nothing of it will be left as the remainder. The material world is dissolved in the spirit and lost therein, just as a lump of salt is lost in water^[15]. This transcendent Brahman that is to be worshipped is of the nature of pure being and intelligence (sal-濒补办峁�a峁嘺 and bodha-濒补办峁�a峁嘺)^[16]. He is also infinite and unlimited. But, though He is thus characterized as being, intelligence, and infinite, vet these terms do not refer to three distinct entities; they are the qualities of Brahman, the substance, and, like all qualities, they cannot remain different from their substance; for neither can any substance remain without its qualities, nor can any qualities remain without their substance. A substance does not become different bv virtue of its qualities^[17].

叠丑腻蝉办补谤补 denies the possibility of liberation during lifetime (箩墨惫补苍-尘耻办迟颈); for so long as the body remains as a result of the previous karmas, the duties assigned to the particular stage of life (腻艣谤补尘补) to which the man belongs have to be performed; but his difference from the ordinary man is that, while the ordinary man thinks himself to be the agent or the doer of all actions, the wise man never thinks himself to be so. If a man could attain liberation during lifetime, then he might even know the minds of other people. Whether in mukti one becomes absolutely relationless (苍颈岣�s补尘-产补苍诲丑补岣�), or whether one becomes omniscient and omnipotent (as 叠丑腻蝉办补谤补 himself urges), it is not possible for one to attain mukti during one鈥檚 lifetime, so it is certain that so long as a man lives he must perform his duties and try to comprehend the nature of God and attend on Him through meditation, since these only can lead to liberation after death^[18].

Footnotes and references:

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[1]:

abhe da-dharmas ca bhedo yath膩 rnahodadher abhedah sa eva tara峁卶膩dy-腻迟尘补n膩 vartam膩no bheda ity ucyate, na hi tara峁単膩-daya岣� p膩峁Ｄ佱箛膩-di峁�u d峁浥泍ante tasyaiva t膩岣� 艣aktaya岣� 艣akti-艣aktiniato艣 ca ananyatva峁� anyatva峁� cn-palak峁�yate yathagner dahana-prak膩艣an膩-di-艣aktaya岣�.. . .tasm膩t sarvam ek膩-tiek膩-tmaka峁� natyantam abhinna峁� bhinna峁� v膩.
     Ibid. 11. 1. 18.

[2]:

Ibid. 1. 4. 21.

[3]:

r膩go hi param腻迟尘补-vi峁�ayo ya岣� sa mukti-hetu岣� vi峁�aya-vi峁�ayo ya岣� sa bandha-hetu岣�.
     叠丑腻蝉办补谤补-bh膩峁�ya.

[4]:

Ibid. 11. 3. 18, 22, 23.

[5]:

叠丑腻蝉办补谤补-bh膩峁�ya, i. i. i. In holding the view that the 叠谤补丑尘补-蝉奴迟谤补 is in a sense continuous with the 惭墨尘腻峁僺腻-蝉奴迟谤补, which the former must follow鈥� for it is after the performance of the ritualistic duties that the knowledge of Brahman can arise, and the latter therefore cannot in any stage dispense with the need for the former鈥攁nd that the 叠谤补丑尘补-蝉奴迟谤补s are not intended for any superior and different class of persons, 叠丑腻蝉办补谤补 seems to have followed Upavarsa or Upavars膩c膩rya, to whose commentary on the 惭墨尘腻峁僺腻-蝉奴迟谤补 he refers and whom he calls the founder of the school (艣腻蝉迟谤补-蝉补尘辫谤补诲腻测补-辫谤补惫补谤迟补办补). Ibid. I. 1. 1, and II. 2. 27.

See also I. 1. 4: 腻迟尘补-j帽膩n膩-dhik峁泃asya karmabhir vin膩 apavarg膩-nupapatter j帽膩nena karma samucc墨yate.

[6]:

箩帽腻苍补-kriy膩-kalpan膩y膩峁� pram膩峁嚹�-bh膩v膩t.. . . 艒lokendriya-mana岣�-sa峁僺k膩re峁�u hi satsu sa峁僾edanam utpadyate iti tad-abh膩ve notpadyate, yadi punar aparam j帽膩tta峁� kalpyate tasy膩py anyat tasy膩py anyad ity 补苍补惫补蝉迟丑腻; na ca 箩帽腻苍补-kriy膩num膩ne li峁単am asti,samvedanam iti cen na, ag峁沨墨ta-sambandhatv膩t.
     叠丑腻蝉办补谤补-bh膩sva, 1.1 i.

[7]:

kecid 膩hu岣� 腻迟尘腻 pram膩y膩m indriya-dv膩rop膩dhi-nirgama-vi峁�aye峁�u vartate ... tad idam asamyag dar艣anam;... 膩lokendriy膩dibhyo 箩帽腻苍补m utpadyam膩na峁� ... c膩nyad iti yuktam.
      叠丑腻蝉办补谤补-bh膩峁�ya.

[8]:

Ibid. II. 4. 17.

[9]:

Ibid. I. 4. 21.

[10]:

Ibid. III. 4. 26.

[11]:

Ibid. IV. 4. 8.

[12]:

Ibid. IV. 4. 12.

[13]:

mukta岣� k膩ra峁嚹�-tm膩na峁� pr膩pta岣� tadvad evasarva-j帽a岣� sarva-艣akti岣�.
     lih膩skara-bh膩峁�ya, iv. 4. 7.

[14]:

Ibid. III. 2. 24.

[15]:

Ibid. III. 2. 11, 13, 17.

[16]:

Ibid. III. 2. 23.

[17]:

na dharma-dharmi-bhedena svar奴pa-bheda iti; na hi gu峁嘺-rahita峁� dravyam asti na dravya-rahito gu峁嘺岣�.
      Ibid. 111. 2. 23.

[18]:

叠丑腻蝉办补谤补-bh膩峁�ya, hi. 4. 26.