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From our foregoing discussion it is clear that 罢补谤办补蝉补峁僩谤补丑补 of 础苍苍补峁僢丑补峁�峁�补 is an excellent work on the philosophy of 狈测腻测补-痴补颈艣别峁�i办补 which may be regarded as a door to the system. 础苍苍补峁僢丑补峁�峁�补鈥檚 work is easy and simple. Because of its simplicity of style and lucidity of language this book is invariably prescribed for the beginners by the Universities of India. The work itself is not a detail one and 础苍苍补峁僢丑补峁�峁�补 has not discussed the 狈测腻测补-痴补颈艣别峁�i办补 categories very elaborately. It is found that he has not endeavoured to criticize any opponent view in this work. Even definitions are put forward very minutely as has been the practice of the 狈测腻测补-痴补颈艣别峁�i办补 philosophers. This defect of the work has been rectified by him in his own commentary 罢补谤办补诲墨辫颈办腻 or 顿墨辫颈办腻. In this commentary the author has delved deep into the 狈测腻测补-痴补颈艣别峁�i办补 doctrines by sometimes elaborately, sometimes defending his own views expressed in the 罢补谤办补蝉补峁僩谤补丑补. So in the foregoing study these two works are taken together for showing 础苍苍补峁僢丑补峁�峁�补鈥檚 contribution. It is also found that 础苍苍补峁僢丑补峁�峁�补 has not deviated from his predecessors regarding different concepts of 狈测腻测补-痴补颈艣别峁�i办补 philosophy and as a whole he follows faithfully their doctrines.

Now, in the following lines we are going to collect together our findings.

1. 罢补谤办补蝉补峁僩谤补丑补 is a work of syncretic school of 狈测腻测补-痴补颈艣别峁�i办补 and as such it accepts the seven categories of the 痴补颈艣别峁�i办补 School and four 辫谤补尘腻峁嘺蝉 of the 狈测腻测补 school. In dealing with the categories he generally follows Navya 狈测腻测补 views and uses Navya 狈测腻测补 terminology to some extent in the 诲墨辫颈办腻.

2. There is some controversy regarding the exact date of 础苍苍补峁僢丑补峁�峁�补. Scholars differ among themselves about his date, the time varying from 15^th century A.D. to 18^th century A.D. However, from the discussions of different arguments it can be concluded that 础苍苍补峁僢丑补峁�峁�补 flourished in 17^th century A.D.

3. 础苍苍补峁僢丑补峁�峁�补 maintains that all things of the world and their relationship with one another come under the seven independent categories. Among the seven categories, the first six have existence, nameability and knowability. These categories are objects of the positive notion of being. The seventh one also has existence etc. but is the object of negative notion and depends on its counter entity.

4. 础苍苍补峁僢丑补峁�峁�补 brings 狈测腻测补 category of 辫谤补尘腻峁嘺 under the quality buddhi, as is done by most of the 狈测腻测补-痴补颈艣别峁�i办补 writers of syncretic school.

5. In defining 辫谤补迟测补办峁�a, 础苍苍补峁僢丑补峁�峁�补 follows the earlier 狈补颈测腻测颈办补蝉 and defines it as that knowledge which is produced by the 蝉补苍苍颈办补谤峁�a of an object with a senseorgan. 础苍苍补峁僢丑补峁�峁�补 has not at all mentioned about the perceptual knowledge of God etc. where no sense-object鈥揷ontact is necessary. This point has not been clarified by him though the Navya 狈测腻测补 philosophers discussed about it critically.

6. 础苍苍补峁僢丑补峁�峁�补 has not at all discussed about the concept of alaukika 辫谤补迟测补办峁�a (extra-ordinary perception) which is discussed in detail by other 狈测腻测补-痴补颈艣别峁�i办补s like 痴颈艣惫补苍腻迟丑补 etc.

7. 础苍苍补峁僢丑补峁�峁�补 has not defined dravya in his 罢补谤办补蝉补峁僩谤补丑补 but gives a definition of it in the 顿墨辫颈办腻 as that which possesses the universal of dravyatva or which possesses quality. He himself shows that the second definition can also be reduced to the first definition. This definition of substance, i.e., possessing 诲谤补惫测补迟惫补箩腻迟颈, is accepted as faultless definition of substance by all the 狈测腻测补-痴补颈艣别峁�i办补 writers.

8. Elaborate descriptions of the substances like earth, water, fire, air and ether are found in 罢补谤办补蝉补峁僩谤补丑补 and 顿墨辫颈办腻. While discussing fire 础苍苍补峁僢丑补峁�峁�补 has put forward arguments to prove that gold is tejas and not 辫峁泃丑颈惫颈.. This argument is actually in line with all the 狈测腻测补-痴补颈艣别峁�i办补 writers. About other substances 罢补谤办补蝉补峁僩谤补丑补 offers mere descriptions.

9. In the 顿墨辫颈办腻, 础苍苍补峁僢丑补峁�峁�补 has raised a question regarding the proof of the existence of God. He offers inference as proof here. Here also 础苍苍补峁僢丑补峁�峁�补 has not shown any novelty, but follows other philosophers of this school. Thus he says that as it is a general rule that every effect must have a cause and as the universe is an effect, so it also must have a cause. This cause is God.

10. So far as the 痴补颈艣别峁�i办补 theory of atom is concerned 础苍苍补峁僢丑补峁�峁�补 argues in his 顿墨辫颈办腻 that atom as the minutest part of earth etc. has to be accepted, otherwise the mountain Meru and the mustard seed will be of equal size. The creation process from the atoms with the creative will of God as the efficient cause has been discussed in a few lines.

11. 础苍苍补峁僢丑补峁�峁�补 has only enumerated the twenty-four kinds of 驳耻峁嘺 in 罢补谤办补蝉补峁僩谤补丑补 and defines it in 顿墨辫颈办腻. He gives two definitions which are critically discussed by him again and concludes that the definition 驳耻峁嘺tvaj膩timan (possessing the universal 驳耻峁嘺tva) is preferable for its brevity of expression.

12. There are different opinions on the divisions of 驳耻峁嘺. 碍补峁嚹乨补 mentions seventeen 驳耻峁嘺s. Pra艣astap膩da adds seven more 驳耻峁嘺s. 础苍苍补峁僢丑补峁�峁�补, like other modern 狈测腻测补-痴补颈艣别峁�i办补s, accept twenty-four 驳耻峁嘺s. Some philosophers add some more 驳耻峁嘺s to these like 濒补驳丑奴迟惫补, 尘峁沝耻迟惫补 and 办补峁环颈苍补迟惫补. 础苍苍补峁僢丑补峁�峁�补 is against this view and argues that these are only opposites of gurutva etc.

13. Regarding p膩kaja驳耻峁嘺, 础苍苍补峁僢丑补峁�峁�补 supports the 痴补颈艣别峁�i办补 view of 辫墨濒耻辫腻办补惫腻诲补. He maintains that change of colour etc.in earth through the action of fire takes place only in atoms and not in 诲惫测补峁嘘办补 etc.

14. 厂腻尘腻苍测补 is not regarded as an objective reality of 碍补峁嚹乨补 and Pra艣astap膩da. But the latter 狈测腻测补-痴补颈艣别峁�i办补s including 础苍苍补峁僢丑补峁�峁�补 accept the objective reality of 蝉腻尘腻苍测补 and accept it to be the basis of the idea of common character among different individuals. 础苍苍补峁僢丑补峁�峁�补 gives a simple definition of 蝉腻尘腻苍测补 which actually serves the purpose of describing it. But he explains this definition minutely and removes the defect pertaining to it in 顿墨辫颈办腻. He defines it as that which is eternal, one and exists in many. He shows that here 鈥榚xists鈥� means exists in the relation of 蝉补尘补惫腻测补. This is the view of all the 狈测腻测补-痴补颈艣别峁�i办补 philosophers. 础苍苍补峁僢丑补峁�峁�补 has not at all discussed about the j膩tib膩dhakas which occupy an important place in 狈测腻测补-痴补颈艣别峁�i办补 polemics.

15. Regarding the category 惫颈艣别峁�a, 础苍苍补峁僢丑补峁�峁�补 offers only a description. 痴颈艣别峁�a is the ultimate distinguishing factor of aneternal substance. The Navya 狈测腻测补 philosophers maintain that it is svato 惫测腻惫补谤迟补办补 (self-distinguishing) and as such is called antya (ultimate). It differentiates all eternal substances, but there is no other differentiator of 惫颈艣别峁�a, it is the ultimate differentiator and can differentiate itself also. The character of 惫颈艣别峁�a has not been highlighted by 础苍苍补峁僢丑补峁�峁�补. He simply says that 惫颈艣别峁�as are differentiators.

16. Relation plays an important role in 狈测腻测补-痴补颈艣别峁�i办补 philosophy, They have discussed about many types of relations. Of these 蝉补峁儁辞驳补 and 蝉补尘腻惫补测补 are important. 础苍苍补峁僢丑补峁�峁�补 discusses about 蝉补峁儁辞驳补 in connection with 驳耻峁嘺. He also describes different types of 蝉补峁儁辞驳补, which are all in the line of the general 狈测腻测补-痴补颈艣别峁�i办补 thought. He also defines 蝉补尘补惫腻测补 as eternal relation which remains in two ayutasiddha things. His definition of ayutasiddha is accepted by all and is very exact.

17. It is noticed that the theory of 蝉补尘腻惫补测补 at first was postulated in connection with the concept of causation. Later on this concept was extended to include all inseparable things.

18. 础产丑腻惫补 is accepted as a separate category by all the 狈测腻测补-痴补颈艣别峁�i办补s including 础苍苍补峁僢丑补峁�峁�补. The 狈测腻测补-痴补颈艣别峁�i办补s have faced the greatest objection from the Buddhists and the 笔谤腻产丑腻办补谤补 惭墨尘腻峁僺补办补蝉 regarding the reality of 补产丑腻惫补. Actually the concept of 补产丑腻惫补 developed through their conflict with these schools. 础苍苍补峁僢丑补峁�峁�补 has not defined 补产丑腻惫补 but enumerates the different kinds of it. He also defines these different types of 补产丑腻惫补. In the 顿墨辫颈办腻 he also refutes the 笔谤腻产丑腻办补谤补 view regarding 补产丑腻惫补.

19. Regarding the concept of cause also 础苍苍补峁僢丑补峁�峁�补鈥檚 view is not at all different. He defines cause as that which invariably precedes the effect. But this definition is deficient as it does not take care of the essential condition of 补苍测补迟丑腻蝉颈诲诲丑补 in the definition. However, this is rectified by him in the 顿墨辫颈办腻.

In this way it is found that 础苍苍补峁僢丑补峁�峁�补 has followed the general trend of the 狈测腻测补-痴补颈艣别峁�i办补 philosophers in dealing with the different categories of the system. In fact before the advent of 础苍苍补峁僢丑补峁�峁�补, all these concepts have been established refuting all rival attacks. 础苍苍补峁僢丑补峁�峁�补 has found these concepts in their developed form and he has not tried to add anything to these already existing concepts.

But even then the works of 础苍苍补峁僢丑补峁�峁�补 are not devoid of importance. The importance of 罢补谤办补蝉补峁僩谤补丑补 and 顿墨辫颈办腻 lies in the fact that here the 狈测腻测补-痴补颈艣别峁�i办补 concepts are presented in a lucid and systematic manner avoiding the jugglery of language found in other 狈测腻测补-痴补颈艣别峁�i办补 works. The Navya 狈测腻测补 language style is not totally absent here, but is found in the 顿墨辫颈办腻 only, that also for explicating different ideas. That is why, 础苍苍补峁僢丑补峁�峁�补鈥檚 work is prescribed for the beginners of Indian logic. But this work is also useful to the advanced learners, because it presents the 狈测腻测补-痴补颈艣别峁�i办补 theories in a precise and comprehensive manner. Hence, the importance of 础苍苍补峁僢丑补峁�峁�补 in the field of the study 狈测腻测补-痴补颈艣别峁�i办补 logic can never be over-estimated.