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Admitting that upamana is a valid source of knowledge (pramana), it may be pertinently asked: Is it an independent source of knowledge, irreducible to any other? This question has been answered in the negative by some systems of Indian philosophy. These systems reject the Naiyayika view of upamuna as an independent method of knowledge. We have already considered the attempt made by the Jainas to reduce it to pratyabhijna or recognition. In some other systems the attempt has been made to reduce it to perception or inference or testimony. Hence the Naiyayikas discuss the question of reducing upamana or comparison to some other pramana. According to the Buddhist logicians upamana is a valid but not an independent source of knowledge. It can be explained as a combination of perception and verbal testimony. There are two factors in upamana, namely, the knowledge of the similarity or dissimilarity between two classes of things and the knowledge of the fact that things of a certain class are denoted by a certain word. As to the first factor we see that it is obviously given by perception. When we see two things together we perceive that they are similar or dissimilar to each other. As to the second factor, namely, the knowledge of the denotation of words, it is derived from the statements of authoritative persons, i.e. testimony. Hence upamana need not be given the status of an independent source of knowledge. Now the Naiyayikas point out that the Buddhist contention rests on a complete misunderstanding of the real nature of an argument by upamana or comparison. The vital point in upamana is neither the perception of similarity nor the verbal knowledge of the denotation of a word, but the recognition of certain objects, not known before, 1 Vide Nyaya-Bhasya & Nyaya-varttika-tatparya-tika, 2. I. 43.

as belonging to a class and denoted by a class-concept. The similarity of those objects to other things may be perceived and the class-concept may be given by testimony. But the application of the concept to a particular class of things cannot be due to perception or testimony. Hence upamana cannot be reduced to perception and testimony.' 鈽� 2 3 In the Sankhya and Vaisesika systems upamana is explained as a form of inference. It is here admitted that the Naiyayika's upamana is neither the perceptual nor the verbal cognition of the similarity between two objects, e.g. the cow and the gavaya. On the other hand, upamana really aims at the knowledge of the denotation of a word or class-concept. But this can very well be explained as due to inference. Analysing the Naiyayika's upamana we get three component factors. First, there is the communication of some knowledge about the denotation of a word by authoritative state:nents. This is obviously a case of knowledge from testimony and is in the form of the sentence the word gavaya denotes animals resembling the cow.' Secondly, there is the observation of a certain animal resembling the cow. This gives us a knowledge of the animal's similarity to the cow, which is undoubtedly perceptual in character, since it is due to sense-object contact. Thirdly, there is the knowledge that the word gavaya denotes animals of the same class as this particular animal now observed. This last cognition is wrongly supposed by the Naiyayikas to be due to upamana. But it is really an inferential cognition based on the knowledge of vyapti or a universal relation between the word The inference may be gavaya and animals resembling the cow. put in the form of the following syllogisin: All animals resembling the cow are gavayas ; This is an animal resembling the cow; Therefore this is a gavay. 1 Vide Nyaya-varttika, 1: 1. 6. 2 Vide Tattvakaumudi and Avaranavarini, 5. 3 Vide Padarthadharina-samgraha, p. 109.

s against the above attempt to reduce upamana to inference, it has been pointed out by the Naiyayikas that the knowledge of the denotation of a word, which upamana aims at, is possible without the knowledge of vyapti or a universal relation between two terms. An argument by upamana or comparison does not consist in an inductive generalisation and its application to a new case. It consists in the application of a class-concept to some objects because they fit in with a given description. Upamana being thus possible without the knowledge of vyapti cannot be reduced to inference which is never possible without a knowledge of vyapti or universal relation between two things. Further, there is an unmistakable difference between the forms of the cognitions in inference and upamana. In upamana the resulting cognition is always expressed in terms of likeness, etc., while an inferential cognition is expressed in terms of the relation of ground and consequence. In inference the introspective consciousness is a feeling of the 'therefore-relation,' while in upamana it is a feeling of similarity, etc. In upamana we are not conscious of inferring but of comparing. Inference is distinguished from perception. because our cognitions are distinctly different in the two cases. Just for the same reason upamana must be distinguished from perception, inference and testimony.'