365bet娱乐

TEST OF TRUTH AND ERROR 89 called the knowledge of object (pram盲), the object of know-
ledge (prameya) and the operative cause of knowledge (pra-
m膩峁嘺), just as the same word may be subject and predicate in
different relations and positions. Hence the question of the
time-relation between knowledge and the object of knowledge
does not necessarily lead to the denial of all knowledge.
Further, scepticism, if it is to be consistent, cannot really
deny the possibility of knowledge. To deny knowledge is to
disbelieve it. But to disbelieve is to know that something is
not true. Hence the denial of knowledge must have a posi-
tive basis in some kind of knowledge. But it is a contra-
diction to deny knowledge by means of knowledge. This is
the Naiy膩yika's reductio ad absurdum of scepticism.'
4. Criticism of the Sankhya view of intrinsic validity
and invalidity
According to the Sankhya, truth and falsity are inherent
in knowledge. A knowledge is both made true or false and
known to be true or false by the conditions of the knowledge
itself. Validity and invalidity cannot be produced in any
knowledge ab extra, but must belong to it ab initio. The
one is as much intrinsic or internally conditioned as the
other. Hence knowledge must have validity or invalidity
on its own account and, as such, these must be self-evident.
This view follows from the Sankhya theory of the pre-existence
of effects (satk膩ryav膩da). According to this, causation is
only manifestation of the effect that potentially pre-exists in
the cause.
A cause can produce only that effect which is
inherent in the causal complex. Otherwise, any cause will
produce any effect, even the unreal and the fictitious. Hence
the validity or invalidity of cognitions as causally determin-
ed effects must be regarded as somehow inherent in the cog-
nitions. This means that validity and invalidity are inherent
12-(O.P. 103)
1 NB., 2. I. 12-16.