365bet娱乐

According to the Sankhya, truth and falsity are inherent in knowledge. A knowledge is both made true or false and known to be true or false by the conditions of the knowledge itself. Validity and invalidity cannot be produced in any knowledge ab extra, but must belong to it ab initio. The one is as much intrinsic or internally conditioned as the other. Hence knowledge must have validity or invalidity on its own account and, as such, these must be self-evident. This view follows from the Sankhya theory of the pre-existence of effects (satkaryavada). According to this, causation is only manifestation of the effect that potentially pre-exists in the cause. A cause can produce only that effect which is inherent in the causal complex. Otherwise, any cause will produce any effect, even the unreal and the fictitious. Hence the validity or invalidity of cognitions as causally determined effects must be regarded as somehow inherent in the cognitions. This means that validity and invalidity are inherent 12-(O.P. 103) 1 Nyaya-Bhasya, 2. I. 12-16.

in knowledge. Thus the validity and invalidity of knowledge are self-evident.' The Sankhya view has been criticised by the Nyaya and the Mimamsa. The latter points out that the theory of causality, on which the Sankhya view of the validity and invalidity of knowledge rests, is itself untenable. Causation or effectuation has no meaning if what is caused is pre-existent and so need not really be caused or produced. Causation must be a process of real effectuation, i.c. it must be the production of the new or the previously non-existent effect. Further, it is a contradiction to say that both validity and invalidity belong to the same thing, namely, knowledge. How can such contradictory characters belong to the same thing? It cannot be said that while validity is intrinsic to valid knowledge, invalidity is intrinsic to invalid knowledge. Apart from any external conditions, a knowledge cannot determine itself either as valid or invalid. If validity and invalidity are equally intrinsic to knowledge, it must have both at the same time.2 The Naiyayikas reject the Sankhya view on the ground that it fails to account for the failure of practical activities (pravrttivisamvada). If the validity of knowledge be self-evident, there cannot be unsuccessful activity. If its invalidity be self-evident, there cannot be any activity at all. The cognition of silver in a shell must be either valid or invalid. If it is valid and known to be valid by itself, then the act of picking it up should not lead to disappointment. On the other hand, if it is invalid and known to be invalid by itself, no one should strive to pick it up. But illusions and disappointments are ordinary and frequent experiences of life. Hence neither the validity nor the invalidity of knowledge is intrinsic and self-evident." 1 Sastradipika & Siddhanta-chandrika, p. 20; Nyayamanjari, p. 160. 2 Sastradipika & Siddhanta-chandrika, pp. 20-21; Manameyodaya, p. 75. ³ Nyayamanjari, p. 160; Tattvachintamani, I, p. 184.