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S. Dasagupta writes "Samanya is the fourth category. means the genus or aspect of generality or sameness that we notice in things. Thus, in spite of the difference of colour between one cow and another, both of them are found to have such a sameness that we call them cows. In spite of all diversity in all objects around us, they are all perceived as Sat or existing. The sat or existence is thus a sameness, which is found to exist in all the three things, Dravya, Guna and Karma. The sameness is called Samanya or Jati, and it is I }} regarded as a separate thing which rests on Dravya. Guna and Karma. ,,,277 278" The Jati according to the Tarkikas, is the property

76 which is peculiar to a class and distinguishes it from all others. It is an essential characteristic of species as Gotva of cows, Asvatva of horses and the like. 279 It is a And common and equally applicable property of the entities. it is being referred to by similar terms. According to them Jati is that which helps to recognise the entities as similar. 280 In connection with the exact meaning of the Jati, Vadiraja poses following questions: Is it a single means of dealing? Or is it endowed with one property? or is it of single formed and is it an object of expression with synonymous words? 281 He opines that the first option is not acceptable to both since, it is well experienced fact that even the entities of similar type are dealt with and referred 'to separately as "It is a pot, this is a pot, that is a pot" and the like. So, on the basis of dealings, the Jati cannot be proved. And the second view is not sound since the expressive dealing in terms will not lead to any identity. As it does not prove the identity, even the third view stands baseless. Because the different and variegated dealings ascertain the fact that there are different and variegated properties. Thus, this discards the claim that the common property of zhou similar kind and of the same magnitude must be there in all the entities of that class. So oneness of common property as Jati cannot be entertained. The difference is distinct

1 77 in all respects; e.g. the offering of Bali for devils and others differs from one to another of the same class. Since it depends upon the individual capability, it is not governed 282 by a common property of any kind. } If it is argued that the Jati of one class is single and the parts of it are manifested individually in each entity of that class, then it appears that the each entity is the part of that and this proves the absence of an entity of complete Jati. Then all the pots become only potsherds (Chata-amsas) and there cannot be a complete pot. 283 This also causes impropriety so far as the usage and dealing are concerned, So the view that the Jati is one in the entities of the same class, is not tenable. The Ghatatva of one Ghata is peculiar and is related with that Ghata only. Hence, Jatis are to be admitted as innumerable even in one single class of entities. Each entity is governed by its own Jati. And if it is referred to with one word for the sake of usage and dealing, there is nothing wrong. Because, this does not prove the common property of the entities of one class. The usage with single word is for the convenience of easy dealing and it does not help to prove any Jati. The property, (Dharma) though appears as if present in all the entities

1 } L 78 of that same class, is distinct on account of the difference in entities as shown above. It may also be held that the similar objects, subject to the similar and common usages and dealings, would be the Vyanjakas and that common and innate property, lying there and which is suggested by the objects, is Vyangya and that is termed Jati. In the expressions, 'This is Chata (pot)', *That is Chata:' Chatas (pots) are similar and they are Vyanjakas and these Vyanjakas denote the common and innate property Ghatatva which is Wangya. 1 He But, Vadiraja says that this view is not correct. advocates counter argument questioning that if on account of similar, common dealings and usages, a common. a common innate property (Jati) is traced and admitted then, what is unsound if distinct and manifold properties are traced and admitted for similar and common dealings. 284 Moreover, according to the Tarkikas, expressions are not Nitya and they differ from time to time and place to place even with respect to similar objects. And hence these distinct expressions cannot prove a single common innate property related to all entities of that class. According to the Tarkikas, even the entities of same

class are different. each other. And these entities cannot be held as causes for the apprehension of single, common innate property. Because, as entities (here, marked with the fact of being cause), that are held causes, are manifold and distinct each other, the differentiating characteristic attribute (Karanatavacchedakadharma) is also manifold and distinct, If Chatas, as Karana, are manifold and distinct, then the fact of their being causes, Karanata is also manifold. When Karanata is manifold, it is evident that the differentiating characteristic attribute (innate property Karanatavacchedakadharma distinct. 285 1 Ghatatva) is also manifold and " Further, if the Jati is taken to be one, then what happens to that Jati, when an entity of that class gets 1 affected. . When a Ghata is broken, then what happens to that Ghatatva? Either the part, manifested, or the complete Jati, should get affected. But it never happens. Thus, the acceptance of the Jati in this sense, leads to such manifold absurdities.