Essay name: The Nyaya theory of Knowledge
Author:
Satischandra Chatterjee
Affiliation: University of Calcutta / Department of Philosophy
This essay studies the Nyaya theory of Knowledge and examines the contributions of the this system to Indian and Western philosophy, specifically focusing on its epistemology. Nyaya represents a realist approach, providing a critical evaluation of knowledge.
Page 271 of: The Nyaya theory of Knowledge
271 (of 404)
External source: Shodhganga (Repository of Indian theses)
Download the PDF file of the original publication
' 254 NYAYA THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE
ing to the Naiy膩yika, to know that smoke is universally related
to fire is indeed to know that 'all cases of smoke are cases of
fire.' But the knowledge we have of all fires and smokes is
mediated by the knowledge of the universals 'fireness' and
' smokeness' (s膩m膩nyalak峁峁嚹乸raty膩satti). This means that
we know all fires and smokes in so far as they participate in
fireness' and 'smokeness,' i.e. in their general character
without any reference to their specific characters. So while
the vyapli gives us a knowledge of the relation between smoke
and fire in general, an inference based on it gives us the know-
ledge of the relation of fire to a particular object, namely, the
smoky hill. The major premise of the inference 'all cases of
smoke are cases of fire' does not by itself lead to the conclusion
that there is fire in the hill. It is only when the major premise
is combined with the minor, 'there is smoke in the hill,' that
we draw the conclusion there is fire in the hill.' This shows
that the truth of the conclusion is not epistemically involved
in that of the major premise or the universal proposition.
Hence we are to conclude that inference is neither inconclusive
nor a petitio principii, since it gives us a new knowledge."
3. The psychological ground of inference (pak峁t膩)
Just as inference depends on the knowledge of vy膩pti or
a universal relation between the middle and major terms, so
it depends on the relation of the middle term with the minor
term. In inference the minor term becomes related to the
major through its relation to the middle term. Every inference
proceeds with regard to some object about which we want to
establish something on the ground of vy膩pti or a universal
proposition. Hence the minor term is as much necessary for
inference as the middle term. The minor term being called
pak峁 in Indian logic, pak峁t膩 is treated as a necessary condi-
1 TB., p. 11; TC., II. pp. 290-91.
2 Anum膩nasya dve ange vy膩pti岣� pak峁dharmat膩 ca, etc., TB., p. 11.
Vyapyasya parvat盲div峁泃titva峁� pak峁dharmata, TS., p. 46.
