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In chapter two I have brought out the various definitions of the different points of view of linguists, philosophers, psychologists, and so on (see 搂2.3). In this section, an attempt has been made to deal with and critically study the language and knowledge as reflected in the Five 狈颈办腻测补蝉. It, however, firstly needs further to examine and discuss the philosophy of language; that is, the language of thought in particular, and the knowledge of language in general.

Language is known as a unique faculty of man鈥檚 knowledge coordinated to the senses and the intellect. It is a form of rational communication, of communication of thought. Philosophers have provided many different accounts of what languages might be. Some think of languages as structured by formal logical relations; others prefer accounts based on the idea of speech acts. Davidson, however, has denied the existence of languages if these are understood as governed by conventions that determine the connections between words and what they might mean. Several philosophers have made claims about what kind of features language must have for it to be learnable by creatures, like us, with finite abilities. According to Tenesini (2007: 87), 鈥淔odor has used these considerations to argue for a language of thought, Dummett to argue against semantic realism, and Davidson to argue for a recursive theory of meaning. Chomsky (1968) proposes that linguistic theory should explain the mental processes that underlie the use of language. He is the pioneer who placed linguistics at the core of studies of the mind in affirming that language is a code that represents our hidden inner thoughts, a 鈥榤irror of mind鈥�. Dialectically, Stcherbatsky (1999: 458) suggests that 鈥渓anguage is not a separate source of knowledge鈥� but 鈥渁n indirect cognition of reality.鈥� It is something what to be used to convey our knowledge or logically our indirect knowledge through inference. Thus, as being viewed above, 鈥渓anguage mirrors human mental processes or shapes the flow and character of thought鈥� (Chomsky 1968: 1). In fact, as Descartes himself quite correctly observed, 鈥渓anguage is a species-specific human possession, and even at low levels of intelligence, at pathological levels, we find a command of language that is totally unattainable by an ape that may, in other respects, surpass a human imbecile in problem-solving ability and other adaptive behavior鈥� (Chomsky 1968: 9).

Before embarking to study the knowledge and the knowledge of language, it is necessary to present briefly the Truth-table which provides all the possible combinations of the truth-values taken by complex truth functional sentences given the values assigned to their atomic sentential constituents. A truth-table, for instance, shows that the conjunction of the sentences 鈥榠t is raining鈥� and 鈥榠t is windy鈥� is true when it is both raining and windy, and false in all other cases. Thus, the truth-table is illustrated below:

Table 1: Truth-Table

It is raining	It is windy	It is raining and it is windy
T	T	T
T	F	F
F	T	F
F	F	F

As the table shown, the truth-tables are used to illustrate the meaning of truth-functional sentential connectives. They also offer an effective method for testing the validity of arguments in propositional logic.

Based on Huarte鈥檚 distinguishing three levels of intelligence; that is, (i) 鈥渄ocile wit鈥�: the lowest level; (ii) the normal human intelligence: the next higher level; and (iii) normal human minds: the highest level that 鈥渁ssisted by the subject alone, without the help of any body, they will produce a thousand of conceits they never heard spoke of 鈥� inventing and saying such things as they never heard from their masters, nor any mouth鈥� (Chomsky 1968: 8), Chomsky goes to conclude that 鈥渘ormal human intelligence is capable of acquiring knowledge through its own internal resources, perhaps making use of the data of sense but going on to construct a cognitive system in terms of concepts and principles that are developed on independent grounds; and it is capable of generating new thoughts and of finding appropriate and novel ways of expressing them, in ways that entirely transcend any training or experience鈥� (Chomsky 1968: 8). A person鈥檚 knowledge of language, according to Chomsky, 鈥渋s representable as a stored set of patterns, overlearned through constant repetition and detailed training, with innovation being at most a matter of 鈥榓nalogy鈥� 鈥� [and] the normal use of language is not only innovative and potentially infinite in scope, but also free from the control of detectable stimuli, either external or internal. It is because of this freedom from stimulus control that language can serve as instrument of thought and self-expression, as it does not only for exceptionally gifted and talented, but also, in fact, for every normal human鈥� (Chomsky 1968: 10-11). Chomsky (1968) continues to argue that 鈥渁 phrase corresponds to a complex idea and a sentence is subdivided into consecutive phrases, which are further subdivided into phrases, and so on, until the level of word is reached.鈥� And he takes an example to illustrate this: the sentence 鈥淚nvisible God created the visible world鈥� contains the subject 鈥渋nvisible God鈥� and the predicate 鈥渃reated the visible world,鈥� the latter contains a complex idea 鈥渢he visible world鈥� and the verb 鈥渃reated,鈥� and so on. In the example just given, 鈥淚nvisible God created the visible world,鈥� the deep structure consists of a system of three propositions, 鈥渢hat God is invisible,鈥� 鈥渢hat he created the world,鈥� 鈥渢hat the world is visible.鈥� Thus, 鈥渢he deep structure is related to the surface structure by certain mental oprations -in modern terminology, by grammatical transformations. Each language can be regarded as a particular relation between sound and meaning. 鈥� The grammar of a language must contain a system of rules that characterizes deep and surface structures and the transformational relation between them, and that does so over an infinite domain of paired deep and surface structures鈥� (Chomsky 1968: 15).

A language, as Chomsky (1968: 23) observed, is a 鈥渉abit structure鈥� or 鈥渁 network of associative connections鈥� or 鈥渢hat knowledge of language is merely a matter of 鈥渒nowing how,鈥� a skill expressible as a system of disposetions to respond. Accordingly, knowledge of language must develop slowly through repetition and training, its apparent complexity resulting from the proliferation of very simple elements rather than from deeper principles of mental organization that may be as inaccessible to intro-spection as the mechanism of digestion or coordinated movement.鈥�

In order to achieve progress in the study of language and human cognitive faculties in general it is necessary first to establish 鈥減sychic distance鈥� from the 鈥渕ental facts,鈥� and then to explore the possibilities for developing explanatory theories, whatever they may suggest with regard to the complexity and abstractness of the underlying mechanism. For Chomsky, 鈥渢he person who has acquired knowledge of a language has internalized a system of rules that relate sound and meaning in a particular way鈥� (Chomsky 1968: 23). It is evidently that knowledge of language鈥搕he internalized system of rules鈥揳ccording to Chomsky is 鈥渙nly one of the many factors that determine how an utterance will be used or understood in a particular situation.鈥�

Drawing upon a fast growing body of research, it can be argued that there in fact exist two types of knowledge; that is, direct and indirect. It means that knowledge originates either from the senses, perception, or the intellect, conception. The knowledge derived from language is known as indirect knowledge because it does not belong to the domain of sensation. Language, though, somewhat belongs to intellectual, inferential, conceptual, and dialectical domains whereas the real knowledge or direct knowledge as the ultimate truth is pure, unintelligible, unutterable and non-dialectical. With a varied and the most extensive appraisal of the Five 狈颈办腻测补蝉, specially the Samyutta 狈颈办腻测补, the reality or the ultimate truth itself is vivid and pure but without the language, the man cannot touch it. As Varshney (17^th ed. 2009: 1) asserts 鈥渨ithout language man would have remain only a dumb animal.鈥�

Philosophical discussions describe clearly and succinctly that language in its intermediary function has aspects of epistemology (theory of knowing) and ontology (theory of being). As a sharp tool of knowledge, it is regarded to operate in a characteristically dialectical process of veiling and revealing truths and is in the process sometimes identified even with the reality that it seeks to represent. It fulfills an interpretative function in the process of effectively apprehending as well as comprehending the applied experience.

The relationship of language to the real knowledge albeit happens to be indirect and distant rather than close. In general, it is pointed out that language is not only an interpretative knowledge of the world and a conferral or comparison of meaning to life but also a means of access to the ultimately reality thus leading to the final liberated goal. For this purpose, the Buddha with the immeasurable wisdom aims to utilize various ways and manners to enable the people understand the truth and through which they can reach to the right and highest knowledge.

Knowledge thus can be viewed in a sense as basically an understanding of or information about a subject which is either represented in a person鈥檚 mind or possessed by people on a whole. It also means awareness, a discovery of something. Thus, as points out by Sasaki (1992) 鈥渒nowledge refers to the analysis of an object, and such knowledge called objective knowledge. This kind of knowledge can be accumulated. It cannot, however, be termed Buddhist knowledge as far as it concerns objective analysis.鈥� This can easily be recognized if we pay attention to the fine distinction between the scientific knowledge, that can be accumulated and obtained by experience or study, and the religious knowledge, that is wisdom or insight rising from awareness and enlightenment, a discriminating knowledge or intuitive apprehension. One possessing the scientific knowledge is the improbable one who has wisdom. Since Buddhism attaches an importance to wisdom based on the faculty, which apprehends the truth of the Buddha鈥檚 teaching more than just the accumulated scientific knowledge. Wisdom in Buddhism sense, according to Sasaki (1992), is divided into two concepts: transcendental knowledge (帽腻峁嘺) and knowledge-to-exercised (辫补帽帽腻).^[1]

帽腻峁嘺 鈥榯ranscendental knowledge鈥� is particularly used in the context of the understanding of doctrines. In terms of the Buddhist epistemology, tradition (anussava) is neither by itself a valid form of knowledge, nor are sense-perception or reason the reliable means of knowledge until the distorting influence of unwholesome mental factors, which are rooted in greed (谤腻驳补), hatred (dosa), and delusion (moha), have been eliminated. Once this has been achieved, one who reflects with right and wise attention (yoniso manasik膩ra) will perceive with the proper mode of cognitive awareness and see things 鈥榓s they really are鈥� (测补迟丑腻产丑奴迟补) (Majjhima 狈颈办腻测补, Sutta number 149.9). In such sense, 帽腻峁嘺 often occurs in intensive couple-compounds with terms of sight as cakkhu 鈥榚ye鈥�, for example: 鈥�肠补办办丑耻-办补谤补峁嘺 帽腻峁嘺-kara峁嘺鈥�, 鈥榦pening our eyes and thus producing knowledge鈥� (that is, giving us the eye of knowledge (a mental eye)), or with dassana (sight, view) as in 帽腻峁嘺dassana, 鈥榢nowledge and vision鈥�, 鈥榝ull vision鈥�, insight given by knowledge that is for 鈥榦ne who knows and sees鈥�^[2] (Majjhima 狈颈办腻测补, Sutta number 2). This is one of the features of Arahantship.^[3] Generally speaking, 帽腻峁嘺 is relative to common experience and perception (蝉补帽帽腻) is necessary for the formation of 帽腻峁嘺, as it precedes 帽腻峁嘺.

笔补帽帽腻 鈥榢nowledge-to-exercised鈥�, which will be discussed in great detail on the next section, is an important concept in Buddhist epistemology. It is often translated as 鈥榳isdom鈥� but closer in meaning to insight, discriminating knowledge, or intuitive apprehension, comprising all the higher faculties of cognition. It is the faculty which apprehends the truth of Buddhist teachings not as a mere understanding of doctrines but as 鈥榗oming-to-know鈥� and 鈥榗oming-to-be鈥�. In other words, 辫补帽帽腻 is not dialectic but an exercise of thought on matter of practice. It is not mere insight or intuition, but conduct accompanied by insight; it is a term of practical import (C.A.F. Rhys Davids 1978: 265). Although all beings possess 辫补帽帽腻, it is usually the underdeveloped that needs to be cultivated through the practice of insight meditation (惫颈辫补蝉蝉补苍腻). In the three standard stages^[4] which lead to arahanship, it occupies the highest and last stage; that is, the third division 辫补帽帽腻-kkhandha 鈥榗ode of intellectual duties or practice of the attainment of highest knowledge鈥�. Obviously, this can found in the Mah膩vedalla Sutta (Majjhima 狈颈办腻测补, Sutta number 43) at which 辫补帽帽腻 is regarded as the practiced knowledge (产丑腻惫别迟补产产腻), a wisely understanding about the Four Noble Truths. In the Abhidhamma, 辫补帽帽腻 is classified as one of the mental functions (cetasika), and is defined as the analytical discrimination of phenomena (dhamma-pavicaya).

The distinction between 帽腻峁嘺 and 辫补帽帽腻 is very multi-polar. In the Early Buddhism, this distinction was not very clear as sometimes they were used as synonymous. However, the Abhidhamma period onwards it became evident clear. In 笔腻濒颈 Abhidhamma, 辫补帽帽腻 came to mean the subject鈥檚 knowing (辫补箩腻苍补). In contract, 帽腻苍补 came to mean the object to be known (帽腻迟补) . Thus, 帽腻苍补 is the object, while 辫补帽帽腻 belongs to the subject. The endeavour to attain 帽腻苍补 thus presupposes 辫补帽帽腻 (Sasaki 1992: 92). Thus, 辫补帽帽腻 obviously has a broader sense than 帽腻峁嘺. This distinction becomes clearer during the period of commentaries. In an attempt to bring out the dynamics of 辫补帽帽腻 more persuasively, the 础迟迟丑补蝉腻濒颈苍墨 presents two characteristics of 辫补帽帽腻鈥� s: (i) illuminating (辞产丑腻蝉补苍补) and (ii) knowing or understanding (辫补箩腻苍补na) as follows:

Hence, the Elder has said: Just as when a man, your majesty, introduces an oil-lamp into a dark house, the lamp so introduced disperses the darkness, produces light, sheds lustre, makes objects visible, so, your majesty, 辫补帽帽腻 as it arises dispels the darkness of ignorance, produces the light of understanding (惫颈箩箩腻), sheds the lustre of 帽腻峁嘺, makes plain the Ariyan Facts. Thus, your majesty, 辫补帽帽腻 has illuminating as its characteristic.

And this was said by the 顿丑补尘尘补蝉别苍腻辫补迟颈 (厂腻谤颈辫耻迟迟补): 鈥業t knows; thus, brother, it is in consequence called 辫补帽帽腻. And what does it know? This is ill鈥�, and so on. Thus it should be expanded. And thus knowing should be regarded as the characteristic of 辫补帽帽腻.

(Sasaki 1992: 97)

Thus, 辫补帽帽腻鈥� s characteristic is quite illuminating, its function is to break up the darkness, and its manifestation is to shed the sheen of 帽腻峁嘺 or to produce the light of understanding (惫颈箩箩腻). 脩腻峁嘺 as a whole is considered as a consequence of 辫补帽帽腻. In addition, the commentator also gave two further etymological interpretations of 辫补帽帽腻 that are: (i) 辫补帽帽腻pana 鈥榯o make known or to indicate鈥�; and (ii) 辫补办腻谤别苍补 箩腻苍腻迟颈 鈥榯o know the object from the viewpoint of impermanence (补苍颈肠肠补迟腻), suffering (诲耻办办丑补迟腻) and non-self (补苍补迟迟腻)鈥�. These two meanings are closely related to each other and turn to the same fact that due to 辫补帽帽腻 the nature of existing things would be made explicitly known. 笔补帽帽腻, thus, signifies the spiritual wisdom which embraces the fundamental truths of the essence of human existence (Sasaki 1992:92-3).

The distinction between the static and dynamic states of 帽腻峁嘺 and 辫补帽帽腻 becomes more pure in 厂补尘尘辞丑补惫颈苍辞诲补苍墨. According to this commentary, 辫补帽帽腻 operates by virtue of function (kicca) and object (腻谤补尘尘补峁嘺) while 帽腻峁嘺 has for its object (dhamma) . It means that in order to operate 辫补帽帽腻 must firstly have an action on the subjective side and the object on the objective side. With the object alone, 辫补帽帽腻 is considered not to work at all. 脩补峁嘺 is included in the object to be known and practised by 辫补帽帽腻. And thus, 帽腻峁嘺 is regarded as the static product and ideal to be obtained, while 辫补帽帽腻 is subjective, dynamic and functional. In terms of spiritual exercise, the important thing is not merely the ideal or result, but rather the way to approach the ideal. Whether the achievement of the ideal is realized or not rest on the ability of the practitioner. 脩腻峁嘺, therefore, will be of significance only when it is considered in relation to the functional 辫补帽帽腻. In other words, the ideal must be achieved by the practical: 帽腻峁嘺 must be achieved by 辫补帽帽腻, it is assimilated in 辫补帽帽腻. In order to elucidate this distinction, the venerable Buddhaghosa compared 辫补帽帽腻 with 蝉补帽帽腻 鈥榩erception鈥� and vi帽帽腻峁嘺 鈥榗onsciousness鈥�. This comparison showed that 蝉补帽帽腻 refers to the perception of a colourful object, whereas vi帽帽腻峁嘺 means the perception of a multitude of appearances. These two terms concern the analytical perception of the object. 笔补帽帽腻, on the other hand, means to distinctively know (辫补箩腻苍补na) 鈥榯he religious significance鈥� of the object.

The view that 帽腻峁嘺 as a consequence, and 辫补帽帽腻 as a means of the Early Buddhism and the 罢丑别谤补惫腻诲补 school are also found in the 础产丑颈诲丑补谤尘补办辞艣补 and its commentary of the 厂补谤惫腻蝉迟颈惫腻诲补 school. This school believes that 辫补帽帽腻 is imminent and refers to the way to be cultivated, while 帽腻峁嘺 is transcendental and a consequence or a result to be attained. Apart from the arguments for the distinction of the two concepts, the 厂补谤惫腻蝉迟颈惫腻诲补 school goes further into the details of their intertwined relationship.

The commentator Ya艣omitra pointed out three types of functions of 辫补帽帽腻 (Skt, 辫谤补箩帽腻):

1. 办丑腻苍迟颈 (Skt, 办峁Ｄ乶迟颈),
2. 帽腻峁嘺 (Skt, j帽腻苍补) and
3. 诲颈峁�峁�丑颈 (Skt, 诲峁涐梗峁璱).

笔补帽帽腻 performs its function as acceptance of the truth at the first stage, as the decision at the second stage, and as the investigation at the last one. These three kinds of functions have a connecting link between each other, representing the stepping-forward of 辫补帽帽腻 in function from acceptance to investigation. Thus, 帽腻峁嘺 here is considered as one of the qualities of the dynamic and functional 辫补帽帽腻, being therefore assimilated by and intertwined with 辫补帽帽腻. The Sarv膩stiv膩dins, in addition, attempt a combination and formulate the philosophy of model form by which 辫补帽帽腻 and 帽腻峁嘺 come into unity. They try to express how the knowledge-to-be-cultivated (that is, 辫补帽帽腻) is combined and unified with its product (that is, 帽腻峁嘺). This unification is termed as 腻办腻谤补. According to the 笔腻濒颈, a concept of 腻办腻谤补 means a type of form (谤奴辫补) which remains even after the disappearance of the object. 笔补帽帽腻 denotes the essential nature of 腻办腻谤补 and the basis of 帽腻峁嘺. In other words, 腻办腻谤补 is a model form in which 辫补帽帽腻 and 帽腻峁嘺 come into unity. It consists of these two counterparts. It is obvious that in the 厂补谤惫腻蝉迟颈惫腻诲补 school 辫补帽帽腻 includes both functions, psychological and philosophical. When 辫补帽帽腻 is taken as knowledge to determine the characteristics of dhamma, it is a psychological function. On the contrary, when 辫补帽帽腻 is taken as knowledge to be cultivated and exercised, it is a philosophical function. It is a means, by which one can remove defilements out of his mind and can reach the final goal.

The notion that 辫补帽帽腻 is as a means to remove defilements can also be seen in the 惭补丑腻蝉补峁噂丑颈办补 school, preceding 惭补丑腻测腻苍补 Buddhism. Later, with the development of 惭补丑腻测腻苍补 Buddhism the concept of 辫补帽帽腻 has come to refer to light. Its original meaning 鈥榯he knowledge to be exercised鈥� has come into focus on the basis of the Bodhisattva鈥檚 ideal, which emphasizes the human activities, encourages altruism and universal compassion.

A Bodhisattva must perfect the Ten Transcendental Perfections (顿补蝉补辫腻谤补尘颈迟腻):^[5]

1. generosity (诲腻苍补),
2. morality (蝉墨濒补),
3. patience (khanti),
4. courage (viriya),
5. meditation (蝉补尘腻诲丑颈),
6. intuitive insight (辫补帽帽腻),
7. skilful means (鲍辫腻测补办耻蝉补濒补),
8. vow (笔补苍颈诲丑腻苍补)
9. power (bala), and
10. knowledge (帽腻峁嘺).

The sixth Perfection, the perfection of insight (辫补帽帽腻), is the central element of the 惭补丑腻测腻苍补 Path. The Mah膩y膩nist experience provided the basis for the identification of the Buddha with ultimate reality (Skt, 辫谤补箩帽腻辫腻谤补尘颈迟腻). Furthermore, the pursuit of the 辫谤补箩帽腻辫腻谤补尘颈迟腻 experience is one and the same with the quest for Buddhahood. Here, 笔谤补箩帽腻辫腻谤补尘颈迟腻 represents the practitioner鈥檚 recognition of his own potential Buddhahood which is cultivated by himself. The cultivation of insight results in the direct realization of emptiness (蝉耻帽帽补迟迟腻) and is regarded by many 惭补丑腻测腻苍补 texts especially the 笔谤补箩帽腻辫腻谤补尘颈迟腻 S奴tra, the foundation of the 惭补丑腻测腻苍补. Accordingly, the 笔谤补箩帽腻辫腻谤补尘颈迟腻 literature was innovative in two principal ways. First, it advocates the Bodhisattva ideal as the highest form of the religious life, and second the 鈥榠nsight鈥� it teaches is into the emptiness and non-production of phenomena (dhammas), rather than into their substantial (albeit impermanent) mode of being as previously assumed.

There are some distinctions between the 惭腻诲丑测补尘颈办补 and the Vij帽腻苍补v膩da school on the basis of the 辫谤补箩帽腻p膩rami (Skt, 辫谤补箩帽腻辫腻谤补尘颈迟腻, 鈥楶erfection of Wisdom鈥�) idea. The 惭腻诲丑测补尘颈办补 school developed the intellectual self-training through knowledge, emphasizing thereby the theoretical structure built round 辫补帽帽腻. The Vij帽腻苍补v膩da School, on the other hand, developed the inner experience through yoga accruing upon the treading of 帽腻峁嘺. For Vij帽腻苍补v膩da school, 帽腻峁嘺 represents the pure knowledge realized by the enlightenment where discriminative knowledge is converted into non-discriminative knowledge. Enlightenment consequently means a conversion from the experimental world based upon discriminative knowledge into non-discriminative knowledge. Thus, the term 帽腻峁嘺 in this context concerns the transcendental and consequential knowledge while 辫补帽帽腻 concerns the immanent and existential knowledge related to the exercise of the practitioner. It is for this reason that the knowledge of the Buddha is always represented as 鈥�Buddha帽腻峁嘺鈥� and not as 鈥�Buddha辫补帽帽腻鈥�. In short, this distinction between the 惭腻诲丑测补尘颈办补 and the Vij帽腻苍补v膩da is after all an expression merely of different emphasis of two sides to Buddhist experience, the theoretical and the inner experiential. This means that Buddhist experience involves not only seeing that the reality is 鈥榚mptiness鈥� but also seeing this in inner experience.^[6]

We have seen two types of knowledge above. It should be recalled here that direct and indirect knowledge. That knowledge originates either from the senses, perception, or the intellect, conception is called direct knowledge. That knowledge derived from language is known as indirect knowledge because it does not belong to the domain of sensation. In Sutta Ni诲腻苍补ssa峁儁atta 鈥楥onnected Discourses on Causation鈥� (Samyutta 狈颈办腻测补, Sutta number 12) in order to make bhikkhus become the noble disciples the Buddha brings out two kinds of knowledge鈥搆nowledge of the principle and knowledge of entailment. That 鈥渉e is called a noble discipline who is accomplished in view, accomplished in vision, who has arrived at this true Dhamma, who sees this true Dhamma, who possesses a trainee鈥檚 knowledge, a trainee鈥檚 true knowledge, who has entered the stream of the Dhamma, a noble one with penetrative wisdom, one who stands squarely before the door to the Deathless鈥� (Samyutta 狈颈办腻测补, Sutta number 12.33).

And the Blessed One also teaches cases of knowledge as follows:

鈥淏hikkhus, I will teach you forty-four cases of knowledge. Bhikkhus, what are the forty-four cases of knowledge? Knowledge of aging-anddeath, knowledge of its origin, knowledge of its cessation, knowledge of the way leading to its cessation. Knowledge of birth... Knowledge of existence... Knowledge of clinging... Knowledge of craving... Knowledge of feeling... Knowledge of contact... Knowledge of the six sense bases... Knowledge of name-and-form... Knowledge of consciousness... Knowledge of volitional formations, knowledge of their origin, knowledge of their cessation, knowledge of the way leading to their cessation. These, bhikkhus, are the forty-four cases of knowledge.

鈥淎nd what, bhikkhus, is aging-and-death?... (definition as above)... Thus this aging and this death are together called aging-and-death. With the arising of birth there is the arising of aging-and-death. With the cessation of birth there is the cessation of aging-and-death. This Noble Eightfold Path is the way leading to the cessation of aging-anddeath; that is, right view... right concentration. (Samyutta 狈颈办腻测补, Sutta number 12.33)

And, further, the Buddha goes on teachings the cases of knowledge:

鈥淏hikkhus, I will teach you seventy-seven cases of knowledge. Bhikkhus, what are seventy-seven cases of knowledge? The knowledge: 鈥楢ging-and-death has birth as its condition: The knowledge: 鈥榃hen there is no birth, there is no aging-and-death: The knowledge: 鈥業n the past too aging-and-death had birth as its condition: The knowledge: 鈥業n the past too, had there been no birth, there would have been no aging-and-death: The knowledge: 鈥業n the future too aging-anddeath will have birth as its condition: The knowledge: 鈥業n the future too, should there be no birth, there will be no aging-and-death: The knowledge: 鈥楾hat knowledge of the stability of the Dhamma is also subject to destruction, vanishing, fading away, and cessation.

鈥淭he knowledge: 鈥楤irth has existence as its condition:... The knowledge: 鈥榁olitional formations have ignorance as their condition: The knowledge: 鈥榃hen there is no ignorance, there are no volitional formations: The knowledge: 鈥業n the past too volitional formations had ignorance as their condition: The knowledge: 鈥業n the past too, had there been no ignorance, there would have been no volitional formations: The knowledge: 鈥業n the future too volitional formations will have ignorance as their condition: The knowledge: 鈥業n the future too, should there be no ignorance, there will be no volitional formations: The knowledge: 鈥楾hat knowledge of the stability of the Dhamma is also subject to destruction, vanishing, fading away, and cessation鈥�.

鈥淭hese, bhikkhus, are called the seventy-seven cases of knowledge.鈥�

(Samyutta 狈颈办腻测补, Sutta number 12.34)

Thus, a noble disciple has purified and cleansed the two kinds of knowledge鈥搆nowledge of the principle and knowledge of entailment鈥揾e is then called a noble disciple who is accomplished in view 鈥� one who stands squarely before the door to the Deathless.

Footnotes and references:

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[1]:

This analysis of two terms 帽腻峁嘺 and 辫补帽帽腻 is based on definitions and explanations of PED, 287 & 390 and DB, 127 & 218.

[2]:

B脩 & BB translate 脩腻峁嘺dassana as 鈥榢nowledge and vision鈥�. And this term can easily be found in AN, SNo. 4.143; and MN, SNo. 2.3; 24.2, 9; 26.18; 29.5; 30.11; 32.7; 77.12; 128.32; and 149.9. According to MA, 帽腻峁嘺dassana also refers to the 鈥榙ivine eye鈥�, the ability to see the subtle forms which are invisible to normal vision.

[3]:

The 鈥榬eviewing knowledge鈥� or 鈥�retrospective knowledge鈥� (paccavekkhana帽腻峁嘺) is one of an Arahanta鈥檚 characteristics. It is usually shown as the confirmation of his liberation by the phrase 鈥渢here comes the knowledge: 鈥業t is liberated鈥�. He understands: 鈥楤irth is destroyed, the holy life has been lived, what had to be done has been done, there is no more coming to any state of being鈥欌�� (see MN, SNo. 22.29; MLDB, n. 265).

[4]:

In PED, TRD explains the three standard stages which lead to arahanship or final emancipation as follows: (i) 蝉墨濒补-kkhandha 鈥榗ode of moral duties鈥�, (ii) 蝉补尘腻诲丑颈-kkhandha 鈥榗ode of practice of concentration and meditation鈥�, and (iii) 辫补帽帽腻-kkhandha 鈥榗ode of intellectual duties or practice of the attainment of highest knowledge鈥� (see PED, 390).

[5]:

Literally, the term 辫腻谤补尘颈迟腻 means 鈥榗rossed over鈥�. It denotes a 鈥榗ompleteness鈥�, 鈥榩erfection鈥� or 鈥榟ighest state鈥�. Early it consists of the original list of six perfections, later it was eventually increased to ten to complement the ten stages (产丑奴尘颈) of a Bodhisattva鈥檚 career. It appears these ten 惭补丑腻测腻苍补 Perfections is risen from the ten 辫腻谤补尘墨蝉 of Early Buddhism. In the later 罢丑别谤补惫腻诲补 literature such as 闯腻迟补办补蝉, 叠耻诲诲丑补惫补峁僺补 or 颁补谤颈测腻辫颈峁璦办补, the word 辫腻谤补尘墨 comes to signify the perfect virtues that a Bodhisatta must fulfill over many lives to attain Buddhahood. It is for this sense that corresponds to the Sanskrit 鈥�辫腻谤补尘颈迟腻鈥� of the 惭补丑腻测腻苍补 literature, even though the numerical lists of virtues overlap only in part (see MLDB, n. 763; and DB, 212).

[6]:

This section is most consulted from the section 鈥淭he Three Modes of Knowledge鈥� in G.H. Sasaki (1992), Linguistics approach to Buddhist Thought, pp. 90-105.