Nyaya-Vaisheshika categories (Study)
by Diptimani Goswami | 2014 | 61,072 words
This page relates 鈥楺ualities (17-18): Sukha and Duhkha (Pleasure and Pain)鈥� of the study on the Nyaya-Vaisheshika categories with special reference to the Tarkasangraha by Annambhatta. Both Nyaya and Vaisesika are schools of ancient Indian Philosophy, and accepted in their system various padarthas or objects of valid knowledge. This study investigates how the Tarkasamgraha reflects these categories in the combined Nyayavaisesika school.
Go directly to: Footnotes.
Qualities (17-18): Sukha and 顿耻岣丑补 (Pleasure and Pain)
Sukha and 顿耻岣丑补 are the special qualities of the self. These two qualities are treated in pair, but these are not contradictory qualities. That means 诲耻岣丑补 is not the negation of sukha or the vice-versa. Both these are positive qualities. According to Pra艣astap膩da sukha is a positive feeling which is produced from the contact of the sense-organs with agreeable objects together with the conjunction of the self and mind. These contacts together with the merit of the self-bring about a felling the effect of which is characterized by affection brightness of the eye etc. Pra艣astap膩da also maintains that pleasure can be 蝉尘峁泃颈箩补 (produced by memory) and 蝉补峁僰补濒辫补箩补 (produced by imagination). 厂尘峁泃颈箩补-蝉耻办丑补 is produced from the recollection of past pleasurable objects. 厂补峁僰补濒辫补箩补-蝉耻办丑补 is produced from the expectation of future objects.[1]
Pain is defined by Pra艣astap膩da as a feeling of disagreeableness. As in the case of pleasure, pain is created through the conjunction of undesirable things with the sense-organs together with the connection of the self with mind. Its cause is demerit. 础迟尘腻 becomes injured by the painful feelings. Pra艣astap膩da divides it into two kinds鈥�厂尘峁泃颈箩补 and 厂补峁僰补濒辫补箩补 just like pleasure. 厂尘峁泃颈箩补-诲耻岣丑补 is caused by imagination of future things.[2]
While defining sukha and 诲耻岣丑补 in the 罢补谤办补蝉补峁僩谤补丑补 础苍苍补峁僢丑补峁弓补 follows Pra艣astap膩da. Thus, in his view also that which is experienced by all with agreeable feeling is called sukha.[3] Similarly that which is experienced by all as disagreeable feelings is called 诲耻岣丑补.[4] However, it appears that he finds these definitions of pleasure and pain as not adequate and faulty and as such he offers a better definition of sukha in the 顿墨辫颈办腻. Pleasure is that which is qualified by the generality sukhatva generated by apperception (补苍耻惫测补惫补蝉腻测补) of the judgement 鈥業 am happy鈥�.[5] The similar will be the case of 诲耻岣丑补 though 础苍苍补峁僢丑补峁弓补 has not specifically mentioned it. He also says that the description of pleasure and pain mentioned earlier are only descriptions of their nature and not definitions.
狈测腻测补产辞诲丑颈苍墨 and other commentaries are more elaborate. According to 狈测腻测补产辞诲丑颈苍墨, sukha is 颈迟补谤别肠肠丑腻苍补诲丑墨苍别肠肠丑腻惫颈峁测补迟惫补尘颈迟颈.[6]
That means pleasure is that which desired for one鈥檚 own sake and not for the sake of the desire of others.
鈥淚t is unphilosophical to label once for all certain external objects as 蝉耻办丑补办腻谤补办补 and certain others as 诲耻岣丑补janaka, for the same thing may be pleasurable to one man and painful to another. The best criterion in this case is therefore the individual experience of each man (sukhyahamity补苍耻惫测补惫补蝉腻测补岣�)鈥�.[7]
Similar type of definition of pain is found in 狈测腻测补产辞诲丑颈苍墨. Hence, pain is the object of aversion for one鈥檚 own self and for any other thing.[8] Actually sukha or 诲耻岣丑补 has no permanent definition. These are personal feelings. Same thing may be 诲耻岣丑补k膩raka for one and may be 蝉耻办丑补办腻谤补办补 for some other.
Footnotes and references:
[1]:
痴补颈艣别峁办补诲补谤艣补苍补尘 with 笔谤补艣补蝉迟补辫腻诲补产丑腻峁补, p. 211
[2]:
Ibid
[3]:
sarve峁Ｄ乵anuk奴latay膩 vedan墨ya峁� sukham. 罢补谤办补蝉补峁僩谤补丑补, p. 57
[4]:
sarve峁Ｄ佱箖 pratik奴latay膩 vedan墨ya峁� 诲耻岣丑补m. Ibid.
[5]:
顿墨辫颈办腻 on Ibid
[6]:
狈测腻测补产辞诲丑颈苍墨 on Ibid
[7]:
罢补谤办补蝉补峁僩谤补丑补, p. 360
[8]:
颈迟补谤补诲惫别峁Ｄ乶补诲丑颈苍补诲惫别峁惫颈峁测补迟惫补尘颈迟颈. 狈测腻测补产辞诲丑颈苍墨 on 罢补谤办补蝉补峁僩谤补丑补, p. 58