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GROUNDS OF INFERENCE 253 assumes what we want to prove in the conclusion, i.e. an
inference involves the fallacy of petitio principii or begging
the question.
The above dilemma of inference has been anticipated and
solved in Indian philosophy. The solution is generally based
on the distinction between the knowledge of the universal and
that of the particulars coming under it. When we know that
smoke is always related to fire, we know them in their general
character as two universals. This does not imply that we know
the relation between all particular smokes and fires. Thus the
M墨m膩峁僺akas argue that the knowledge of vy膩pti or a uni-
versal relation between smoke and fire does not necessarily
involve any knowledge of a particular instance of fire, e.g.
the fire in a hill. When we know the universal proposition 'all
cases of smoke are cases of fire,' we do not know anything
about the hill, far less, about its relation to fire. If that were
not so, or, if we knew anything about the fire in the hill, there
could be no necessity for the perception of smoke in the hill, in
order to know the existence of the fire in it. Hence it follows
that the conclusion of the inference, namely, 'that hill is fiery,'
is a new knowledge which is not involved in the knowledge of
its premises. The Naiy膩yika view of vy膩pti as covering all
the individual cases of a relation seems to commit inference to
the fallacy of petitio principii. Thus it has been held by the
Naiy膩yika that when we know the vy膩pti or the universal
relation between smoke and fire, we know all the individual
cases of smoke to be related to fire. Otherwise, we cannot
account for the inference of fire from the smoke in a hill. If
we do not know that the hill-smoke is related to fire, we could
not possibly pass from the one to the other. But then the diffi-
culty is that if we already know the hill-smoke to be related
to fire, there is no room for an inference to arrive at a new
truth. The conclusion of such an inference will only repeat
what is already stated in the premises. This difficulty in the
Ny膩ya view of inference may however be explained. Accord-
1 Vide SD., pp. 62-63.