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In Chapter II we have considered the different forms of non-valid knowledge (aprama). Here we are to consider the nature of valid knowledge (prama) and the general character of the method of valid knowledge (pramana). It may appear to some that the distinction between valid and non-valid or invalid knowledge is not only unnecessary but incorrect. Knowledge, in its strict sense, means a true belief that carries with it an assurance of its truth.' Hence knowledge is always true. It is a tautology to speak of valid knowledge and a contradiction to speak of 'non-valid or invalid knowledge.' The latter is no knowledge at all, since it does not stand for any belief which is true and which gives us an assurance of its truth. When we speak of prama as valid knowledge, we do not forget the strict sense of the word 'knowledge.' But the word 'knowledge' has been used in a narrow as well as a wide sense. Hence in view of the facts that the Nyaya-Vaisesikas use jnanam in a very wide sense, that they make a distinction between true and false jnanam, and that prama implies something more than knowledge in its strict sense, we propose to use the phrase 'valid knowledge for prama. As, however, we have already said, the word knowledge may be taken to mean prama according to the . context. 1 Cf. Russell, Problems of Philosophy, p. 217. 7-(0.P. 103)

rama has been defined by the Nyaya as true presentational knowledge (yatharthanubhava). It is a definite and an assured (asamdigdha) cognition of an object, which is also true and presentational in character. Hence it is that prama excludes all kinds of non-valid knowledge, such as memory, doubt, error, hypothetical argument (tarka), etc. Memory is excluded because it is not presentational (anubhava). Doubt and the rest are excluded either because they are not true or because they are not definite and assured cognitions. appears from this that prama has three main characteristics, namely, assuredness, truth and presentativeness. It As to the first, we may explain it by saying that prama or valid knowledge is a definite categorical assertion as distinguished from all indefinite, problematic and hypothetical knowledge. In prama there is a feeling of assurance or conviction in what is known. That is, valid knowledge is always connected with a firm belief. All assurances or firm beliefs, however, are not prama. In illusion (bhrama) we firmly believe in what is false. Prama implies something more than a subjective certainty. Hence the second characteristic of prama is that it is true or unerring (yathartha) knowledge. But what makes knowledge true (yathartha)? In answer to this we are told that knowledge is true when it is not contradicted by its object (arthavyabhicari). This means that knowledge is true when it reveals its object with that nature and attribute which abide in it despite all changes of time, place and other conditions." What is once true of an object is always true of it, no matter what its position in space and time may be. More definitely speaking, to know a thing truly is to know it as characterised by what is a characteristic of it (tadvati tatprakaraka). We have the truth about a thing when we judge it to be such-and-such, and it is such-and-such, i.e. as we determine it by qualities which the ¹ Nyaya-varttika-tatparya-tika, pp. 5, 21.

thing does in fact possess.' Hence, according to the Nyaya the truth of knowledge consists in its correspondence to facts. So far prama may be said to mean the same thing as knowledge in its narrow sense. Like the latter, it is a true belief which is connected with an assurance or conviction of its truth. But the Nyaya goes further and adds a third qualification to prama. According to it, prama is not only a true and an assured cognition, but also a presentational cognition (anubhava). Otherwise, memory will have to be regarded as prama. Memory-knowledge is both true and definitely believed to be true. Still it is not prama, since it is not presentative but representative cognition. What then is anubhava? To say, as some Naiyayikas have said, that anubhava is knowledge other than memory is just to beg the question. But the matter has not been left there. We are told by others that anubhava is knowledge of given facts as distinguished from those that are imagined or supplied by the mind.² Or, it may be said that anubhava is knowledge which is grounded in and due to the object itself (arthajanya). Or again, it may be said that anubhava is a cognition that follows uniformly and immediately on the presence of its special cause. This means that a cognition is presentational if it is not separated from the existence of its unique cause by any interval of time. As such, memory cannot be called anubhava, because its object is not a given fact, or because it is not due to any influence of the object, or because the impressions (samskara), out of which it arises, are not immediately antecedent to it in every case. On the other hand, perception, inference, comparison (upamana) and testimony are all cases of anubhava or presentational knowledge. That sense-perception is so, will be generally admitted. But inference and the rest also are, according to the Nyaya, pre- " 1 Cf. Lossky, The Intuitive Basis of Knowledge, p. 227: We have acquired truth only when the differentiated appearance is composed entirely of elements present in the object itself and nothing has been introduced into it from without.' " 2 Tattvamanaropitam sec. 64. rupam, tasya jnanamanubhavah, Saptapadarthi, rupam,

sentational cognitions. Even pratibha or intuitive knowledge of future events is regarded as a perception due to the object itself. The Nyaya holds that each of these is a cognition of some objective facts and is conditioned by those facts. Memory being only a reproduction of past experience cannot be said to be due to its object and is, therefore, other than presentational knowledge (anubhava).' Hence the Nyaya definition of prama or valid knowledge comes to this. Prama is a presentational cognition (anubhava), in which there is a characterisation, in thought, of the object as it is in reality (yathartha), as well as a definite assurance of its being objectively valid (asamdigdha).