Bhakti-rasayana by Madhusudana Sarasvati
(Study and translation of first chapter)
by Lance Edward Nelson | 2021 | 139,165 words
This is a study and English translation of the Bhakti-rasayana by Madhusudana Sarasvati (16th century)—one of the greatest and most vigorous exponents of Advaita after Shankara-Acharya who was also a great devotee of Krishna. The Bhaktirasayana attempts to merge non-dualist metaphysics with the ecstatic devotion of the Bhagavata Purana, by assertin...
Part 20 - Objections Based on Other Theories of Mind
In reference to what has been said thus far, the Nyaya logicians might object as follows: "Since the mind is unchanging, without parts, and atomic in size, how is it possible to say that it undergoes transformation into the form of an object by becoming melted? And how can you use the illustration of lac, a substance composed of parts? Increase and diminution are not possible in the case of something that is partless. Therefore the foregoing discussion of the nature of the permanent emotion is unsound." In answer to this, the author says: 19. THE MIND IS UNITARY LIKE AN ATOM; THEREFORE IT CANNOT ACQUIRE THE FORM OF AN OBJECT--THIS AND SIMILAR OPINIONS OF OTHERS ARE DISREGARDED BECAUSE THEY ARE NOT BASED ON ANY AUTHORITATIVE MEANS OF KNOWLEDGE.
277 The words "and similar" serve to include the view of the Prabhakaras 187 that the mind is all pervading 188 and the doctrine of the Buddhists that the mind is the immediately preceding cognition that serves as the cause of its successors. 189 The truth is that the mind is of medium size. 190 We infer this from the fact that it is an instrument, like an There are no grounds ax, and a sense organ, like the eye. at all for inferring that it is atomic. Nor can it be inferred that it is all pervading because it is an eternal 191 since the sense organ like the faculty of hearing, latter's eternality remains unproved. In fact, because the ether itself is non-eternal, 192 all the more so will be the faculty of hearing which is its product. 193 Since something that is produced can never be all pervading, our inference [that the mind is] of medium size does not fail in respect of [the objection based on the supposed nature of] the faculty of hearing. 194 Moreover, there is an invariable rule 195 that whatever sense apprehends a particular quality is a product of the element which possess that quality. This proves that the eye and the other senses are products of the elements which posses the qualities that they apprehend. 196 Since the mind perceives the qualities of all five of the gross elements, we must accept that it is a product of those
278 elements. There are no grounds for making a distinction between the mind and the other senses in this respect. 197 A distinction cannot be based on the supposition that dissimilar things (such as the elements] cannot combine to produce an effect [such as the mind]. Gold, silk, and cotton threads are dissimilar, yet they can combine to form a single cloth. If one does not accept a whole consisting of parts in this case, there will be the undesirable consequence of bidding farewell to all wholes consisting of parts, for we would have to deny this category in other cases also. Therefore the mind be understood as a product of the five gross elements in their pure state. 198 Having a predominance of the luminous quality, 199 the mind has a natural inclination towards expansion and contraction. A clear substance, it is capable like the eye of being affected by concrete objects. Joy, pain, desire, and knowledge reside in the mind; this we accept. Since these things are known to pervade the entire body, so must the mind which is their locus. Hence the mind is coextensive with the body in size. If it is objected [by the followers of the Nyaya] that the rejection of the atomicity of the mind entails the possibility of its being connected with all the sense organs simultaneously and that hence there will be the unwanted contingency of diverse cognitions arising at the same
279 time, 200 we say, "Not so." A single cognition alone is produced by a single sense organ at any one time. Otherwise, why would there not be the simultaneous occurrence of two visual perceptions? The simultaneous arising of cognitions produced by different sense organs is, however, desirable. We have examples such as the concurrent experience of sound, touch, form, taste, and smell when someone is eating a long sweetcake. Moreover, the objectors themselves accept the doctrine that the conjunction of the skin and the mind is necessary for all perception; otherwise they cannot explain the phenomenon of deep sleep. will be difficult for them to deny the simultaneous perception of, for example, the taste and touch of sugar 201 So it which is in contact with the area of the skin that forms the tongue. 202 The result of all this is that a divergence of opinion in respect of the [theory of] mind which we accept-and which is supported by revealed scripture, traditional wisdom, and reason--is not possible. The [Buddhist] teaching that the mind is the immediately preceding cognition is disregarded as being extremely illogical; the detailed refutation of this view is set forth in our Vedantakalpalatika. 203