Nyaya-Vaisheshika categories (Study)
by Diptimani Goswami | 2014 | 61,072 words
This page relates ‘Qualities (1): Rupa (Colour)� of the study on the Nyaya-Vaisheshika categories with special reference to the Tarkasangraha by Annambhatta. Both Nyaya and Vaisesika are schools of ancient Indian Philosophy, and accepted in their system various padarthas or objects of valid knowledge. This study investigates how the Tarkasamgraha reflects these categories in the combined Nyayavaisesika school.
Go directly to: Footnotes.
Qualities (1): ū貹 (Colour)
ū貹 (Colour) is the first quality amongst the twenty-four ṇa. It is a special quality. According to Praśastapāda, the colour is perceptible to the eye.[1] վśٳ states in his ṣāp岹 that colour is cognized by the sense of vision. It is an aid to the cognition of substance, quality, action, generic attributes etc. It is an auxiliary cause of visual perception.[2] Śivāditya defines ū貹 as that quality which possesses the generality of colourness and is perceptible by the eye alone.[3]
ԲԲṃbṭṭ also follows his predecessors in giving the definition of ū貹 as he says that colour is known as the quality which is apprehended by the eye only.[4] This definition is explained by him in the ī辱 to show its faultlessness. In this definition, the word ٰ ia added to avoid the defect of over-pervasion to ṃk. Because number is also apprehended by eye but it is perceived by touch also, the word ‘only� will not be applicable to number, not by the eye only.[5] Thus, the word ṇa is added in this definition to avoid over-pervasion to ū貹tva, i.e., the generic attribute of colour. The same organ which comprehends a ṇa, comprehends its پ also. Hence, ū貹tva is also perceived by eye.[6] Therefore, the word ṇa is added to exclude this over-pervasion. Again to avoid over-pervasion to ṃyDz (conjunction) of light with the wall the definition should be that which is perceptible by eye only and which possesses a generic attribute.[7] The ⲹ-ǻī. On the other hand takes ṇa in the sense of special quality (viśeṣaṇa).[8] If only special quality is given as the definition, then that will be over-pervasive to rasa etc., which are also special qualities. So the term ‘perceptible by eye only� is given.[9] Govardhana follows ī辱 in explaining other terms of the definition. But he adds that to avoid over-pervasion to gurutva (weight) etc. which are not perceptible by causes, the term ṣuⲹ is given. He also clarifies that ⲹ here means the object of ordinary perception.[10] Gobardhana also maintains that the over-pervasion to prabhābhittiṃyDz can be avoided by the inclusion of the term viśeṣaṇa as ṃyDz is not a special quality.[11] But even then the word ٰ in the definition will be superfluous, because in that case the term special quality can avoid the overpervasion to number etc. Gobardhana argues that it is necessary to exclude overpervasion to natural fluidity.
ⲹ-ṛtپ, another commentary on ղ첹ṃg, states that this definition is not faultless because 貹 ū貹 (colour of atom) is not perceptible to the eye. Hence, the definition will be non-pervasion to the colour of the atoms.
To avoid this, ⲹ-ṛtپ explains the definition as:
tvagaⲹ-ṣuⲹ ṇavibhājaka-dharmavatvam.
Here, the word tvagagrahya is used instead of ٰ, while ṇavibhājakadharmavatvam (possessing the attribute which is the distinguishing mark of quality) serves the purpose of ṇatvaپ. Paramāṇuū貹 possesses ū貹tvaپ, though not perceptible by eye, so it is included in this definition.[12]
Colour is divided into seven kinds, viz.,
- white,
- blue,
- yellow,
- red,
- green,
- brown and
- variegated.
Among these the last one is the mixture of the other qualities. Now, it may be asked why citraū貹 should be accepted as a separate quality instead of saying that a particular substance possesses different colours. To this ԲԲṃbṭṭ replies that colour being a pervasive (ⲹṛtپ) quality, there cannot be several colours in one and the same object.[13] Hence variegated colour is accepted as a separate colour. But then it may be objected that a cloth can be perceived by means of the colour of its parts and as such there is no necessity of accepting a variegated colour. According to ԲԲṃbṭṭ, it is not possible, for there is no colour in the piece of cloth as a whole and without a colour an object cannot be perceived. But one may again argue here that the condition for perceptibility of an object can be ū貹vatsamavetatva (i.e., the state of being in inherent relation with things having colour) and not only the possession of colour (ū貹vatta). In that case though the piece of cloth does not possess a colour of its own, it is in inherent relation with parts that have colour and as such will be perceptible. This view is rejected by ԲԲṃbṭṭ on the ground that it is unnecessarily elaborate.[14] The seven colours reside in earth, water and light. All the seven kinds exist in earth, pale-white resides in water and bright white is found in light.[15]
Footnotes and references:
[4]:
cakṣurٰgrāhyo guṇo ū貹m. ղ첹ṃg, p. 14
[5]:
ṃkdāvativyāptivāraṇāya ٰpadam. ī辱 on ղ첹ṃg, p. 14
[6]:
ū貹tve’tivyāptivāraṇāya ṇapadam Ibid
[7]:
cf. ղ첹ṃg, p. 151
[9]:
Ibid
[11]:
Ibid.
[12]:
cf. հ첹ṃg, pp. 151-152
[13]:
ū貹sya ⲹṛtپtvaniyamāt. ī辱 on ղ첹ṃg, p.14
[14]:
tasmātpaṭasya pratyakṣatvānyathānupapatyā citraū貹siddhi�. Ibid
[15]:
ղ첹ṃg, p. 14