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Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration, Word-for-word and English translation of 痴补颈艣别峁�i办补 s奴tra 1.1.4:

啶оぐ啷嵿ぎ啶掂た啶多�囙�� 啶�啷嵿ぐ啶膏�傕い啶距い啷� 啶︵�嵿ぐ啶掂�嵿く啶椸�佮ぃ啶曕ぐ啷嵿ぎ啶膏ぞ啶�啶距え啷嵿く 啶掂た啶多�囙し啶膏ぎ啶掂ぞ啶�啶距え啶距�� 啶�啶︵ぞ啶班�嵿ぅ啶距え啶距�� 啶膏ぞ啶оぐ啷嵿ぎ啷嵿く啶掂�堗ぇ啶班�嵿ぎ啷嵿く啶距き啷嵿く啶距�� 啶むい啷嵿い啷嵿さ啶溹�嵿�炧ぞ啶ㄠぞ啶ㄠ�嵿え啶苦�冟ざ啷嵿ぐ啷囙く啶膏ぎ啷� 啷� 啷�.啷�.啷� 啷�

dharma惫颈艣别峁�a pras奴t膩t dravyagu峁嘺karmas膩m膩nya 惫颈艣别峁�asamav膩y膩n膩峁� pad膩rth膩n膩峁� s膩dharmyavaidharmy膩bhy膩峁� tattvaj帽膩n膩n苍颈岣ヅ况别测补蝉补尘 || 1.1.4 ||

dharmma-惫颈艣别峁�a-辫谤补蝉奴迟腻迟鈥擯roduced by a particular dharma; dravya-驳耻峁嘺-办补谤尘补-s膩m膩nya-惫颈艣别峁�a-蝉补尘补惫腻测腻苍腻尘鈥攐f Substance, Attribute, Action, Genus, Species, and Combination; 辫补诲腻谤迟丑腻苍腻尘鈥攐f the 辫补诲腻谤迟丑补蝉 or predicables; 蝉腻诲丑补谤尘测补-惫补颈诲丑补谤尘测腻产丑测腻尘鈥擝y means of resemblance and difference; 迟补迟迟惫补箩帽腻苍腻迟鈥擣rom knowledge of the essence; 苍颈岣ヅ况别测补蝉补尘鈥擳he Supreme Good.

4. The Supreme Good (results) from the knowledge, produced by a particular dharma, of the essence of the Predicables, Substance, Attribute, Action, Genus, Species, and Combination, by means of their resemblances and differences.

Commentary: The 鲍辫补蝉办腻谤补 of 艢补峁卥补谤补 惭颈艣谤补:

(English rendering of 艢补峁卥补谤补 惭颈艣谤补鈥檚 commentary called 鲍辫补蝉办腻谤补 from the 15th century)

[Full title: Knowledge of Predicates is the means of attaining the Supreme Good]

Having described the nature and characteristic of dharma in accordance with the desire of the disciples, he lays down the following aphorism for ascertaining the subject-matter and the 鈥渞elation鈥�.鈥�

Such knowledge of the essences is dependent upon the 痴补颈艣别峁�i办补 System; therefore it goes without saying that it too is a source of the Supreme Good. If, through its derivation in an instrumental sense, namely, that the essence is known by it, the word 鈥�迟补迟迟惫补箩帽腻苍补鈥� refers to the treatise, then it will not have apposition to the word 鈥榙harma-vi艣esa-辫谤补蝉奴迟腻迟.鈥� In 鈥�诲谤补惫测补-驳耻峁嘺, etc.,鈥� the compound is a 鈥榗opulative compound鈥� wherein all the words are prominent, because the knowledge of the essence of all the Predicables is the source of the Supreme Good.

Now, here the 鈥榬elation鈥� is understood to be: between the Doctrine and the Supreme Good, that of the means and the end or motive; between the Doctrine and the knowledge of the essences, that of form and matter; between the Supreme Good and the knowledge of the essences, that of effect and cause; between the Predicables, Substance, etc., and the Doctrine, that of the demonstrable and that which demonstrates. And from the knowledge of these relations, those who seek the Supremo Good apply themselves to this Doctrine, and those who desire salvation apply to it only when they realize that the sage is an 腻辫迟补 or trustworthy person.

鈥淣i岣ヅ況eyasa鈥� is final cessation of pain; and the finality of the cessation of pain consists in its non-simultaneonsness with the antecedent non-existence of pain in the same substratum, or in its simultaneonsness, in the same substratum, with the simultaneous annihilations of the special attributes of the Soul, viz., a岣嶀箾峁ａ弓a and 蝉补峁僺办腻谤补. Or, Salvation is the antecedent non-existence of pain upto the moment of the annihilation, without leaving any trace, of these special attributes.

Note鈥斺�淎ntecedent non-existence鈥�: Non-existence is fourfold, viz.

1. antecedent, e.g. of the pot before it is produced.
2. emergent, e.g. of the pot after it is destroyed.
3. reciprocal, e.g. of the characteristic of the pet in a picture and vice versa.
4. absolute, e.g. of the pot in a room where there is no pot.

It will be noticed that antecedent non-existence has no beginning; emergent non-existence has no end; and reciprocal non-existence and absolute non-existence have neither beginning nor end.

The thing of which there is non-existence, is said to be the opposite or counter-opposite (pratiyog墨) of that non-existence. In the above illustration the counter-opposite is the pot.

One kind of non-existence (e.g. of the pot) is differentiated from another kind of non-existence (e.g. of the picture), by means of the characteristics of their counter-opposites. These characteristics are therefore called determinants or differentiators (avacchedaka).

Now, mere cessation of pain is not Salvation; because there remains the possibility of rain in future and there remains also the memory of the pain that has then passed into non-reing. The cause of the possibility of pain is 补诲峁涐梗峁璦 or karma (merit and demerit); and the cause of the memory of pain is 蝉补峁僺办腻谤补 (the imprint of the experience of pain left in the soul). Salvation will result only when there is not merely the cessation of the pain actually experienced, but also the neutralisation of the causes of possible pain viz. 补诲峁涐梗峁璦 and 蝉补峁僺办腻谤补.

Not that it is not an object of volition, being incapable of achievement, because even antecedent non-existence can be brought about by the neutralisation of the cause. Nor does it thereby lose in the characteristic of being antecedent non-existence, because such characteristic remains as the characteristic of the non-existence of the producer of the opposite (i.e., the existence of pain); and to be the producer is merely its essential or general fitness to be the cause. Again, antecedent non-existence is not the last member or element, so that, it existing, the effect must necessarily appear; for if it were so, then it would follow that an effect also has no beginning. Thus, as in the absence of a contributory cause it did not produce the effect so long, so also in future it will not produce it without the co-operation of a contributory cause, the person operating to the eradication of the cause. Therefore this aphorism too upholds antecedent non-existence. Hence in the second aphorism of Gautama, 鈥淧ain, birth, activity, faults, and false notion鈥攐n the successive removal of these in turn, there is the removal of the one next preceding and thereafter salvation,鈥� (狈测腻测补 厂奴迟谤补, 1, i, 2), the statement of the non-existence of the effect on the non-existence of the cause, strengthens the idea of salvation as having the form of the antecedent non-existence of pain. Removal of activity on the removal of faults, removal of birth on the removal of activity, of pain on the removal of birth鈥攈ere removal does not mean annihilation but non-production, and that is nothing but antecedent non-existence. It is not that the opposite is not known, for the opposite is surely known in the form of pain in general. As in the case of propitiation, there too only the non-production of pain is expected through the annihilation of faults. In the world also it is seen that the removal of the snake, thorn, etc. is for the purpose of the non-production of pain. So the activity of the wise is directed only towards removing the causes of pain.

Some however say: 鈥淥nly the absolute non-existence of pain is salvation. If it is not seated in the Soul, yet, as seated in the stone, etc., it is connected with the Soul; and its connection lies in the annihilation of pain which does not accompany the prior non-existence (or potential existence) of pain; as it is found in connection with such annihilation of pain, seeing that such annihilation taking place, there arises the consciousness of the absolute non-existence of pain in that place. This being so, such texts of the Veda as 鈥淗e moves about being absolutely relieved of pain,鈥� also become explained.鈥� We reply that it is not so. Absolute non-existence of pain, being incapable of accomplishment, is not an object of voluntary activity. Nor has annihilation of pain any connection to that, since this would entail a technicality.

Note.鈥擜bsolute non-existence has neither beginning nor end. It does not therefore depend upon human will or effort. Hence it cannot be pursued as an object of desire. You may say that, as long as it is not accomplished in the Soul, as the connection of that which is not connected with it,鈥攕uch connection taking the form of the annihilation of pain which does not coexist with the antecedent non-existence of pain鈥攕o long surely it is an object of desire. But to this also there is an objection; viz., that the annihilation of pain does not form such a connection, as it is not co-extensive with the soul. To hold otherwise, would be to put a new interpretation upon the word 鈥渃onnection鈥� (Sambandha).

The text of the Veda 鈥淗e moves about being absolutely relieved of pain鈥� implies that, by way of the neutralization of causes, prior non-existence of pain may be reduced into a condition similar to that of the absolute non-existence of pain.

It may be said, 鈥淭his is not an object of the will, as it is not an object of desire which is not subject to another desire, because those only who seek pleasure, become active in the removal of pain, seeing that pleasure is not produced at the time of pain.鈥� But this is not so; because it is equally easy to say the contrary also. Will not desire for pleasure also be subject to the desire for the absence of pain? seeing that men overwhelmed with grief as well as those who turn their faces away from pleasure, having in view only the absence of pain, are-inclined to swallowing poison, hanging themselves, etc..

Neither can it be said, 鈥淓ven if it is an object of the will, it is so only because it is an object of cognition. But salvation as absence of pain is not even an object of cognition. Otherwise (i.e., if to be an object of cognition were not a necessary condition of being an object of the will) men would be in dined to bring about the state of swoon, etc. For that which is capable of being known from the Veda and by inference-cannot be reasonably said to be unknowable. For there are the texts of the Veda: 鈥淗e moves about being absolutely relieved of pain,鈥� 鈥淏y knowing Him only one transcends death,鈥� etc. There is inference also: The series of pain is finally or absolutely rooted out, because it is a series like a series of lamps; and so on. It can be known by perception also, since final annihilation of pain for a moment becomes the subjectmatter of thought in the realization of pain in consciousness (in the-moment prior to death) and (if you do net admit this), also because the yogins perceive the future annihilation of pain by virtue of the power born of concentration (yoga).

It cannot be said, 鈥淪till, the loss and gain being the same, it is not the object of the will, since with pain, pleasure is also removed, the removal of both being due to the same set of causes鈥�; for men naturally dispassionate and fearful dark days of suffering and who overestimate every glow-worm of; leasure, are active to that end.

It cannot again be said, 鈥淐essation of pain is still not the object of the will; because cessation of j ain which is yet to come, is impossible, pain which is ast is in the past, and pain which is present will cease even without an effort of the person鈥�; for the activity of the person is towards the eradication of causes, as in pecances. Thus, false knowledge attended with desire, is the cause of 厂补峁僺腻谤补, i.e., succession of mortal existences; it is rooted out by the knowledge of the truth about the Self; and knowledge of the truth about the Self is producible by the practice of Yoga; hence activity in this direction is justified.

It cannot be said that only the manifestation of permanent pleasure is salvation, and not the absence of pain; for there is no proof that pleasure can be permanent; if there were such proof the i the manifestation of pleasure being constant, there would be no difference between a worldly and an other-worldly or liberated man, a id also manifestation being a product or effect, on its termination there will again follow 厂补峁僺腻谤补 or stream of mortal existence.

It cannot be said that salvation consists in the laya or disappearance of the 闯墨惫腻迟尘腻 or embodied Self into the 叠谤补丑尘腻迟尘腻 or un-embodied or universal Self; for if laya means amalgamation, then there is an obstacle, as two do not become one. It cannot be explained that laya means the removal of the subtle embodiment composed of the senses and of the physical organism; for hereby the absence of the causes of pain being implied, it follows that the absence of pain alone is salvation.

Hereby the doctrine of the 贰办补诲补峁囜笉颈苍蝉 (a sect who carry staffs consisting of single sticks) that salvation means the remaining of the pure Self after the cessation of Nescience or false knowledge and that Self is by nature true knowledge and happiness, is also refuted, because there is no evidence that the Self is knowledge and happiness. The text of the Veda 鈥�Brahman is eternal, knowledge, and bliss,鈥� is no evidence, because it proves possession of knowledge and possession of bliss. For we have the perceptions 鈥淚 know,鈥� and 鈥淚 am happy,鈥� but not the perceptions 鈥淚 am knowledge鈥� and 鈥淚 am happiness.鈥� Moreover, Brahman being even now existent, it would follow that there is no distinction between a liberated and a worldly man. The cessation of 础惫颈诲测腻 or false knowledge is also not an object of the will. Brahman also, being eternal, is not a 蝉腻诲丑测补 or what has to be accomplished. The realization of Brahman within the Self, having Him as the object, is not a 蝉腻诲丑测补 or what has to be accomplished. Similarly bliss also, having Him as its essence or object, is not a 蝉腻诲丑测补. For these reasons activity directed towards Him is not justified.

It cannot be said that salvation lies in the purity or unimpeded flow of the stream of consciousness. For if by purity is meant the removal of such impediments as pain, etc., then this much alone being the object of the will, there is no reason for or proof of the survival of the stream of consciousness. Moreover, the retention or survival of the stream of consciousness can be possible only by means of the body, etc., and hence in this view the retention of 蝉补峁僺腻谤补 or the stream of mortal existence also would be necessary.

It is therefore proved that cessation of pain as described above is alone the Supreme Good.

In 鈥榢nowledge of the essence鈥� the genitive has been used in the place of the accusative. The third case-ending in 鈥楽膩dharmya-Vaidharmy膩-产丑测腻尘鈥� shows the mode (of knowledge). Of these 鈥楽膩dharmya鈥� means recurrent property and 鈥榁aidharmya鈥�, divergent property. Although a property which is recurrent in one place is divergent in another, and vice versa, still knowledge in the shape of recurrent and divergent properties, is here intended.

Here the enumeration itself of the Predicables, Substance, etc., has. come to be their division, which has the effect of excluding a more or less number. Therefore it follows that as a rule Predicables are only six in number. And this is not proved. If any other Predicable which requires to be excluded is known then the rule does not stand good; if it is not known, then the exclusion is invalid. It cannot be said that this is not the exclusion of the addition of something else but the exclusion of non-application; in other words, that the nonapplication of the characteristics of the six to all predicables or things is excluded. For all known predicables having been included by the word 鈥楶redicable,鈥� there is here then the fault of proving over again, and also that something else is not known. Moreover, which is to be excluded, non-application of the characteristics jointly or their nonapplication severally? In the first alternative, joint non-application prevails everywhere, so that there can be no exclusion. It cannot be said that in the second alternative also there can be no exclusion as with reference to one another their individual non-application prevails everywhere; for the purpose of the rule is to exclude the non-application of the characteristics of the six, when, according to others, they do not apply to Energy, Number, Similarity, and other Predicables recognised by them. Therefore the meaning of the rule that Predicables are only six in number is that in all perceptible objects, there is application of one or other of the characteristics of the six, and not that there is non-application. Now. 鈥榦nly,鈥� if it goes with the noun, it means exclusion of the addition of something else; if it goes with the adjective, it means exclusion of non-application; and if it goes with the verb, it means exclusion of absolute non-application. Here according to some 鈥渙nly鈥� has all this three-fold significance; while others say that its force lies in mere exclusion and that non-application, addition of something else, etc., are things to be excluded, which are derived by association.

鈥淧roduced by a particular dharma鈥� is the adjective of 鈥渒nowledge of the essence.鈥� Here 鈥減articular dharma鈥� means piety characterised by forbearance or withdrawal from the world. If by 鈥湷俨钩俪俦共孤崦蹦宀圆光�� explained as 鈥渂y this essence is known.鈥� the treatise (i.e., the Aphorisms of 碍补峁嚹乨补) is meant, in that case it should be said that 鈥減articular dharma鈥� means the grace of and appointment from God, for it is heard that the great sage 碍补峁嚹乨补 composed this System by obtaining the grace of and appointment from God. In the aphorism by 鈥渒nowledge of the essence鈥� the realization of the truth about the Self in the understanding is intended, because such realization alone is competent to root out false knowledge attended with desire. 鈥淏y knowing Him only one transcends death, no other road is known (vidyate) for travelling,鈥� 鈥淭wo Brahmans have to be known (yeditavye),鈥� 鈥淗aving no eyes He yet sees, etc.鈥濃�攊n all these passages the word vedana has the sense of realization in the understanding, and the use of the fifth case-ending in the causal sense in the word 鈥槼俨钩俪俦共孤崦蹦宀阅宄兮�� indicates that such realization of the Self comes in the progressive career of hearing from the 艢腻蝉迟谤补蝉, thinking within oneself, meditation, etc.,鈥�4.

Commentary: The 痴颈惫峁泃颈 of Jayan膩r膩ya峁嘺:

(English extracts of Jayan膩r膩ya峁嘺 Tarkapa帽c膩nana鈥檚 痴颈惫峁泃颈 or 鈥榞loss鈥� called the 碍补峁嚹乨补s奴traviv峁泃i from the 17th century)

鈥楧harma惫颈艣别峁�apras奴t膩t鈥� means produced by a particular (goo conduct, virtue or) merit, acquired in this life or in previous, births. It is the qualification of 鈥槼俨钩俪俦共孤崦蹦宀阅宄兮�� (knowledge of essence). As pointed out by the author of 惭耻办迟腻惫补濒墨, 鈥楽膩dharmya鈥� means common property, and 鈥榁aidharmya鈥� means opposing (i.e., distinguishing) property. The use of the third case-ending indicates manner. The fifth case ending in 鈥槼俨钩俪俦共孤崦蹦宀阅宄兮�� has the sense of applicability. Thus the meaning is: By particular virtue knowledge of essence is produced by means of the generic and specific properties of the Predicables, Substance and others; thereafter is produced 鈥榠ntellectual conception鈥� of the Self, and next comes the realization of the Self in the understanding by constant meditation; after this liberation follows in the train of the removal of false knowledge, etc., (Vide 狈测腻测补 厂奴迟谤补, I. i. 2.)

The author of the 鲍辫补蝉办腻谤补 has however said: The word 鈥槼俨钩俪俦共孤崦蹦宀圆光�� in the aphorism conveys the principal idea of the realization of the Self in the understanding; or, if it is interpreted in the instrumental sense, it refers to the treatise which is the (instrument or) means of such realization. In the first of these cases, the word 鈥榙harmma惫颈艣别峁�a鈥� will mean that dharma the characteristic of which is forbearance (苍颈惫峁泃迟颈); and in the latter case it will mean a particular virtue or merit in the form of the grace of and appointment from God, according to the tradition that the great sage 碍补峁嚹乨补 composed this treatise under the grace and appointment of God. And as the causal use of the fifth case-ending bears the sense of applicability, the realization of the Self in the understanding will follow from the treatise through the chain of intellection, constant meditation, and soon, for the word knowing in such texts of the Veda as 鈥淏y knowing Him only one transcends death,鈥� 鈥淭wo Brahmans have to be known,鈥� etc., denotes realization in the understanding (i.e., spiritual intuition), and alone is competent to root out false knowledge together with desires.

This should be considered. If the word 鈥槼俨钩俪俦共孤崦蹦宀圆光�� in the aphorism denotes the realization of one鈥檚 Self in the understanding which counteracts false knowledge together with desires, then it would follow that the expression 鈥榖y means of generic and specific properties鈥� as well as the term, 鈥榦f the Predicables,鈥� bearing the sense of the sixth caseending, have no syntactical connexion. For in the matter of the realization of the Self in the understanding there is neither the modality of the generic and specific properties, nor the materiality or substantiveness of the six Predicables; because they do not exist there, as they are distinct form the body, etc., whereas the realization of the Self in the understanding is only competent to root out desires, etc., which are not distinct from the body, etc. It cannot be said that in the state of the representation of separateness from the other (i.e., the Not-Self) in the Self by the virtue born of Yoga (concentration), knowledge of the six Predicables, namely Substance, etc., by means of their generic and specific properties, is also produced through their temporary contiguity, inasmuch as the subject-matter of such knowledge (i.e., the Predicables, etc.) appears there for the time being. For notwithstanding that such representation contains such indifferent generic property, etc., within itself, since it is not necessary for the real purpose in view, the description of it by the revered sage will mean so much mad talk on his part.

Again, the venerable author of the 鲍辫补蝉办腻谤补 has brought forward the texts 鈥淏y knowing Him alone, etc.鈥� as being evidence that the realization of the Self in the understanding is the cause of liberation. That too has been improper. For the Supreme Self alone being implied by the text, 鈥�1 know Him, the Great Person, of the colour of the Sun, beyond the reach of darkness,鈥� the word 鈥榯at鈥� (that) has reference to the Supreme Self, and therefore it cannot refer to the 闯墨惫腻迟尘腻 (Subordinate or Embodied Self) which has not been so implied. So much for the sake of brevity.

Here the enumeration of six Predicables has been made under the view of Existence or Being. In fact Non-Existence or Non-Being also has been intended by the sage to be another Predicable. Hence there is no impropriety either in the aphorism 鈥淣on-existence of effect, from non-existence of cause鈥� (I. ii. 1) of the second chapter or in such aphorisms as 鈥淔rom non-existence of qualification by Action and Attribute鈥� (IX-i-1) of the Ninth Book. Accordingly in the 狈测腻测补-L墨l膩vat墨. it has been said: 鈥淣on-existence also should be stated as conducive to the Supreme Good, like the modifications of Existence. This conduciveness is proved by the fact that the non-existence of the effect follows from the non-existence of the cause in all cases. In the 顿谤补惫测补办颈谤补峁嚹乿补濒墨 also, 狈测腻测补 teachers have admitted that Non-Existence is the seventh Predicable, in the passage ending thus: 鈥淎nd these Predicables have been mentioned as being the principal ones. Non-Existence, however, although it possesses a form of its own, has not been mentioned, not that it is something negligible, but because its ascertainment is dependent upon the ascertainment of its opposite.鈥� Thus the knowledge of the generic and specific properties of the seven (and not six only) Predicables is conducive to the Supreme Good; and that conduciveness, it should be observed, lies in the mode of knowledge of marks (濒颈峁単补), etc., in the matter of the establishment of separateness from the Not-Self in the Self.

The Supreme Good, according to the views of the 狈测腻测补, 痴补颈艣别峁�i办补, and 厂腻峁卥丑测补 philosophies, consists in the permanent cessation of pain, and results as the annihilation of pain, which is not synchronous with pain co-existent with itself. In fact, annihilation of ultimate pain is non-synchronus with pain co-existent with itself, since no pain can at that moment arise in the liberated Soul. With a section of the 狈测腻测补 thinkers, salvation means permanent cessation of demerit only, because, in their view, this only can be directly accomplished by the realization of the Self in the understanding, as the Veda says, 鈥淎nd his actions wear off when he sees that High-and-Low (惭耻峁囜笉补办补 2, 2, 8).鈥� In the opinion of the one-staffed Ved膩ntin, salvation lies in the cessation of nescience, and nescience is (with him) a different Predicable. In the opinion of the three-staffed Ved膩ntin, salvation means the disappearance of the Embodied or finite Self in the Great Self, and results as the cessation of the 鲍辫腻诲丑颈 or external condition of the 闯墨惫补 (Embodied Soul), and of the causal body. Causal body again has been proved to be 鈥渢he organic combination of the five life-breaths, mind, understanding, and ten senses, arising from the elements which have not been compounded (i.e., redintegrated), possessing subtle limbs, and being the means of experience (i.e., bhoga)鈥�. The 叠丑补峁�峁�补蝉 however say that salvation consists in the manifestation of eternal happiness, and that eternal happiness, though evidenced by the Veda and penetrating all living beings (闯墨惫补), is unmanifest in the state of transmigration (厂补峁僺腻谤补), and becomes manifest to the sense, immediately after the realization of the truth about the Self in the understanding. The possible defects in these views are not shown here for fear of increasing the volume of the book. But in all the views the permanent cessation of pain in the state of salvation remains uncontradicted. And that is our point.

Now, it may be contended, 鈥淭here are additional Predicables such as Energy, Similarity, etc. How else can it be explained that in the vicinity of the jewel, etc., burning is not caused by that which causes burning and is caused when it is not in the vicinity鈥�? Therefore it must be imagined that the jewel, etc., counteract the burning energy of that which causes burns, and that the inciting removal of them revivifies it. In like manner, Similarity also is a different Predictable. For it does not fall within the six forms of existence, as it equally applies to them all, since such similarity as in 鈥淎s bovine-ness is eternal, so also is horseness,鈥� is perceived. Nor is it a non-existence, as it appears in the form of an existence.鈥� But our reply is that reconciliation being possible by the mere suppostion of the self-activitv of fire, etc., existing away from the jewel, etc., or the supposition of the absence, etc., of jewel, as the cause of burning, etc., it is not proper to imagine infinite Energy, its prior non-existence, and its annihilation. It should not be asked again how there can be burning even in the close presence of a powerful jewel, because that supposition has been made only of the absence of jewels in general, which are powerful but remote, in the same way, Similarity also is not different Predicable, but denotes that, while one thing is quite distinct from another thing, the one possesses the majority or the chief of the attributes belonging to the other; as the Similarity of the moon in the face, means that the face which is quite distinct from the moon, possesses the cheerfulness, and other attributes belonging to the moon. This in brief.

Commentary: The 叠丑腻峁�y补 of 颁补苍诲谤补办腻苍迟补:

(English translation of 颁补苍诲谤补办腻苍迟补 罢补谤办腻濒补峁卥腻谤补鈥檚 叠丑腻峁�y补 called the 痴补颈艣别峁�i办补bh膩峁�ya from the 19th century)

(1) Dharma presents two aspects, that is, under the characteristic of 笔谤补惫峁泃迟颈 or wordly activity, and the characteristic of 狈颈惫峁泃迟颈 or withdrawal from wordly activity. Of these, Dharma, characterised by 狈颈惫峁泃迟颈, brings forth 迟补迟迟惫补-箩帽腻苍补 or knowledge of truths, by means of removal of sins and other blemishes.

(2) Here the separate enumeration of 厂腻尘腻苍测补, etc., is unnecessary, on account of their non-divergence; for, 厂腻尘腻苍测补, etc., falling, as they do, within Substance, etc., do not differ from the latter. Their separate mention, however, is justified on the possibility of difference in the mode of treatment adopted by the author. Systems, differing in their methods, are taught for the benefit of embodied souls, differing from one another. This is, then, the 痴补颈艣别峁�i办补 System, of which the distinctive features are 厂腻尘腻苍测补, etc., as are, in the other (狈测腻测补) System, Doubt, etc., although they are included in the Proof and the Provable, respectively. Accordingly, this System is enabled to stand apart by mens of 厂腻尘腻苍测补 and the other Predicables; and so it is called the 痴补颈艣别峁�i办补 System. Otherwise it would be merely an 鲍辫补苍颈峁�a迟 teaching 础诲丑测腻迟尘补-惫颈诲测腻, Philosophy of the Embodied Self. * * * * * 鈥楽am膩nya峁冣�� means possession of similarity. * * * Doubt and Error arise from (observation of) 厂腻尘腻苍测补峁� and from non-observation of 痴颈艣别峁�a (or distinctive) peculiarity. Observing the common properties, altitude and extension, of a pillar and a person, and remaining ignorant of their differentia, one feels the doubt whether it be a pillar or a person; error also arises in this way: observing the common property only and in consequence of fault or imperfection, one mistakes a pillar for a person or a mother of pearl for a piece of silver. False cognition, again, is the root of all suffering. It is for this reason that 鈥槼�腻尘腻苍测补鈥� has been separately mentioned, notwithstanding that it is included in Substance, etc. 鈥槼站迸洷疳梗a鈥� is that by which a thing is reduced to itself. False cognition which springs from (observation of only) the common property is corrected by the observation of the distinctive property: whence arises correct knowledge, which is called tattva-箩帽腻苍补. * * * For this reason 鈥槼站迸洷疳梗a鈥� is separately mentioned, although it is included in Substance, etc. If, again, it is a single reality that, being determined in particular ways, comes to be used as 鈥槼�腻尘腻苍测补鈥� and 鈥槼站迸洷疳梗a,鈥� then it falls within (the class of) Attributes. Or, if these are mere technical names, then they are not additional Predicables. 鈥�厂补尘补惫腻测补鈥� means complete approximation, i.e., indentification: as it has been said, 鈥槼Р钩静贡鼓宀獠光�� is inseparable existence. * * * 鈥槼Р钩静贡鼓宀獠光�� is an attribute, which is the counter-opposite of Separateness, either characterised as plurality or characterised as difference in kind. It inheres in. Substance, and does not possess Attribute; nor is it a form of Action. Now, birth means a particular conjunction (of the Self) with the body, the senses, and the feelings. Thereafter the 闯墨惫补 errs that the Self has no separate existence from the body, etc., in consequence of which a person transmigrates and suffers a multitude of pains, and on the cessation of which he is liberated, the stream of his sufferings being dried up. Hence 鈥槼Р钩静贡鼓宀獠光��, though included in Attributes, is separately mentioned.

(3) There are other Predicables also, viz., 辫谤补尘腻峁嘺, Proof; prameya, Provable; 蝉补峁兣沘测补, Doubt; prayojana, Purpose; 诲峁涐梗峁�膩n迟补, Instance; 蝉颈诲诲丑腻苍迟补, Tenet; avayava, Member (of a syllogism); tarka, Confutation (or Reasoning); 苍颈谤峁嘺测补, Ascertainment; 惫腻诲补, Discussion; jalpa, Wrangling; 惫颈迟补峁囜笉腻, Cavilling; 丑别迟惫腻产丑腻蝉补, Fallacy; chala, Equivocation; 箩腻迟颈, Showing the futility of the mark of inference; and 苍颈驳谤补丑补-蝉迟丑腻苍补, Ground of Defeat or Opponent鈥檚 Error. These too come under the Predicables of 碍补峁嚹乨补.

(4) The Supreme Good results from knowledge of truth about the Self, etc., while knowledge of truth about the rest is auxiliary to it. False knowledge about the Self, etc., is of various kinds, e.g., the sense of Non-Ego in the Ego, the sense of Ego in the Non-Ego.