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Having shown that the world of duality consisting of the subject and the object (the perceiver and the perceived) is only the vibration of the mind, 骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补 now in 办腻谤颈办腻 73 proclaims the existence of mind is only from empirical (蝉补尘惫峁泃颈) standpoint and not from the absolute (辫补谤尘腻谤迟丑补) truth. For a thing which is dependent (paratantra) for its existence may exist in empirical realm and not in absolute truth.

This 办腻谤颈办腻 includes a discussion of 蝉补尘惫峁泃颈, because here the technical discussion of absolute and relative truth is emphasised by establishing that whatever imagination (kalpita) exist from the standpoint of conventional truth (蝉补尘惫峁泃颈) cannot exist from the standpoint of Ultimate Truth (辫补谤尘腻谤迟丑补).

骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补 says in 办腻谤颈办腻 73:

鈥楾hat which is believed to exist as a result of illusory experience has no real existence. That, which is believed to exist according to other schools of thought like 痴补颈艣别峁�i办补蝉, when considered from the point of view of Reality, has also no real existence鈥�.

It may be urged that if the mind is unattached due to the absence of external objects then the distinction about the teacher, student etc. is not possible. 艢补峁卥补谤补 explains that the scripture, the teacher, and the taught are not absolutely real. They have an empirical validity. The objects such as the scripture etc. are of the nature of illusory phenomenal experience and imagined only as a means (耻辫腻测补) for realizing the Ultimate Reality. They have no real existence. It has already been stated that when the Ultimate Reality is known, duality does not exist (1:18). Again, anything or any reality that may be accepted to exist on the ground of being propounded by other schools of philosophy (辫补谤补迟补苍迟谤腻产丑颈蝉补峁僾峁泃测腻) like 厂腻峁卥丑测补 or 痴补颈艣别峁�i办补 etc. is not valid. They may have an empirical perspective and also some utility but from the absolute standpoint they do not really exist. Therefore in 办腻谤颈办腻 72 the mind has been aptly described as unattached/non-relational.

Bhattacharya reads 鈥�辫补谤补迟补苍迟谤补岣� 补产丑颈峁�a峁僾峁泃测腻鈥� and further interprets paratantra as such kind of truth which depends on another^[1]. 艢补峁卥补谤补 explains the term 鈥�paratantra鈥� as other schools of thought/philosophy. Karmarkar, accepting 艢补峁卥补谤补鈥檚 interpretation, says that the term 鈥�paratantra鈥� is used in 狈测腻测补蝉奴迟谤补 (I.1-29) for another school of philosophy and there is no need to resort to the technical Buddhist meaning as suggested by Bhattacharya.^[2]

Bhattacharya points out that Buddhists accept two kinds of truth-empirical (蝉补尘惫峁泃颈) and absolute (辫补谤补尘腻谤迟丑补). According to 艢补峁卥补谤补 truth is one and the phenomenal experience (蝉补峁僾峁泃颈) is illusory or imagined (kalpita). 厂补峁卥补谤补 interprets kalpita, in 办补濒辫颈迟腻产丑颈蝉补峁僾峁泃测腻 as imagined as a means to ultimately lead the seekers to the highest Reality.

In the other schools of philosophy e.g. the 痴补颈艣别峁�i办补 school accepts six categories (辫补诲腻谤迟丑补蝉) viz. from substance (dravya) to inherence (蝉补尘补惫腻测补). But when analysed from the (absolute point of view), the definitions of these categories indicate that there is mutual dependence (辫补谤补蝉辫补谤腻艣谤补测补迟惫补) on each other. Their independent existence is not established. Hence, they are illusory. In reality, mind is unrelated to an object (苍颈谤惫颈峁�a测补). 膧迟尘补苍 alone is real and without attachment. The scripture etc. include the distinctions of knower, knowledge and the object of knowledge. They are in the realm of empirical experience due to ignorance (补惫颈诲测腻).

The following 办腻谤颈办腻 adopts the famous method of 补诲丑测腻谤辞辫补 and 补辫补岣�v腻诲补. 骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补 having propounded the doctrine of 补箩腻迟颈惫腻诲补 now does the 补辫补惫腻诲补 of the notion of (aja) or being unborn. The postulation springs from the common sense belief that the Self is born; here the Self is seeing to be identical with the gross body that takes birth. Therefore, it is believed when the body is born, the Self is also born. Such a view is not only a common sense view but also world-wide religious view. In the context of this view 补箩腻迟颈惫腻诲补 is pertinent, meaning that it is important to talk about the birthlessness of the Self which is the witness of the three bodies gross, subtle and causal and also the three states wakeful, dream and deep sleep. The

significant 补辫补惫腻诲补 is now to negate the notion of 鈥榖irthlessness鈥� itself. The notion of birthlessness or aja is correlative with the notion of birth. When birth itself is illusory, its correlative notion of birthlessness is meaningless. Following the traditional methodology of 痴别诲腻苍迟补, 骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补 does the subsequent retraction (补辫补惫腻诲补) of the notion of aja.

Herein lays the importance of the 办腻谤颈办腻 74 where he declares the following:

鈥�膧迟尘补苍 is called unborn (aja) from the standpoint of the illusory empirical experiences. It is, truly speaking, not even unborn. That unborn 腻迟尘补苍 appears to be born from the standpoint of the belief of the other schools of thought鈥�.

It may be contended that if the scriptural teaching are in the realm of phenomenal experience, then the description of 腻迟尘补苍 is unborn (aja) is also a part of the phenomenal experience (蝉补峁僾峁泃颈).

艢补峁卥补谤补 begins his commentary by accepting the truth of this contention and says that from the ultimate point of view, 腻迟尘补苍 cannot be described even as unborn (aja). The other schools of thought e.g. 厂腻峁卥丑测补s establish the 腻迟尘补苍 as born because their philosophical position conceals the truth. It is in relation to their false notion of the 腻迟尘补苍 that the view of the 腻迟尘补苍 as unborn is advanced to highlight the point that these schools falsely attribute birth to the birthless. Hence, the idea that 腻迟尘补苍 is unborn cannot encompass the Absolute, as the idea itself is part of the illusory phenomenal experience. Strictly speaking, no statement at all can be made from the (辫补谤尘腻谤迟丑补) absolute point of view^[3].

Footnotes and references:

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[1]:

Bhattacharya, 膧gama 艣膩stra, 174.

[2]:

Karmarkar, 骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补 K膩rik膩, 131.

[3]:

Saccid膩nandendra Saraswati in his 惭腻峁囜笉奴办测补 Rahasya 痴颈惫峁沬迟颈 (406 and 419) says Loka蝉补峁僾峁泃颈 or Laukika蝉补峁僾峁泃颈 is due to 补惫颈诲测腻 while 碍补濒辫颈迟补蝉补峁僾谤鈥� ti is an 耻辫腻测补鈥搃magined for 辫补谤补尘腻谤迟丑补 -诲补谤艣补苍补 like a teacher.