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The word upamana is derived from the words upa meaning sadrsya or similarity, and mana meaning cognition. Hence upamana derivatively means the knowledge of the similarity between two things. This derivative meaning, however, requires certain qualifications in order to give a complete definition of upamana. As a pramana, upamana is the source of our knowledge about the relation between a word and its denotation (samjna-samjnisambandha).' We have such knowledge when first we are told by some authoritative person that the word denotes a class of objects of a certain description and, secondly, finding some objects of that description we recognise them as denoted by that word. The description of the unknown objects denoted by the word is generally given in terms of their similarity to some familiar object of experience. Hence upamana is generally defined as the ground of our knowledge of a thing from its similarity to another thing previously wellknown. * Thus a man, who does not know what a gavaya or wild ox is, may be told by some forester that it is an animal like the cow. When next he meets with such an animal in the forest, he knows that it is the gavaya. But the description of the unknown objects denoted by a word may also be given in terms of their dissimilarity to certain known objects or their peculiar properties. Hence upamana or knowledge by comparison is not always due to the knowledge of similarity or dissimilarity between things. The knowledge of similarity or 2 3 1 Samjnasamjoisambandhajnanamupamitih, etc., Tarkasamgraha, 2 Vide Nyaya-sutra & Nyaya-Bhasya, 1. 1. 6. * Vide Nyaya-varttika & Nyayasutra-vrtti, I. 1. 6. P. 62.

dissimilarity is an accidental character of this or that kind of upamana. What, however, is common to all cases of upamana is the knowledge of the denotative relation between a word and a certain class of objects. Hence the Naiyayikas finally define upamana as the process of reasoning by which we know that a word denotes a certain class of objects on the basis of some authoritative statements. Analysing the process of reasoning in upamana we get the following steps. First, we have an authoritative statement (atidesavakya) that a word denotes objects of a certain description, e.g. 'the gavaya is like the cow.' Secondly, when one observes any such object, he has the knowledge that it answers to the given description (sadrsyadhi). Thirdly, there is a recollection of the descriptive statement received from authority (vakyarthasmrti). Lastly, there is the resulting knowledge that this kind of objects is denoted by the word in question (upamiti).' Thus a man, who does not know what objects are denoted by the word gavaya, may have it from some authority that the word denotes animals resembling the cow. When next he happens to find such animals, he perceives their striking similarity to the cow. Then he remembers the authoritative statement that animals resembling the cow are gavayas. With this he comes to the conclusion that the word gavaya' denotes this class of animals. It may here be asked: Which of the four factors mentioned above is the karana or operative cause of the knowledge derived from upamana or comparison? It cannot obviously be the last, since that is the resulting cognition, of which we want to know the principal cause. According to the older Naiyayikas, the first factor, namely, the descriptive statement of some authority is here the karana or special cause of the knowledge of denotation of words. The modern Naiyayikas, however, hold that the perception of similarity, etc., is the special cause whose function (vyapara) is to revive in memory 1 Vide Bhasapariccheda, 79-80.

the authoritative statement and thereby lead to the knowledge in question. A man recognises a gavaya as such just when he perceives its similarity to the cow and remembers the statement 'the gavaya is an animal resembling the cow.'