The Nyaya theory of Knowledge
by Satischandra Chatterjee | 1939 | 127,980 words
This essay studies the Nyaya theory of Knowledge and examines the contributions of the this system to Indian and Western philosophy, specifically focusing on its epistemology. Nyaya represents a realist approach, providing a critical evaluation of knowledge. The thesis explores the Nyaya's classification of valid knowledge sources: perception, infe...
Part 2 - Distinction between perception and inference
Perception and inference are equally valid methods of human knowledge (pramana). But while perception is independent of any previous knowledge, inference depends on previous perception. Inference is sometimes defined as knowledge which is preceded by perception." It depends on perception for the knowledge of the linga or the middle term as subsisting in the paksa or the minor term. It depends on perception also for the knowledge of vyapti or the universal relation between the middle and major terms of inference.* 1 Padarthadharina-samgraha, pp. 99 f. 2 Nyayabindu, Chapter. II. 3 Prameyakamalamartanda, p. 101. 4 Tattvakaumudi, 5; Vyasa-Bhasya, 1. 7; Sastradipika & Siddhanta-chandrika, p. 60 ; Vedanta-paribhasa, Ch. II. 5 Nyaya-sutra, 1. 1. 5. 6 Nyaya-Bhasya, I. I. 5.
t is only when we have observed two things to be always related that from the perception of the one we infer the existence of the other. Thus inference is knowledge derived from some other knowledge, while perception is not derived from any other knowledge. That is, inference is mediate and perception immediate knowledge of an object. All perception is essentially of one kind, namely, that it is a knowledge of what is given. But there are different kinds of inferences based on different kinds of vyapti or universal relation. Perception is generally due to some contact of our sense organs with the objects perceived by us. It gives us knowledge of only those objects which lie within the range of the senses. Hence it is limited to the here and the now, i.e. to present objects. Inference, on the other hand, is due to the knowledge of vyapti or universal relations among objects. It is by means of such universal principles that inference gives us a knowledge of objects beyond the reach of our senses. It extends our knowledge from the present to the past, distant and future. Ordinarily we perceive objects that are in actual contact with our senses, but we infer those that are not open to sense perception.' Perception usually excludes inference but not vice versa. What is perceived or directly known does not ordinarily require to be known indirectly by means of inference. Inference functions with regard to neither what is absolutely unknown no what is definitely known. It relates to objects that are doubtful, i.e. objects which we have reasons to believe in, but which are not yet established facts. Hence inferences generally require confirmation by means of perception."