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The fourth kind of fallacy is called the sadhyasama or the asiddha. The word sadhyasama means a middle term which is similar to the sadhya or the major term. The sadhya is a character which we want to prove in relation to the paksa or the minor term. Hence the sadhyasama stands for a middle 1 Yasmat prakaranacinta sa nirnayarthamapadistah prakaranasamah, Nyaya-sutra, Yasya pratipaksabhutam hetvantaram vidyate sa prakaranasamah, sa eva satpratipaksah etc., Tarkabhasa, p. 36. I. 2. 27. 2 Vide Nyaya-Bhasya, I. 2. 7. 3 Vide Nyayasutra-vrtti, 1. 2. 6.

term which requires to be proved as much as the major term. This means that the sadhyasama middle is not a proved or an established fact, but an asiddha or unproved assumption.' The fallacy of the asiddha occurs when the middle term is wrongly assumed in any of the premises and so cannot be taken to prove the conclusion. It follows that the premises which contain the false middle become themselves false. Thus the fallacy of the asiddha virtually stands for the fallacy of false premises, which is a form of the material fallacies in Western logic. There are three main forms of the fallacy of asiddha, namely, (i) the asrayasiddha, (ii) svarupasidaha and (iii) vyapyatvasiddha." Of these, the asrayasiddha is a middle term which has no locus standi. One condition of a valid middle term is that it must be present in the minor term. The minor term is thus the locus of the middle. Hence if the minor term is unreal and fictitious, the middle cannot be related to it. The result is that the minor premise, in which the middle is related to an unreal minor, becomes false. This is illustrated in the inference the sky-lotus is fragrant, because it belongs to the class of lotus.' Here the minor term 'sky-lotus' is unreal, so that the middle class of lotus' cannot subsist in it. The middle term having no locus standi, we have a fallacy of the asrayasiddha or the baseless middle.³ f zhe 4 The svarupasiddha is a middle term which cannot be proved to be real in relation to the minor term. It is a middle term which is not found in the minor term. The existence of the middle in the minor being unreal, the minor premise which relates it to the minor term becomes false. Thus if one argues: ' sound is eternal, because it is visible,' he commits this fallacy. Here I 1 Sadhyavisistah sadhyatvat sadhyasamah, Nyaya-sutra, 1. 2. 8. * Tarkasamgraha, p. 58; Tarkabhasa, p. 31. 3 There are two kinds of this fallacy, viz. asatpaksa and siddhasadhana. The first is explained above. The second means a middle which seeks to prove a proved or undoubted fact, e.g. 'a body has limbs, because it is so perceived.' Cf. Tarkamrta, Ch. II. 4 Tarkasamgraha & Tarkabhasa, ibid. 37-(O.P. 103)

the middle term 'visible' is wrongly assumed in the minor term ' sound' and is not justified by facts. If the minor term stands for a number of things and the middle is found in some but not all of them, we have the fallacy of bhagasiddha or ckadesasiddha. To illustrate: the four kinds of atoms of earth, etc., are eternal, because they are fragrant.' Here the middle 'fragrant' is related only to a part of the minor term, namely, the atoms of earth, but not to the other kinds of atoms. Hence the middle term is partly false and so equivalent to the svarupasiddha middle. The fallacies of bhagasidaha or ekadesasiddha are therefore included within the fallacy of svarupasiddha. It includes also such other fallacies as (i) visesanasiddha, where the middle term has a false adjunct, as when one argues sound is eternal, because being a substance it is intangible,' while sound is not a substance but a quality; (ii) visesyasiddna, where the middle is an unreal substantive of a real adjective, e.g. 'sound is eternal, because it is an intangible substance'; (iii) asamarthavisesanasiddha, where the middle has an unmeaning adjunct, e.g. 'sound is eternal, because being a quality it has no cause,' in which the adjunct being a quality' has no force or sense in the argument; (iv) asamarthavisesyasiddha, where the middle is an unmeaning substantive of a significant adjective, e.g. 'sound is eternal, because it is an uncaused quality,' in which the adjective 'uncaused' renders the word 'quality' quite superfluous.' The vyapyatvasiddha is a middle term whose concomitance (vyapti) with the major cannot be proved." A valid middle term must be universally related to the major term. If a middle term is not known to be universally concomitant with the major, it becomes invalid. The result is that the major premise which should express a vyapti or a universal relation between the middle and major terms becomes materially false. The fallacy of the vyapyatvasiddha may arise in two ways. It may be due to the non-concomitance of the middle term with the 1 Vide Tarkabhasa, pp. 34-35- 鈥� Vyapyatvasiddhastu sa eva yatra hetorvyaptirnavagamyate, ibid.

major, as in the inference all reals are momentary; sound is a real, therefore sound is momentary.' Here the major premise is false, because there is no universal relation between the 'real' and the 'momentary.' Or, it may be due to the presence of an (upadhi) or condition, on which the relation between the middle and major terms depends. Here the middle term is not, as it should be, unconditionally related to the major and is, therefore, false. It is illustrated in the inference 'the hill is a case of smoke, because it is a case of fire. This inference is invalid, because the relation of the middle term 'fire' to the major smoke' is conditional on its being 'fire' from wet fuel.' This fallacy of the conditional conditional middle is technically called anyathasiddha."