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Nyaya-Vaisheshika categories (Study)

by Diptimani Goswami | 2014 | 61,072 words

This page relates ‘Atomic Theory� of the study on the Nyaya-Vaisheshika categories with special reference to the Tarkasangraha by Annambhatta. Both Nyaya and Vaisesika are schools of ancient Indian Philosophy, and accepted in their system various padarthas or objects of valid knowledge. This study investigates how the Tarkasamgraha reflects these categories in the combined Nyayavaisesika school.

Go directly to: Footnotes.

The Atomic Theory is the most important theory of the ⲹ-ղśṣi첹 system. All the material objects of the world are made up of some parts. This material object is divided into smaller parts and the latter is further divisible into smaller parts which are further divisible into still smaller parts. This process cannot go on infinitely and the ultimate minutest part of matter which cannot be further divisible is called atom or 貹Գ. This atom is partless, eternal and indivisible. According to Gautama atom is partless, indivisible and smallest part of composite things which cannot be divided into further parts.[1] Atom has no inside and outside because it is not a product.[2]

ٲⲹԲ gives his opinion that an atom is the smallest part of a composite thing which cannot be divided into smaller parts.[3] Uddyotakara states that if an atom is divisible then it cannot be an atom.[4] Atom is indestructible. 峦貹پ points out that an atom is called to be an atom for its smallest size which cannot be divided into smaller parts.[5] According to Jayanta Bhaṭṭa atom is called to be atom as it cannot be further divided.[6] It cannot be produced and destroyed. Therefore, atoms are eternal.[7]

Gautama also refers to the view of the opponents, viz., the Buddhists regarding the partlessness of atoms and finally refutes them. The Budhists rejoin that as the atoms possess parts because they possess a definite shape and also enter into conjunction among themselves. The ⾱첹 uphold the view that the atoms are spherical in form. Anything having forms like triangular, quadrangular, square, spherical etc. must be composed of parts. Moreover, an atom conjoins with another atom in order to produce dyads, triads etc. conjunction is possible only with some part. Hence, the atoms are composed of parts–this is the rejoinder of the Buddhists.[8]

Gautama refutes this charge by stating that if the atoms are accepted as possessing parts, then that will lead to infinite regress. If it is said that an atom is divisible into parts, then it must be admitted that those parts are again divisible into further parts. In that case a large thing and a small one will be of equal dimension as both would possess an infinite number of parts.[9]

The four kinds of atom are earth, water, fire and air.[10] An atom is eternal, i.e. it has no creation and destruction. Śī󲹰 says that it is eternal because it is a partless substance, like ether.[11] But their composite products are non-eternal. Atoms are not able to combine one another and they are motionless in themselves. But Śivāditya states that atoms are active.[12] According to the earlier ղśṣi첹 motion is imparted to them through the unseen power (ṛṣṭa). But the later ղśṣi첹 state that God gives motion in the atoms joins them into composite products according to their merits and demerits.[13]

Some Greek philosophers also accept the atomistic theory of world creation. But there are some differences between the Greek atomism and the ղśṣi첹 atomism though both regard atoms as the indivisible, partless, imperceptible and eternal, which are material cause of this physical universe. Firstly, the Greek atomist philosophers recognize quantitative difference in atoms, while they accept the atoms as qualitatively the same. On the other hand, the ղśṣi첹 uphold qualitative differences in the atoms. Qualitatively, the atoms of earth differ from the atoms of air, the atoms of air from the atoms of fire and so on.[14]

Secondly, according to Greek philosophers, atoms reject the secondary qualities but the ղśṣi첹 atoms possess secondary qualities also.[15]

Thirdly, Greek atomists admit that atoms have motion and they are active. But according to the ղśṣi첹, atoms are motionless, inactive and God imparted motion to them by the merits and demerits of the individual souls.[16]

Fourthly, according to the Greek atomists even the souls are made of the finest, smoothest and most nimble atoms. ղśṣi첹, on the other hand, maintain that souls are completely different from atoms. They point out that atoms are unconscious and spiritual.[17]

The ղśṣi첹 regards that God creates this world with the atoms as material cause. God is being the efficient cause of it.[18] The Greeks being materialists do not conform to this view.

The atoms of earth possess the qualities of smell, taste, colour, touch, fluidity, gravity and velocity. The atoms of water possess taste, colour, touch, natural fluidity, viscidity, gravity and velocity. The atoms of fire have colour, touch, fluidity and velocity. There are two ṇa of the atoms of air which are touch and velocity. There are some general qualities of these four kinds of atoms, such as number, magnitude, distinctness, conjunction, disjunction, remoteness and proximity. These qualities are eternal. There are both primary and secondary qualities in the atoms of earth, water, fire and air. The qualities of the composite effects are found according to the qualities of their atoms.[19]

ղśṣi첹 give the following arguments for the existence of atoms:

(i) If all the things are divisible into an infinite number of parts then there will be no difference in the size of things. A mountain and a mustard seed will be equal in size.[20] Therefore, it must be admitted that the atom is the minutest part of composite things which is partless and indivisible.

(ii) վśٳ argues that composite substances are transient, changeable, divisible, produced and destroyed. Hence, there must be some ultimate cause of these substances which is partless, unchangeable and eternal, which is nothing but an atom.[21] Vyomaśivācārya argues that if there is no indivisible atom, then there will be no destruction. So, we must admit that atoms are partless, indivisible.[22]

It may be mentioned that the ղśṣi첹 atomism is not materialistic but they believe in the reality of individual souls and God, and the law of karma. There are difference between the ղśṣi첹 atomism and Jaina atomism. According to ղśṣi첹, there are different kinds of atoms and they possess different qualities. On the other hand, Jaina states that each atom has colour, taste, odour and touch and their qualities are the same.[23] Jainas admit theistic atomism and ղśṣi첹 theistic atomism. Jainas state that God does not combine the atoms into composite things and does not impart motion in the atoms. But according to ղśṣi첹, God imparts motion to the atoms and combines them into dyads, triads, and quartrads and so on. But both the Jainas and the ղśṣi첹 admit that an atom is the eternal indivisible and the smallest part of matter.[24]

The Buddhists also believe in the reality of atoms. They consider atoms to be momentary. Buddhists divide atoms into perceptible atoms () and imperceptible atoms () and they consider that the is formed of the 貹s. The ٰܳԳپ첹 admit atoms as partless and momentary. The Buddhist considers the atoms as transient. They do not accept the reality of dyads, triads and quartrads. Buddhists uphold an atheistic atomism against the ղśṣi첹’s theistic atomism. Therefore, there are differences between the ղśṣi첹 atomism and the Buddhist atomism.[25]

ԲԲṃbṭṭ in his ī辱 argues for the existence of atoms that the finest particle of mote perceived floating in a sunbeam is a structure consisting of component parts as it is a substance which is visible to the eye, like a cloth. Even a component part of a triad is a composite whole made up of parts because it produces the large magnitude a triad, just like a thread. An atom is that which forms a part of a dyad and it is eternal. Otherwise, if we assume the atom also to be a product of still smaller parts, it would result in the defect of endless regression. And also the hypothesis that the mountain Meru and the mustard seed are of equal size will remain unsolved.[26]

Footnotes and references:

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[1]:

貹� vā ttuṭe�. ⲹūٰ, 4.2.17

[2]:

cf. ⲹūٰ, 4.2.20

[3]:

cf. ⲹṣy, on ⲹūٰ, 4.2.16

[4]:

yadi 貹rvibhājyate 貹rna syāt. ⲹپ첹, 4.2.22

[5]:

paramatvavisiṣṭo hyanu� 貹Գ�. ⲹپ첹tātparyaṭīkā, 4.2.17

[6]:

niravayavatve tu tasya 貹Գtvam. ⲹñᲹī, p.502

[7]:

cf. Ibid.

[8]:

cf. ⲹūٰ, 4.2. 23-24; ⲹṣy, on Ibid

[9]:

ⲹūٰ, 4.2. 25; ⲹṣy, on Ibid.

[10]:

An Introduction to Indian Philosophy, p.227

[11]:

貹Գ� nityo dravyatve satyanavayavatvāt ākāśavat. ⲹ첹ṇḍī, p.31

[12]:

Ծⲹ� kriyāvān貹. ٲ貹ٳī, p.64

[13]:

Vide, Sinha, Jadunath, Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 386.

[14]:

cf. A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy, p.184.

[15]:

cf. Ibid.

[16]:

cf. Sinha, Jadunath, Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 392

[17]:

cf. Ibid.

[18]:

cf. Ibid, p. 393.

[19]:

Vide,. Sinha, Jadunath, Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 386.

[20]:

anantāvayavārabdhatvāviśeṣeṇa merusarṣapadīnam parimāṇabhedānupapatte�. ṇāvī, p. 51

[21]:

Vide, Sinha, Jadunath, Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 389

[22]:

Ibid.

[23]:

Ibid., pp.390-391

[24]:

Ibid., p. 391

[25]:

Ibid., p. 391

[26]:

ī辱 on ղ첹ṃg, p.9

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