365bet娱乐

Tarka is a type of implicative argument by which we may test the validity of the conclusion of any reasoning (or of any judgment). Here we ask whether any contradictions would follow if the given conclusion be accepted as true or rejected as false. If there is any contradiction in accepting it as true Ibid., pp. 369-70.

we have no doubt that it is invalid. But if in rejecting it as false we are involved in a contradiction, there can be no doubt that the conclusion must have been valid. The process of reasoning in tarka consists in the deduction of an untenable proposition from a certain position (anistaprasanga). This has the logical effect of exposing the invalidity of that position and thereby lending support to the counter-position. Thus with regard to the inference of fire from the perception of smoke, there are two alternative positions, namely, that the smoky object is fiery, and that it is not fiery. From the latter position we deduce the proposition that the object is not smoky, which is contradicted by our direct experience. This is expressed in the form of a hypothetical proposition, viz. ' if the object be fireless, it must be smokeless.' Here tarka validates the inference of fire through the deduction of an inadmissible proposition from the contrary hypothesis. The proposition is a deduction from the hypothesis in the sense that it follows from it according to a general rule. It is a general rule that whatever has a mark (the vyapya), has that which it is a mark of (the vyapaka). Now the absence of fire is a mark of the absence of smoke. Hence if it be said that there is absence of fire in the object, we cannot resist the conclusion that there is absence of smoke in it, i.e. it is smokeless. Such a conclusion, however, is contradicted by direct observation. Hence it is that tarka has been defined by the modern Naiyayikas as the process of deducing from a mark that of which it is a mark, but is false (vyapyangikarena anistavyapakaprasanjanarupah).' When the proposition established by any method of knowledge (pramana) is doubted or disputed, we should have recourse to tarka to lay the doubt or end the dispute. In tarka we take the contradictory of the proposition in the form of a hypothesis and readily see how that hypothesis leads to a contradiction. Hence tarka serves as the limit to doubt (sankavadhi). Since, however, the invalidity of a position is not a ground of the validity of its opposite, tarka is an aid or 1 Tarkabhasa, p. 32.

auxiliary (sahakari) to pramana, but not pramana by itself. Thus when on seeing a table we say: 'there is no book on the table,' we have a judgment of perception expressed in a proposition. If anyone doubts the truth of this proposition we may effectively dispel it by an argument like this: 'If there were any book on the table, it would have been perceived like the table; but it is not so perceived; therefore it does not exist.' But to argue in this way is not to know the non-existence of a book on the table. The knowledge of the book's non-existence is a matter of perception according to the Naiyayikas. Similarly, to argue that if the object be fircless it must be smokeless,' is not to know that it is fiery. The knowledge that the smoky object is fiery is acquired by means of inference from smoke as a mark of fire. The hypothetical argument only confirms this inference. Hence tarka does not originate true knowledge, i.e. is not a pramana, although it confirms a pramana which brings about the knowledge in question, i.e. is auxiliary to the pramana (pramananugrahaka).' 2 There are five kinds of tarka. These are called atmasraya, anyonyasraya, cakraka, anavastha and tadanyabadhitarthaprasanga. In all of them the logical form and character of the argument is the same, and they serve the same end of testing the validity of some reasoning or judgment. Atmasraya is an argument that brings out the inconsistency involved in a reasoning which seeks to prove that anything is dependent on itself in respect of its origin or duration or cognition. The argument may be stated in this form: 'If A is the cause of A, it must be different from itself, because the cause is different from the effect.' Anyonyasraya is an argument which brings out the contradiction involved in the judgment that two things are reciprocally dependent on each other. The argument may be stated thus: 'If A depends on B, and B depends on A, A cannot depend on B.' To say that 'B depends on A' is 1 Tarkabhasa, p. 32. 2 Nyayasutra-vrtti, 1. 1. 40.

virtually to deny that 'A depends on B.' The idea of reciprocal dependence, which is so much favoured by some Western thinkers, is rejected by the ancient Indian thinkers as self-contradictory and absurd. The third type of tarka is called cakraka. It consists in exposing the fallacy of a reasoning in which a thing is made to explain the pre-supposition of its own pre-supposition (tadapeksyapcksyapeksitva). If A is pre-supposed in B and B is pre-supposed in C, then to explain A by C is to reason in a circle, because C by its inherent limitations leads us back to A. Starting from A we are referred to C as the ground of its explanation, but to explain C we are brought back to A as its ultimate ground or basis. Here the curve of explanation makes a complete circle in so far as our thought returns to its own starting-point through two or more intermediaries. Thus if we admit that perception is pre-supposed in inference and the latter is pre-supposed in testimony, then to prove perception by testimony is to commit the fallacy of circular reasoning. This may well be exposed by a tarka like the following: 'If perception depends on testimony, it must be independent of sense-object contact.' The fourth type of larka is called anavastha. It is an argument which brings out the absurdity of an indiscriminate extension of the fallacy of undue assumption. Here we expose the fallacy involved in the indefinite regress of thought from point to point without any final resting ground (avyavasthitaparampararopa). There is an infinite regress of thought (anavastha) when in an explanation we make use of an indefinite number of principles, each of which pre-supposes its next. Here our thought moves not in a circle, but up a staircase, as it were. Thus if we explain A by B, B by C, C by D, and so on ad infinitum, we do not really explain anything. Or, if we try to deduce the ground of inference from inference we are logically committed to the fallacy of infinite regress. The fallacy may be exposed by a tarka like this: . If inference depends on inference for its ground, no inference is possible.' '

he last type of tarka is called tadanyabadhitarthaprasanga or pramanabadhitarthaprasanga. It is an argument which indirectly proves the validity of a reasoning by showing that the contradictory of its conclusion is absurd. This may be done by opposing the contradictory of the conclusion to some fact or some universal law. If, therefore, its contradictory be false, the original conclusion must be true and based on a valid reasoning. Take, for example, the inference: "Whatever is smoky is fiery; this object is smoky; therefore this object is fiery.' If this conclusion be false, then its contradictory, this object is not fiery' should be true. But the latter proposition is found to be absurd by the following tarka. 'If in the case of this object smoke is not related to fire, then it cannot be an effect of fire. But it must be due either to fire or to not-fire. There is no third alternative here. We do not find it to arise out of not-fire. Hence if it is not due to fire, it must be either an uncaused effect or a non-existent phenomenon. The first alternative contradicts the law of universal causation and is, therefore, untenable. The second alternative becomes self-contradictory, since it commits us to the proposition that the smoky object is smokeless. For, if A (smoke) be a mark of B (not-fire), and B (not-fire) were a mark of C (not-smoke), then A (smoke) would be a mark of C (notsmoke). In view of such absurdities involved in the contradictory of the original conclusion we must reject it as false and accept the original conclusion as true and as based on a valid inference. It is to be observed, however, that the Nyaya division of tarka into five different kinds is logically unsound. This division has reference to the different kinds of reasoning which may be tested by an argument like tarka. But the classification of tarka should not be based on the kinds of reasoning that may be tested by it, because these are unlimited and quite external to the nature of tarka as a type of argument. A classification of tarka must be based on the logical character of the arguments employed in different cases. Now having

regard to its logical character, we find that tarka is fundamentally of one kind. In every case in which it is employed it has the form of an inconsistent argument (anistaprasanga) developed out of the conclusion of a given reasoning or its contradictory. If this inconsistent argument arises out of the conclusion of the given reasoning, we are convinced that the given reasoning is invalid. If it arises out of the contradictory of the conclusion of a given reasoning, we know for certain that the original conclusion and the given reasoning are valid. As to its logical character, therefore, tarka seems to correspond to the antilogism in Western logic. According to some Western logicians, the antilogism is an inconsistent triad of propositions by which the validity of any syllogism may be determined. A syllogism is proved to be valid if by combining the contradictory of its conclusion with the original premises we get an inconsistent triad. If, however, the resulting triad is consistent, the original syllogism is invalid. It is also admitted by these Western logicians that the inconsistent triad, like the Naiyayika's tarka, is not itself an argument. It should however be remarked here that the logical form of the argument in tarka does not exactly correspond to that of the antilogism. Tarka is put into the form of an implicative argument, while the antilogism into that of a categorical syllogism. Again, tarka may be employed to test the validity of any reasoning, inferential or otherwise, and it may be developed out of a given conclusion or its contradictory with or without the original premises. 1 Cf. Chapman and Henle, The Fundamentals of Logic, pp. 90 and 102.