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Just as inference depends on the knowledge of vyapti or a universal relation between the middle and major terms, so it depends on the relation of the middle term with the minor term. In inference the minor term becomes related to the major through its relation to the middle term. Every inference proceeds with regard to some object about which we want to establish something on the ground of vyapti or a universal proposition. Hence the minor term is as much necessary for inference as the middle term. The minor term being called paksa in Indian logic, paksata is treated as a necessary condition

of inference. If there is to be any inference, there must be a paksa or a minor term. Hence the question is: Under what conditions do we get the minor term of an inference? Or, under what conditions do we draw inference with regard to anything? While the validity of inference depends on vyapti, its possibility depends on paksata. Inference takes place when there is a paksa or subject of inference, it becomes valid when based on vyapti or a universal relation between the middle and the major term. Hence while vyapti is the logical ground of inference, paksata is its psychological ground or condition. From the fact that the minor term is an object about which we want to infer something, it will appear that the two obvious conditions of a minor term are the absence of certainty about something (siddhyabhava) and the will to infer it (sisadhayisa). The old Naiyayikas' and the Vedantists accept both of these conditions when they say that paksata consists in the presence of doubt about the sadhya or the major term (sadhyasamdeha). We have a paksa or a minor term when we are in doubt whether a certain subject is related to the sadhya or the major term. Now doubt implies not only the absence of certain knowledge about something but also a positive desire or will to know it. Hence doubt as a condition of inference involves both the absence of certainty about something and the desire to have certain knowledge about that thing. The modern Naiyayikas take exception to the above view of paksata. According to them, neither the absence of certainty nor the will to infer is a necessary condition of inference. There may be inference even in the presence of certainty. A logician may, if he so will, infer the existence of an elephant from its trumpeting voice even when he has perceived it and so acquired certain knowledge about it. Or, a man may infer the existence of the self even when he has acquired certain 1 Na nirnite'rthe nyayah pravartate kintu samsayite, Nyaya-Bhasya, I. I. I. Samdigdhasadhyadharma dharmi paksah, Tarkabhasa, p. 11. 2 Paksatvam tu sadhyasamdehavattvam saadhyagocarasadhakamanabhavavattvam va, Advaitasiddhi, p. 29.

knowledge about it from the scriptures. Again, there may be inference even when there is no will to infer, as when one involuntarily infers the existence of clouds from the roar of thunder. This case shows also that the presence of doubt is not an essential condition of inference, since there is in it no previous doubt as to the existence of clouds in the sky. Thus we see that inference takes place under the following conditions: (a) when there are absence of certainty and presence of the will to infer; (b) when there is absence of both certainty and the will to infer: (c) when there is presence of both certainty and the will to infer. But no inference takes place when there are presence of certainty and absence of the will to infer. Hence to combine the first three cases and exclude only the last, we are to say that inference takes place in all cases excepting that in which there are presence of certainty and absence of the will to infer. This is expressed by the modern Naiyayikas by saying that paksata consists in the absence of that condition in which there are the presence of certainty and absence of the will to infer.' The conditions of valid inference have of late been discussed by some Western logicians. All of them, however, do not sufficiently realise the importance of the psychological condition of inference, inference, which Indian logicians discuss So thoroughly under the theory of paksata. Russell seems to think that all that is necessary for inference is the logical condition of a relation of implication between propositions. According to him, the psychological element, namely, our knowledge of the propositions and their relation, is not a necessary condition of inference. Thus he says: 'It is plain that where we validly infer one proposition from another, we do so in virtue of a relation which holds between the two propositions whether we perceive it or not: the mind, in fact, is as purely receptive in inference as common sense supposes it 1 Sisadhayisaviraha-visistasiddhyabhavah paksata. Yatra siddhirnasti tatra sisadhayisayam satyamasatyamapi paksata. Yatra sisadhayisasti tatra siddhau satyamasatyamapi paksata. Yatra siddhirasti sisadhayisa ca nasti tatra na paksata, etc., Siddhanta-muktavali, pp. 309-10. Vide also Tarkamrta, Ch. II; Tattvachintamani, II, pp. 407-32.

to be in perception of sensible objects." Some other Western logicians like Mr. Johnson and Dr. Stebbing 2 have recognised the importance of both the logical and psychological conditions of inference. According to them, there are two kinds of conditions for any valid inference. The first kind of conditions refers to the propositions and the relations that hold between them. These conditions are said to be independent of the thinker and are called by Mr. Johnson the "constitutive conditions." In order that the proposition 9 may be formally inferred from p, it is necessary that should logically imply q and also that p should be true. The other kind of conditions refers to the relation of the propositions to what the thinker may happen to know. Since in inference a thinker passes from something known to something inferred, it follows that the propositions and their relations must be known by us. It follows also that what is inferred must not be already known as true or false. In order that q may be validly inferred from p, it is necessary that must be known to be true, and also that p must be known to imply q without its being known that q is true. is true. These conditions are dependent upon the relation of the thinker to the propositions involved in inference, and are called "the epistemic conditions" of inference. It would appear from the above that there is a consensus of opinion among logicians, both Indian and Western, that a valid inference must satisfy at least two conditions, namely, that there must be a true proposition and that it must imply another proposition. There is, however, some difference of opinion among them as to how these conditions condition inference. While a realist like Russell seems to think that they condition inference even when they are not known, Indian logicians maintain that they can condition inference only when they are known by us. According to them, while perception may be said to be conditioned by the existence of the sense organs, inference is conditioned, not by the mere fact, but by 1 Russell, Principles of Mathematics, p. 33. Stebbing, A Modern Introduction to Logic, pp. 215-16. 33-(0.P. 103)

the knowledge of something as a sign and that of its invariable relation to something else, although the reality of these things and their relation is independent of our mind.' These two views seem to be reconciled by Mr. Johnson who holds that for inference there must not only be a true proposition and a relation of implication between propositions, but that these must be known by the thinker who is inferring. With regard to what we have called the psychological conditions of inference, there is a sharp difference of opinion among logicians. The question here is: Under what conditions does inference take place? The answer given to this question by the old Naiyayikas and the Vedantins is that inference takes place when there is a doubt about what is to be inferred. This is perhaps the most plausible view that would be readily accepted by common sense. No man takes the trouble to infer or prove anything unless he is in doubt about it. This view, however, is contradicted by the inference of clouds from the sudden roar of thunder, since it is not preceded by any doubt in the mind of the thinker who infers. But then it may be said that want of certainty, if not a positive state of doubt, is the essential condition of inference. In the Advaitasiddhi this view is accepted as an alternative to the first given above, when it says that paksata consists in the absence of proof relating to what is to be inferred.² Among Western logicians, Dr. Stebbing also supports this view when she says: "Since inference is a process in which a thinker passes from something known to something inferred, it is clear that we would not say we had inferred q if we had already asserted q. It is, therefore, obvious that q must not be known to be true, and equally obvious that a must not be known to be false. There is a strong presumption in favour of this view. Inference as a source of knowledge aims at giving us certain >>3 1 Sa (vyaptih) ca sattaya caksuradivannamgabhavam bhajate kintu jnatataya, Sarvadarsanasamgraha, Ch. I. Cf. also Bhasapariccheda, 66; Vedanta-paribhasa, Ch. II. 2 Sadhyagocarasadhakamanabhavavattvam va, Advaitasiddhi, p. 29. A Modern Introduction to Logic, p. 215.

knowledge about things. So it is obvious that if we want to know anything by inference, it is because we lack certain knowledge about it. Now let us consider if the second view can explain all the cases of inference mentioned by the modern Naiyayikas. There seems to be no difficulty so far as the first two cases are concerned. In the first case (a), we have inference when there is the absence of certainty together with the will to infer, e.g. the inference of future rain from the appearance of dark clouds in the sky. In the second case (b), we have inference when there is the absence of both certainty and the will to infer, e.g. the inference of clouds from the roar of thunder. While there is the absence of certainty in both these cases, the will to infer is absent in the second. This seems to suggest that the absence of certainty is the essential condition, and the will to infer only an accidental condition of inference. But when we come to the third case, we are confronted by an exception to the rule that every inference is conditioned by the absence of certainty. Thus in case (c), we have inference when there is certainty together with the will to infer. If this be so, we have to reject the view that the absence of certainty is an essential condition of inference and recognise the importance of the will to infer as a condition of inference. But the question is: Is there really any case in which inference takes place in spite of certainty and in virtue of the will to infer? The examples cited by the Naiyayikas are rather doubtful cases. Thus it may be said that if a logician infers the existence of an elephant perceived by him, it must be because he has some doubt, however slight, about the truth of his perception. Similarly, we may say that when a person infers the existence of the self known by him through the scriptures, it must be because he is not absolutely sure of the truth of his scriptural knowledge. But there are certain cases of inference which may be taken as crucial instances. The path described by a falling body may be deduced by a physicist from certain laws of motion, even when he sees it and has no doubt about the reality of what he sees.

'We might prove, to a person who doubted the correctness of our memory, that it rained yesterday, by pointing to other facts with which rain is necessarily connected.' A lawyer may produce evidences to prove a case of which he has a personal knowledge. Some theorems of Geometry prove what is otherwise obvious or clearly perceived. At least, the geometrician who proves them has no doubt about their truth. It is true that in some of these cases there is some doubt in the mind of the person or persons for whom these inferences are made. But we must frankly admit that there is no doubt in the mind of the person who makes the inference. It cannot be said that the presence of doubt in one mind conditions the process of inference occurring in a different mind. Hence we are to admit that there may be inference in the face of certainty, only if we have the will to infer. It may, of course, he asked here: What does the will to infer aim at in such a case? To this we reply that it aims at demonstrating a known fact by showing its necessary connection with other facts. It cannot be said that the demonstrative knowledge of the fact being absent before, the inference is really conditioned by the absence of certainty. So far as the knowledge of the fact is concerned, its demonstration adds nothing to the certainty with which it was otherwise known before. Nor can we say that what the demonstrative inference proves is not that there is such-and-such a fact, but that such-and-such a fact follows from certain other facts. That a fact follows from other facts is no part of the conclusion of an inference, but a part of its grounds or premises. Hence we are to say that the conclusion of the demonstrative inference states the same fact that was previously known by perception or memory, only it arrives at the fact by way of inference. And, as Prof. Creighton says: "It is not necessary for inference that the conclusion reached should be a fact which was not hitherto known," So we conclude that the modern Naiyayikas are justified when they emphasise the function of 1 An Introductory Logic, p. 432.

will in inference, and define paksata as the absence of the condition in which there is certainty, but no will to infer.