A study of the philosophy of Jainism
by Deepa Baruah | 2017 | 46,858 words
This page describes the Division of jaina categories or substances from the study of the philosophy of Jainism: one of the oldest religions in India having its own metaphysics, philosophy and ethics. Jainism is regarded as an ethical system where non-violence features as an important ethical value.
Chapter III.d - Division of jaina categories or substances
The Jaina categories or substances are broadly divided into two classes, viz., (a) extensive and (b) non-extensive. The extensive substances are known as پⲹ. That means which possesses many ś (places). The non-extensive substance is known as anپⲹ. That which has only one ś is called anپⲹ. Time or is the only one substance, which is devoid of extension.
The extensive substances are again divided into two classes, viz., (i) ī (living) and (ii) aī (non-living). Again, these two types of substances are known as cetanatattva and acetanatattva. The Cārvākas identifies the self with the body endowed with consciousness. According to them, consciousness is manifested from earth, water, fire and air. By the conjunctions of these four ūٲ, the Իṛiⲹ, śī etc. are manifested, and then consciousness is manifested from the combination of Իṛiⲹ, śī etc., just as intoxication is manifested from the combination of flour, water and molasses. So, consciousness is manifested from material elements (ūٲ). But the Jainas do not agree with the Cārvākas. Prabhācandra says that consciousness cannot be manifested from the four ūٲ. It is always found in the ī or self. To refute Cārvāka views, Prabhācandra asks whether this consciousness which is manifested from the elements is sat (existent) or asat (non-existent) or sadasat (both existent and non-existent). If consciousness is accepted as existent, then it must be 徱 (beginningless) and ananta (endless). If it is said that previous non-existent consciousness is manifested, then that will be contradictory to our perception, since that which is totally non-existent is not perceived to be manifested later on. If on the other hand, it is accepted that consciousness which is somewhat existent and non-existent, then this will amount to accept the view of the Jainas themselves.
Some other Cārvākas say that consciousness is not manifested but it is produced from these elements. The Jainas including Prabhācandra refute this view also. Here the question is: what type of causality is accepted in case of the elements; is it material causality or efficient causality? It cannot be material causality. Material cause generally follows in the effect. As such the elements will follow in consciousness, just as gold follows in golden ornaments. But that is not possible. The elements possess qualities like colour etc. and have the nature of supporting, moving, flowing and warming, while consciousness possesses not of these. If, on the other hand, elements are the efficient cause, then there must some other material; cause. But there is no other thing from which consciousness can be produced. Hence, the view of Cārvākas cannot be accepted.
Hence, ī is identical with the self. It is the conscious spirit. The self or ī is again divided into two classes, baddha and mukta. Baddhas are again subdivided into trasa and ٳ屹. Aī or non-living substance means the unconscious non-spirit. It is divided into five categories, viz., pudgala, ś, dharma, adharma and . These aī dravyas are firstly divided into two categories, viz., ū辱� and aū辱�. Rūpi� means those which have form, such as pudgala. Aū辱� means those which have no form, such as ś, dharma, adharma and . The first four aī substances, i.e. pudgala, ś, dharma and adharma are called پⲹ. Actually پⲹ substances are sub-divided into five classes, viz., ī (self), pudgala (matter), ś (space), dharma (motion) and adharma (rest). These are called 貹ñپⲹ, which possess constituent parts extending in space; while time or is the only anپⲹ-dravya which does not have any extension in space.
According to another classification, dravya is of three kinds, viz., sakṛiya, niṣkṛiya and ṛiⲹ-Ծṣkⲹ. ṛiⲹ dravyas are those which have the capacity of moving from place to place, such as pudgala and ī. ṣkṛiⲹ-ⲹ possesses the opposite nature of ṛiⲹ-dravya, such as ś and time. ṛiⲹ-niṣkṛiya dravyas are those which move about themselves undergoing changes. Dharma and adharma are ṛiⲹ-niskṛiya-dravya. Again, according to some, categories are of seven types, viz., ī, aī, , bandha, samvara, ԾᲹ and ǰṣa. Some others hold nine categories, by adding ṇy and 貹 to the foregoing seven. These nine categories are�ī, aī, ṇy, 貹, , samvara, ԾᲹ, bandha and ǰṣa. All of these categories are elaborately discussed in a latter chapter. Thus, substances are broadly divided into three categories: 1. First of all that which is purely conscious, such as ī. 2. Secondly that which are unconscious and has some form, such as pudgala. 3. Thirdly that which is unconscious and has no form, such as ś, dharma, adharma and . In the following lines, the extensive and non-extensive substances except the ī are discussed one by one.
Concept of jiva or self is discussed in another chapter. Here, only the non-living substances, i.e., ś, dharma, adharma, pudgala and are discussed briefly:
(i) Āś:
Āś is an پⲹ or extensive substance. Āś has been accepted as space container of all other substances. That means, ś is that substance, which is capable of allowing space or ś for all the things that enter into it; all the things have or entrance into ś. As a matter of fact, ī, pudgala, dharma, adharma and all exist in space. For an example, while a swan enters into the water of a pond, then the swan has into the water and the water gives him ś or space. That means, ś is the of all the dravyas. Āś includes dik in its category, because ś gives ś to all the things. Space in form of east, west etc. is based on the rise of the sun. For instance, the east is in the direction of sunrise. Hence direction like east etc. is produced by ś and is cognized therein. So, the Jainas hold that dik also comes under ś. They do not agree with the Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas who maintain that dik is a separate substance. Prabhācandra categorically says that there is no need to accept dik as a separate substance.
Āś is non-conscious, all-pervasive, eternal and formless. It has infinite number of ś. ʰś means part where ś is surrounded by many 貹. Each ś has the capacity to give space to one smallest particle of each dravya, i.e., ī, pudgala etc.
According to the Vaiśeṣikas, ś is regarded as a material substance. Ś岹 or sound is the quality of ś, through which ś is known. It is one, allpervading and eternal. But the Jainas do not agree with the Vaiśeṣikas. They hold that is the quality of ś and not ś岹. According to them, sound is a substance and not a quality. The ʰⲹ첹ٲṇḍ offers inference to show that sound is a substance. The inference runs thus: sound is a substance, because the qualities of touch, 貹ٱ-ٳٱ-貹ṇa, ṃk, ṃyDz etc. are found to stay in ś岹. All the things which possess qualities are known as dravyas. So, sound is also a substance.
Prabhācandra, in his ʰⲹ첹ٲṇḍ has clearly discussed these qualities of sound or ś岹 in detail for the establishment of sound as a substance not as a quality of ś.
1. Firstly, Prabhācandra says that the quality of sound is touch, because sound is the cause of ٲ (beat) of other substances which is related with it like a staff. It is well-known fact that the sound of a vessel of brass being related with sound in general becomes the cause of ٲ of ear. If it is not the quality of sound, then the ٲ of ear is not possible. He also says that the substances which do not have the quality of touch, cannot have any relation of that substance with others, just as the which is devoid of touch, has no relation with any substance. So, sound or ś岹 is a substance. It is not the quality of ś.
2. Secondly, Prabhācandra argues that sound is a substance, because it is the locus of the quality of size like alpatva (smallness), mahattva (largeness) etc. Just as, smallness is found in the fruits like berry etc., similarly there is largeness and smallness in sound. So, ś岹 is not the quality of ś.
3. Thirdly, he says that as ṃk is a quality of sound, so it is a substance. Sound possesses number like one, two, many etc., just like ghaṭa, paṭa etc. So, it is a substance not the quality of ś.
4. Fourthly, ṃyDz is the quality of sound, because it is seen that sound is obstructed by air just as sand, paper etc. are obstructed by air. When sand, paper etc. are connected with hand, air etc., then only these are seen to be obstructed. Similarly sound becomes obstructed by air, only when it comes in contact with air. Hence, conjunction is a quality of ś岹 and as such ś岹 is a substance.
5. Fifthly, Prabhācandra argues that if ś岹 is accepted as the quality of ś, then it will be something which is mediate (貹ǰṣa). Ā첹 is a 貹ǰṣa substance, whereas sound is known by perception and as such is immediate (ٲⲹṣa). It is a fact that the qualities of 貹ǰṣa-dravya cannot be ٲⲹṣa, like the colour etc. of atoms. Hence, sound is only a substance and not a quality of ś.
6. Sixthly, the Vaiśeṣikas hold that ś which is partless is the inherent cause of ś岹. Prabhācandra here argues that if such is the case then ś岹 will also be allpervasive and eternal, being the quality of ś, which is all-pervasive and eternal. But this is in contradiction to the view of the Vaiśeṣikas who hold that sound is momentary and remains in one part of ś. In that case ś will be required to have various parts. In this way the view of the Jainas that ś is composed of parts is established.
7. Prabhācandra also argues, if sound is the quality of ś, then it will be not destroyed. But destruction of sound is admitted by the Vaiśeṣikas. Hence, ś岹 is not a quality but a substance. By inference also, the Jainas hold that ś岹 or sound comes under pudgala. Prabhācandra says that ś岹 is a pudgala since it is perceived by us, is non-conscious and possesses action like arrow etc.
In this way, establishing that sound is a substance and not a quality of ś. Prabhācandra proceeds to establish that is the quality of ś, where all the things got space or ś. But, the Vaiśeṣikas do not agree with Prabhācandra. They argue that if all the things get into ś, then where does ś get ? Prabhācandra here replies that as ś is also an allpervasive substance, so the cause of of it is ś itself. The substances which are not all-pervasive cannot have in itself. Light (ś) and darkness (Ի) are not all-pervasive, so these cannot have own .
Āś is the cause of of ś and Ի. So, or entrance is the quality of ś not ś岹 or sound.
Āś is of two types, viz., lokś and alokś. Lokś is that where ī, pudgala, dharma, adharma and are exists; while, alokś is that which is beyond of this lokś.
(ii) Dharma:
ٳپⲹ is the principle of motion. It is devoid of the qualities of taste, colour, smell, sound etc., which are the attributes of matter. Therefore, it is non-material. It is also non-conscious, like ś; so, it is non-psychical.
Dharma is also all-pervasive. It is said to pervade the whole of the lokś. It is an inactive substance. It is also formless. Though it is inactive, yet it helps the selves and the pudgalas for their movement from one place to another place. As a matter of fact, although the selves and matter have got the capacity of movement, yet they cannot move unless the medium of motion can help them for their movement. Dharma does not create motion, it only helps them. Just like, a fish swims in the river, but water does not create swimming, it only helps the fish to develop the tendency of swimming.
Dharma is of three kinds, viz., skandha, ś and ś. Dharma as a whole is known as skandha. A largest fraction of skandha is called ś and a smallest fraction of ś is called ś.
(iii) Adharma:
پⲹ is the principle of rest. Like dharma, it is also devoid of taste, colour, touch, smell etc., which are the attributes of matter. So, it is nonmaterial. It is also non-conscious like ś, dharma etc.;so, it is non-psychical.
پⲹ is all-pervasive. It is an inactive entity. It is also formless. It is also said to pervade the whole of the lokś, i.e., both dharma and adharma pervade the lokś, just as oil pervades the whole of a mustard seed. Adharma helps the substances to take a rest. As a matter of fact, though it is an inactive entity, yet it helps the selves and the pudgalas when they take rest. The matter and the selves are stopped by themselves, but adharma or rest simply helps them in this act of stopping or resting, just as a tree is helpful to a person who comes from far distance in the hot sun, and wants to take some rest under it.
Like dharma, adharma is also of three kinds, viz., skandha, ś and ś. Adharma as a whole is called skandha. A largest fraction of skandha is known as ś and a smallest fraction of ś is called ś.
(iv) :
is the only anپⲹ or non-extensive substance. Time or is an eternal, inactive and formless substance like ś, dharma and adharma. Time is not perceived but only inferred. Continuance is the characteristics of time or . Continuance, modification, movement, newness and oldness of substances are the functions or characteristics of time. Without time the continuance existension of a thing is not possible. The modification of a thing is created by time. Their movements also occur in time. The newness and oldness of a thing also depend on time. Hence, these are the functions or characteristics of time. So, it can be said that the existent of time can be inferred.
or time is of two types, viz., (i) paramārtha and (ii) vyavahāra. Paramārtha is also known as mukhya. Paramārtha is the auxiliary cause of continuance of substances, i.e., continuance is the function of mukhya or paramārtha. While, vyavahāra is the auxiliary cause of changes or modifications of substances, i.e., modifications, movements, newness and oldness are the functions of vyavahāra.
Mukhya or paramārtha is the material cause of vyavahāra, because, vyavahāra has a beginning and an end. It is also consists of varieties of moments, such as, days, weeks, months, seconds, minutes, hours etc. All of these are not possible without the mukhya, i.e., mukhya produce the vyavahāra, just like, without the existence of mukhya, the existence of ṇa is not possible. Paramārtha is of various kinds. It consists of minute particles. The universe is full of these particles of time. Every space-unit contains time-unit. No space-unit is devoid of it. So, it can be said that the particles of time are indivisible, innumerable and formless. In ʰⲹ첹ٲṇḍ, Prabhācandra has quoted a line from ṛhⲹṃg of Nemicandra, where Nemicandra says that the particles of time exist one by one in each ś of lokś, just as the heaps of jewels exist one by one in jewels. Hence, time is not one, but it is an eternal and innumerable substance.