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Perception is the most primary and fundamental of all the 辫谤补尘腻峁嘺蝉. The 狈补颈测腻测颈办补蝉, maintain that all other 辫谤补尘腻峁嘺蝉 depend on perception.^[1] Perception is the final test of all knowledge. Inference, verbal testimony requires confirmation by perception, while perception does not require any such confirmation.^[2] The term 辫谤补迟测补办峁�a is a compound of two terms prati, meaning before and also, meaning sense-organ.^[3] This term is used for both perceptual knowledge (辫谤补迟测补办峁�a 箩帽腻苍补) and the source of perception (辫谤补迟测补办峁�a 辫谤补尘腻峁嘺).

Gautama defines 辫谤补迟测补办峁�a as that knowledge which arises from the contact of the sense-organ with its object, which is unnamable, uncontradicted and determinate.^[4] These three conditions given by Gautama have been critically and elaborately discussed by the subsequent logicians. These three terms have also created a great deal of controversy among these logicians. According to Gautama, 辫谤补迟测补办峁�a is produced by the sense-object-contact. Though this sense-object-contact accepted by Gautama as the cause of perception has been admitted by 痴腻迟蝉测腻测补苍补 also, he maintains that sense-object-contact is not the only cause of perception. He has made it clear that in every perceptual knowledge there must be the contact of the mind and also of the self. That means, the self-unites with the mind, the mind with the sense-organ and the sense-organ with the object, then only perception arises. However, 痴腻迟蝉测腻测补苍补 points out that Gautama accepts only sense-object contact as the cause of perception, since self-mind contact is common to perception, inference etc.^[5] 痴腻肠补蝉辫补迟颈 惭颈艣谤补 clarifies that the word 蝉补苍苍颈办补谤峁�a is used in the definition because 蝉补苍苍颈办补谤峁�a includes both 蝉补峁儁辞驳补 and 蝉补尘补惫腻测补 and as such is more suitable for the purpose.^[6]

The second adjective used by Gautama in the definition of perception is 补惫测补辫补诲别艣测补尘 which means that it cannot be expressed in words. This word has given rise to much controversy. According to 痴腻肠补蝉辫补迟颈 惭颈艣谤补, this term is used in the definition to indicate indeterminate perception (nirvikalpa 辫谤补迟测补岣硈补).^[7] Jayanta Bha峁�峁璦 also holds the same view^[8] 痴腻肠补蝉辫补迟颈 惭颈艣谤补 also holds that the term 痴测腻惫补蝉腻测腻迟尘补办补 in the definition indicates savikalpaka 辫谤补迟测补办峁�a.^[9] Thus, Gautama includes the two types of perception in the definition. However, according to 痴腻迟蝉测腻测补苍补 and Uddyotakara, the term 痴测腻惫补蝉腻测腻迟尘补办补 excludes doubtful apprehension from the scope of perception.^[10]

By the term 补惫测补产丑颈肠腻谤颈 erroneous knowledge is excluded. 痴腻迟蝉测腻测补苍补 points out that when one perceives water in a mirage, the eye actually comes in contact with the hot surface of the desert mixed up with sun-rays. Here there is sense-objectcontact, but this is not a valid cognition. To avoid this the author of 狈测腻测补蝉奴迟谤补 has added this term in the definition.^[11] Other logicians also accept this meaning of the term.

In this way Gautama鈥檚 definition has been elaborately explained by the latter logicians. However, the portion of the definition 颈苍诲谤颈测腻谤迟丑补sannikar峁�otpanna峁� 箩帽腻苍补m (the knowledge produced by the contact of an object with a sense-organ) is accepted by all as the basic definition of perception. Thus, 础苍苍补峁僢丑补峁�峁�补 has defined perception as that knowledge which is produced by the 蝉补苍苍颈办补谤峁�a of an object with a sense-organ.^[12] He also states 辫谤补迟测补办峁�a (perception) as the instrument of perceptive knowledge.^[13] He uses the word 箩帽腻苍补 to mean the right apprehension and the wrong apprehension. Perceptive knowledge is produced through the connection of the sense-organ with the objects.^[14] In the 顿墨辫颈办腻, he states that indriya (sense-organ) means eye, nose, etc., artha (object) means jar etc. When there is a contact between the senseorgan and the object, there is a knowledge, which is known as perception.^[15] In this definition the word 箩帽腻苍补 is added to exclude 蝉补苍苍颈办补谤峁�adhva峁僺a and through the word 颈苍诲谤颈测腻谤迟丑补, the 辫谤补迟测补办峁�a becomes different from other kinds of knowledge.^[16] According to 艢iv膩ditya, the instrument of true knowledge which cannot be unconnected with perceptible knowledge, is known as 辫谤补迟测补办峁�a.^[17] In the 狈测腻测补蝉颈诲诲丑腻苍迟补尘耻办迟腻惫补濒墨, 痴颈艣惫补苍腻迟丑补 states that knowledge is known as 辫谤补迟测补办峁�a which is produced through the sense-organ.^[18] He also mentions in his 叠丑腻峁Ｄ乸补谤颈肠肠丑别诲补 that the sense-organs are of six kinds, viz. nose, tongue, eye, skin, ear and mind. The object of the nose is smell, the object of the tongue is taste, the object of the ear is sound, the object of the eye is sight, touch is the object of the skin, pain, pleasure are the objects of the mind.^[19]

Though sense-object contact is said to be the main cause of perception, there is also perception without sense-object-contact. God has no body and as such has no senses. But he perceives all things. To account for the perception of God 痴颈艣惫补苍腻迟丑补 has given another definition of perception. Thus, he say that perception is that knowledge which is not generated by the instrumentality of any other knowledge.^[20] The instrument of inference is the knowledge of 惫测腻辫迟颈 that of comparison is the knowledge of similarity and that of verbal testimony is the knowledge of words. But perception is not caused by any other knowledge. This definition is common to both ordinary perception and God鈥檚 perception.

Types of 笔谤补迟测补办峁�a:

Perception is divided into two types laukika (ordinary) and alaukika (extra-ordinary).Ordinary perception is again divided into two types鈥�savikalpakam (determinate) and nirvikalpakam (indeterminate). 础苍苍补峁僢丑补峁�峁�补 and 碍别艣补惫补 惭颈艣谤补, however, divided 辫谤补迟测补办峁�a directly into two types鈥�savikalpaka and nirvikalpaka.^[21]

Laukika and alaukika 辫谤补迟测补办峁�as are based on the way in which the sense-organ come in contact with their object. It is called laukika 辫谤补迟测补办峁�a in which there is direct contact of the sense-organ with objects. The ordinary perception is caused by ordinary 蝉补苍苍颈办补谤峁�a or sense object contact.

The contact of the senses with the objects is regarded by the 狈补颈测腻测颈办补蝉 as of six kinds鈥�

1. 蝉补峁儁辞驳补 (conjunction),
2. sa峁儁ukta蝉补尘补惫腻测补 (inherence with what has come into contact),
3. sa峁儁uktasamaveta蝉补尘补惫腻测补 (inherence with that is inherent with a thing which has come in contact),
4. 蝉补尘补惫腻测补 (inherence),
5. samaveta蝉补尘补惫腻测补 (inherence with what is inherent) and
6. 惫颈艣别峁�a峁嘺惫颈艣别峁�y补产丑腻惫补 (the connection of the attribute with the substantive).^[22]

1. Sa峁儁oga 蝉补苍苍颈办补谤峁�a: Conjunction is the contact, producing perception of the jar by the eye.

2. Sa峁儁ukta蝉补尘补惫腻测补 蝉补苍苍颈办补谤峁�a: The inherent union with the conjoint is the contact in producing the perception of the colour of a jar, as the colour is inherently united with the jar which is in contact with the eye.

3. Sa峁儁uktasamaveta 蝉补尘补惫腻测补 蝉补苍苍颈办补谤峁�a: Inherent union with the intimately united is the contact in producing the perception of the universal genus colourness, as colour is inherently united with the jar that is conjoint with the ocular organ and the genus colourness is inherently united therewith.

4. Samav膩ya 蝉补苍苍颈办补谤峁�a: Inherent union is the contact in the perception of word by the organ of hearing as the organ of hearing is the ether in the cavity of the ear in as much as sound is the quality of ether and the quality and the qualified are inherently united.

5. Samaveta蝉补尘补惫腻测补 蝉补苍苍颈办补谤峁�a: Inherent union with the inherently united is the contact in cognizing soundness, as the genus soundness is inherently united with sound which is inherently united with auditory sense.

6. Ve艣e峁�a峁嘺vi艣e峁�yabh膩va 蝉补苍苍颈办补谤峁�a: The connection of the qualifier and the qualified is the conjunction in the perception of negation, as in the cognition. This spot of earth is with the negation of jar. Here, the negation of a jar is an attribute of a place in contact with the eye.^[23]

On the other hand alaukika 辫谤补迟测补办峁�a is that in which sense-organ does not come in contact with the object directly, but through an unusual medium. Alaukika 辫谤补迟测补办峁�a has three types -

1. 蝉腻尘腻苍测补濒补办峁�a峁嘺,
2. 箩帽腻苍补lak峁�a峁嘺 and
3. yogaja.^[24]

Savikalpaka 辫谤补迟测补办峁�a:

Savikalpaka 辫谤补迟测补办峁�a is that in which the cognition of an object is qualified by certain attributes like name, genus, quality etc.^[25] According to 础苍苍补峁僢丑补峁�峁�补, attributive knowledge is called savikalpaka (determinate) 辫谤补迟测补办峁�.^[26] In 顿墨辫颈办腻 he says that the knowledge which comprehends the relation of qualified and qualifier such as name, class etc. are known as savikalpaka.^[27] Apprehensions like, 鈥楬e is a Dittha鈥�; 鈥楬e is a 叠谤腻丑尘补峁嘺鈥�; 鈥楬e is black鈥�; 鈥楬e is a cook鈥� etc. are the examples of Savikalpaka 辫谤补迟测补办峁�a. These are the illustrations of knowledge qualified by 蝉补峁僯帽腻 (name), 箩腻迟颈 (class), 驳耻峁嘺 (quality) and 办谤颈测腻 (action) respectively.

Nirvikalpaka (indeterminate) is called that cognition which is not qualified by such attributes.^[28] 础苍苍补峁僢丑补峁�峁�补 in his 顿墨辫颈办腻 states that the knowledge in which subject, attribute and relation (between the attribute and the subject) are absent, is the nirvikalpaka knowledge.^[29]

Chandradhar Sharma observes that:

鈥�Nirvikalpaka perception is the immediate apprehension, the bare awareness, the direct sense experience and is free from assimilation, discrimination, analysis and synthesis.鈥�^[30]

According to these philosophers, nirvikalpaka is an actual knowledge but beyond sense perception (补迟墨苍诲谤颈测补尘). In reality the contents of the savikalpaka and the nirvikalpaka are the same. But the difference is that while in the savikalpaka the object and its attributes stand in the subject-predicate relation, in the latter, no such relation is accepted.

The 狈补颈测腻测颈办补蝉 accepts nirvikalpaka perception as a logical necessity. It is a fact that all attributive knowledge presupposes the knowledge of the quality and qualified separately. As for example, the knowledge in the form of 诲补峁囜笉墨 辫耻谤耻峁�a岣� (The man with a stick) must be preceded by the knowledge of both the stick and the man separately. Only there we can have the attributive knowledge. Hence, 础苍苍补峁僢丑补峁�峁�补 says that it can be inferred that any attribute knowledge is generated by the knowledge of the attribute.^[31]

Footnotes and references:

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[1]:

cf. 狈测腻测补蝉奴迟谤补, 1.1.5; 狈测腻测腻产丑腻峁�y补, 1.1.6-7

[2]:

cf. Ibid., 1.1.3

[3]:

cf. Bijalwan, C.D., Indian Theory of knowledge, p.67

[4]:

颈苍诲谤颈测腻谤迟丑补sannikar峁�otpanna峁� 箩帽腻苍补m 补惫测补辫补诲别艣测补尘 补惫测补产丑颈肠腻谤颈 vy膩vas膩y膩tmakam 辫谤补迟测补办峁�am. 狈测腻测补蝉奴迟谤补, 1.1.4

[5]:

狈测腻测补产丑腻峁�y补, on 狈测腻测补蝉奴迟谤补, 1.1.4

[6]:

狈测腻测补惫腻谤迟颈办补迟腻迟辫补谤测补迟墨办腻, p. 109

[7]:

Ibid., p. 129

[8]:

nirvikalpakavat tasm膩t 辫谤补迟测补办峁�a峁� savikalpakam. 狈测腻测补尘补帽箩补谤墨, p.

[9]:

狈测腻测补惫腻谤迟颈办补迟腻迟辫补谤测补迟墨办腻, p.133

[10]:

狈测腻测补产丑腻峁�y补, on 狈测腻测补蝉奴迟谤补, 1.1.4; 狈测腻测补惫腻谤迟颈办补 on Ibid.

[11]:

Ibid.

[12]:

颈苍诲谤颈测腻谤迟丑补蝉补苍苍颈办补谤峁�ajanya峁� 箩帽腻苍补m 辫谤补迟测补办峁�am. 罢补谤办补蝉补峁僩谤补丑补, p.29

[13]:

辫谤补迟测补办峁�a箩帽腻苍补kara峁嘺峁� 辫谤补迟测补办峁�am. Ibid

[14]:

Ibid., p.211

[15]:

顿墨辫颈办腻 on 罢补谤办补蝉补峁僩谤补丑补, p.30

[16]:

罢补谤办补蝉补峁僩谤补丑补, p. 211

[17]:

辫谤补迟测补办峁�apram膩鈥檡ogavyavacchinna峁� 辫谤补迟测补办峁�a辫谤补尘腻峁嘺m. 厂补辫迟补辫补诲腻谤迟丑墨, p.73

[18]:

颈苍诲谤颈测补箩补苍测补峁� 箩帽腻苍补峁� 辫谤补迟测补办峁�am. 狈测腻测补蝉颈诲诲丑腻苍迟补尘耻办迟腻惫补濒墨, p. 282

[19]:

叠丑腻峁Ｄ乸补谤颈肠肠丑别诲补, pp. 80-83

[20]:

j帽膩n膩kara峁嘺kam 箩帽腻苍补峁� 辫谤补迟测补办峁�am. 狈测腻测补蝉颈诲诲丑腻苍迟补尘耻办迟腻惫补濒墨, p. 282

[21]:

罢补谤办补产丑腻峁Ｄ�, p. 60

[22]:

罢补谤办补蝉补峁僩谤补丑补, p.31

[23]:

Ibid., pp.31-33

[24]:

alaukikastu vy膩p膩ratrividha岣� 辫补谤颈办墨谤迟颈迟补岣�/ s膩m膩nyalak峁�a峁噊, 箩帽腻苍补lak峁�a峁嘺 测辞驳补箩补蝉迟补迟丑腻// 叠丑腻峁Ｄ�-辫补谤颈肠肠丑别诲补, p. 99

[25]:

蝉补惫颈办补濒辫补办补峁� 苍腻尘补箩腻迟测腻诲颈测辞箩补苍腻迟尘补办补峁�. 罢补谤办补产丑腻峁Ｄ�, p. 72

[26]:

saprak膩raka峁� 箩帽腻苍补峁� savikalpakam. 罢补谤办补蝉补峁僩谤补丑补, p. 29

[27]:

n膩maj膩ty膩divi艣e峁�a峁嘺vi艣e峁�yasa峁僢andh膩vag膩hi 箩帽腻苍补mityartha岣�. 顿墨辫颈办腻 on Ibid., p.30

[28]:

苍颈谤惫颈办补濒辫补办补峁� n膩maj膩ty膩di yojan膩h墨na峁� vastum膩tr膩vag膩hi鈥� 罢补谤办补产丑腻峁Ｄ�, p. 70

[29]:

vi艣e峁�a峁嘺vi艣e峁�yasa峁僢andh膩navag膩hi 箩帽腻苍补mityartha岣�. 顿墨辫颈办腻 on 罢补谤办补蝉补峁僩谤补丑补, p. 30

[30]:

Sharma, C.D., A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy, p.194

[31]:

顿墨辫颈办腻 on 罢补谤办补蝉补峁僩谤补丑补, p. 30