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It is with some hesitation that we use the word mind for manas in connection especially with the Nyaya philosophy. In Western philosophy mind is generally taken to mean both the subject of consciousness or the self and the totality of conscious states and processes in which the self is manifested. In this sense mind corresponds roughly, not to the manas, but to the atman or soul in the Nyaya system. Of course, among European thinkers there are some, the materialists and some behaviourists, who reduce mind or self to a function of the body. Thus understood, mind stands for just what the Carvakas mean by atman or the self. In deference to the common usage of language we propose to use the word mind for manas pointing out the differences in their meaning. 1 According to the Nyaya-Vaisesikas, manas or mind is a sense like the senses of taste, smell, etc. It is an internal sense having its locus in the heart (hrdayantarvarti). In the Sankhya and Mimamsa systems also mind is treated as an internal (antara) sense." The Sankhya considers it to be an unconscious product of subtle matter (ahankara). For the Nyaya-Vaisesikas, mind is an eternal substance which is different from the physical substances. Unlike the external senses, mind is non-physical (abnautika), i.c. it is not constituted by any of the physical elements of earth, water, etc. It is not, like the external senses, possessed of any specific attribute of the physical elements, nor is it limited to the perception of any particular class of objects. As an internal sense it is concerned in all knowledge in different ways. It is atomic and exists in contact with the soul (anvatmasamyogi). The mind as a sense 1 Tarkabhasa, p. 5. 2 Tarkabhasa, p. 20. P. 36. 3 Sastradipika, 鈥� Sankhyakarika, 27.

cannot be perceived, but is known by inference (na pratyaksamapi tvanumanagamyam.)' Just as external perception depends on the external senses, so internal perception depends on an internal sense, called manas. Every perception requires the contact of an object with its special sense organ. We have perceptions of such subjective facts as pleasure, pain, desire, aversion and the like. These perceptions cannot be due to the senses of sight, hearing, etc., since they arise even without these senses. Hence there must be an internal sense to produce internal perceptions." The mind is also a condition of external perception. The external senses can perceive objects only when they are in contact with the mind. To perceive an object the mind must attend to it through the senses. We do not perceive things in a state of absentmindedness, even though our senses be in physical contact with them." So also the mind is a condition of such subjective states and processes as doubt and dream, memory and inference, etc.* Some Naiyayikas hold that although the mind is a condition of all knowledge, yet it does not act as a sense in the case of memory, inference, etc., because that will render them indistinguishable from perception. But it may be said that in memory and inference the mind gives us a knowledge of objects, not by its contact with them, but through some other knowledge, as a past experience and the understanding of a universal relation (vyapti). Hence memory and inference are not cases of perception, although they are dependent on the function of the mind as a sense." 5 That manas or the mind is and is atomic follows also from the order of succession among our cognitions. At any moment of our waking life various objects are acting upon our body. All the external senses may thus be in contact with their objects 19 (O.P. 103) 1 Nyaya-Bhasya, 1. 1. 4; Tarkabhasa, pp. 23, 30. 2 Bhasapariccheda, 57, 85. 3 Tarkabhasa, ibid. 4 Nyaya-Bhasya, I. I. 16. ³ Tattvachintamani, I, p. 550; Siddhanta-muktavali, 51. 鈥� Sastradipika, p. 36.

at the same time. But we cannot have more than one cognition at one moment. Hence it follows that the senses of smell, taste, etc., must come in contact with some internal organ in order to produce cognitions. This internal organ is manas or the mind. It has no extension or magnitude (avyapi), because it cannot come in contact with more than one thing at one time. If the mind were an extended organ, it would have had simultaneous contact with more senses than one and we could have many perceptions at one and the same time. This being not the case, we are to say that the mind is atomic (anuparimana)¹ The Vedanta view of the mind is different from those of the other systems. According to it, manas, is that function (vrtti) of the antahkarana which is concerned in the state of doubt. The saine antahkarana is called buddhi, ahankara and citta, according as it functions respectively in the states of decision (niscaya), conceit (garva) and recollection (smarana). It is the antahkarana which performs these and other mental functions, such as cognition, feeling, desire, etc. Hence by the mind we are to understand, not manas, but antahkarana as conceived by the Vedantist. According to him, the mind is not an atomic substance, but an inert principle of limited dimension (paricchinna). Although inert (jada) in itself, it manifests pure intelligence (caitanya) and is therefore regarded as intelligent in a secondary sense (jnanatvopacara). The mind is not a sense (indriya) whose existence is proved by inference from the perception of pleasure, pain, etc. Direct knowledge or perception is not due to sense-object contact. We have a direct perception of the mind when we perceive the qualities of pleasure, pain, etc., in it. And a perception of these mental states does not require any internal sense, called manas, in the other systems. 2 It is to be observed here that the view of mind as sense is not acceptable. Those who take the mind as internal sense deny that it is a physical (bhautika) thing of any kind. So the ¹ NE., 1. 1. 16, 3. 2. 60-63; Bhasapariccheda, 85. 2 Vedanta-paribhasa, Ch. I.

> 147 mind as sense cannot be a physiological apparatus like the brain or any part of it that is directly correlated to conscious processes. The mind as a non-physical sense is analogous to the inner sense conceived as a special faculty of inner experience in traditional Western psychology.' But the one is quite as unnecessary as the other to explain the facts of consciousness. It is the internal perception of pleasure, pain, etc., that is held to require an internal sense. But if by sense we mean, as the Naiyayikas do mean, a medium of contact between mind and an object, then the mind itself cannot be a medium of contact between itself and objects like pleasure, pain, etc. The medium must be something else which should be called sense and not the mind. In truth, however, no internal or inner sense' is necessary for the perception of pleasure, pain and other psychical processes. These are held by the Naiyayikas to be attributes of the self. As such, they are parts of the conscious life of the self and are, by their very nature, conscious or perceived facts. The Vedanta is right in holding that the mind (antahkarana) perceives itself and its functions without the help of any internal sense. It agrees with modern psychology in holding that mind is just the totality of conscious states and processes. It is involved in some difficulty by making conscious phenomena qualities of a material substratum. How can the antahkarana, which is inert and material in itself, become a conscious and an intelligent mind? 'By the self's relation to or reflection in it,' says the Advaita Vedantist. The self (atman), which is neither mind nor matter, is the ground of both mental and material phenomena. The Advaita Vedantist would thus agree with the new realists. who hold that mind and matter are not two opposed substances but different arrangements of the same neutral stuff. Or, as Russell has said: "Matter is not so material and mind not so mental as is generally supposed'.2 If so, mind and matter 1 Vide Klemm, A History of Psychology. 2 The Analysis of Mind, p. 36.

need not be two contradictory terms or irreconcilable opposites, but may become related to each other. Hence mental functions may belong to an apparently material substratum like the antahkarana.