Essay name: The Nyaya theory of Knowledge
Author:
Satischandra Chatterjee
Affiliation: University of Calcutta / Department of Philosophy
This essay studies the Nyaya theory of Knowledge and examines the contributions of the this system to Indian and Western philosophy, specifically focusing on its epistemology. Nyaya represents a realist approach, providing a critical evaluation of knowledge.
Page 252 of: The Nyaya theory of Knowledge
252 (of 404)
External source: Shodhganga (Repository of Indian theses)
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NATURE OF INFERENCE 235 It is only when we have observed two things to be always related
that from the perception of the one we infer the existence of the
other. Thus inference is knowledge derived from some other
knowledge, while perception is not derived from any other
knowledge. That is, inference is mediate and perception
immediate knowledge of an object.
All perception is essentially of one kind, namely, that it
is a knowledge of what is given. But there are different kinds
of inferences based on different kinds of vyÄpti or universal
relation. Perception is generally due to some contact of our
sense organs with the objects perceived by us. It gives us
knowledge of only those objects which lie within the range of the
senses. Hence it is limited to the here and the now, i.e. to
present objects. Inference, on the other hand, is due to the
knowledge of vyÄpti or universal relations among objects. It
is by means of such universal principles that inference gives
us a knowledge of objects beyond the reach of our senses. It
extends our knowledge from the present to the past, distant and
future. Ordinarily we perceive objects that are in actual
contact with our senses, but we infer those that are not open to
sense perception.' Perception usually excludes inference but
not vice versa. What is perceived or directly known does not
ordinarily require to be known indirectly by means of inference.
Inference functions with regard to neither what is absolutely
unknown no what is definitely known. It relates to objects
that are doubtful, i.e. objects which we have reasons to believe
in, but which are not yet established facts. Hence inferences
generally require confirmation by means of perception."
3. The Constituents of Inference
From the definition of inference (anumana) it will appear
that there must not be less than three propositions and more
1 NV., 2. 1. 31.
2 Agnerdṛṣá¹atvena saṃdehasyänudayÄt. SaṃdigdhaÅ›cÄrtho 'numiyate, TB.,
p. 8.
