365bet娱乐

Generally in Indian philosophical thought, two words are used for knowledge, viz., 箩帽腻苍补 and 辫谤补尘腻. The word 箩帽腻苍补 stands for all kinds of cognition true and false. But the word 辫谤补尘腻 is used only in the sense of true knowledge or yath膩rtha-箩帽腻苍补. True knowledge is distinct from false knowledge or ayath膩rtha箩帽腻苍补 which is known as a辫谤补尘腻, such as knowledge of rope in the snake. 笔谤补尘腻 means right knowledge of an object. It means valid experience. It is free from all kinds of doubts, errors etc. Right judgment about an object is 辫谤补尘腻. In knowledge, knower is known as 辫谤补尘腻t膩, the knowing object is known as prameya and the means of knowledge is known as 辫谤补尘腻峁嘺. Without 辫谤补尘腻峁嘺, prameya is not known, because 辫谤补尘腻峁嘺 is the 办补谤补峁嘺 (instrument) of 辫谤补尘腻. That means the instrument of 辫谤补尘腻 or valid knowledge is called 辫谤补尘腻峁嘺. A 办补谤补峁嘺 is conceived as the unique cause through which the action of a particular effect is produced. So, 辫谤补尘腻峁嘺 is the means of right knowledge. Though all accept 辫谤补尘腻峁嘺 as the 办补谤补峁嘺 of 辫谤补尘腻, yet there are differences of opinion regarding the nature of 辫谤补尘腻峁嘺.

The Jainas generally define 辫谤补尘腻峁嘺 as knowledge which is self-revealing as well as object-revealing. It is clear from all kinds of obstacle. This is the general definition given by the Jaina logicians. Samantabhadra defines 辫谤补尘腻峁嘺 as knowledge which knows its nature along with the object. Siddhasena defines 辫谤补尘腻峁嘺 as knowledge which reveals itself and its object and also free from all kinds of obstacle. Akala峁卥a defines 辫谤补尘腻峁嘺 as knowledge which is un-contradicted and also which manifests unknown object. Though these definitions differ in their language, yet their meanings are the same.

M膩峁噄kyanandi defines 辫谤补尘腻峁嘺 as that knowledge whose nature is the determination of itself as well as objects which are previously not known. In this definition, there are five terms, viz., (i) sva (ii) 补辫奴谤惫补, (iii) artha, (iv) 惫测补惫补蝉腻测腻迟尘补办补 and (v) 箩帽腻苍补. Here, 箩帽腻苍补 means knowledge. Sva means itself. 础辫奴谤惫补 means new and artha means object. So, 补辫奴谤惫腻谤迟丑补 means that object, which is quite new, i.e., it is not known before. The word 惫测补惫补蝉腻测腻迟尘补办补 is the adjective of the word 箩帽腻苍补. Hence, 辫谤补尘腻峁嘺 means that determinate knowledge which not only reveals itself but also reveals the new object. It means that 辫谤补尘腻峁嘺 is knowledge which is truly of determinate nature. If it is not determinate, then it cannot contradict error, doubt etc. It is also of the form of knowledge because it knows the right things and does not accept wrong things. Thus, 辫谤补尘腻峁嘺 means the determinate knowledge of an object. Explaining this 蝉奴迟谤补 giving the definition of 辫谤补尘腻峁嘺, Prabh膩candra refutes different theories of 辫谤补尘腻峁嘺 forwarded by different philosophers. First of all he refutes the 办腻谤补办补蝉腻办补濒测补惫腻诲补 of the old Naiy膩yikas. Jayanta Bha峁�峁璦, one of the most famous Naiy膩yikas, defines 辫谤补尘腻峁嘺 as the collocation (蝉腻尘补驳峁浤�) of conscious and non- conscious conditions which gives rise to the knowledge of objects that is un-contradicted and devoid of doubt. Jayanta also makes it clear that 辫谤补尘腻峁嘺 is the instrument (办补谤补峁嘺) of cognition and that 办补谤补峁嘺 is the collocation of different factors. Hence, in this view, 辫谤补尘腻峁嘺 is nothing but a collocation. This theory is referred to by Prabh膩candra as 办腻谤补办补蝉腻办补濒测补惫腻诲补, i.e., the theory of collocation of all conditions.

Prabh膩candra refutes the theory of 办腻谤补办补蝉腻办补濒测补. He says that the word 箩帽腻苍补 in the definition of 辫谤补尘腻峁嘺 given by M膩峁噄kyanandi serves the purpose of refuting this theory that the aggregate or collocation of all the conditions giving rise to knowledge constitutes 辫谤补尘腻峁嘺. 笔谤补尘腻峁嘺 means the 办补谤补峁嘺 of cognition and 办补谤补峁嘺 is defined as 蝉腻诲丑补办补迟补尘补尘 (i.e., the most efficacious condition). Prabh膩candra argues that collocation of conscious and non-conscious conditions cannot be the most efficacious condition for giving rise to knowledge of the self as well as of others, because collocation is of the nature of a箩帽腻苍补 (ignorance), just like an object of cognition (prameya). Knowledge which is contradictory to ignorance can only reveal itself and others and as such it should be accepted as the 办补谤补峁嘺 of right cognition, i.e., 辫谤补尘腻峁嘺. The object is manifested by knowledge; without knowledge an object cannot be manifested, just as, without lamp a room is not manifested. So, knowledge is the cause. Prabh膩candra argues that 辫谤补尘腻峁嘺 is knowledge which reveals both itself and its object. But 办腻谤补办补蝉腻办补濒测补 is not of that nature. Because, it is both conscious and non-conscious. The things which are nonconscious cannot produce knowledge. Although conscious and non鈥揷onscious conditions are the secondary causes for producing knowledge, none of these is the extra鈥搊rdinary cause. For both natures, i.e., conscious and non鈥揷onscious, 办腻谤补办补蝉腻办补濒测补 cannot reveal itself, so it cannot reveal its object. An object is manifested by knowledge. So, knowledge is the cause. Hence, 办腻谤补办补蝉腻办补濒测补 is not the cause of valid knowledge and it is not 辫谤补尘腻峁嘺.

After refuting the 办腻谤补办补蝉腻办补濒测补惫腻诲补 of the Naiy膩yikas, Prabh膩candra proceeds to refute the theory of 蝉补苍苍颈办补谤峁�a forwarded by the Ny膩ya-Vai艣e峁�ikas. The Ny膩ya-Vai艣e峁�ikas accept four 辫谤补尘腻峁嘺s, viz., 辫谤补迟测补办峁�a, anum膩na, upam膩na and 艣补产诲补. Of these 辫谤补迟测补办峁�a or perception is defined as that knowledge which is generated by sense-object-contact (ind峁沬y膩rtha蝉补苍苍颈办补谤峁�ajanya峁� 箩帽腻苍补峁� 辫谤补迟测补办峁�am). Hence, in their view 蝉补苍苍颈办补谤峁�a or the relation between the object and sense-organs is the 办补谤补峁嘺, 辫谤补尘腻峁嘺 or perception. This sense-object-contact is of six kinds, viz., (a) 蝉补峁儁辞驳补, (b) 蝉补峁儁耻办迟补蝉补尘补惫腻测补, (c) 蝉补峁儁耻办迟补蝉补尘补惫别迟补蝉补尘补惫腻测补, (d) 蝉补尘补惫腻测补, (e) samaveta蝉补尘补惫腻测补 and (f) 惫颈艣别峁�a峁嘺惫颈艣别峁�y补产丑腻惫补. In all perceptual knowledge, sense鈥搊bject contact is necessary.

Prabh膩candra refutes this view. He argues that 蝉补苍苍颈办补谤峁�a cannot be the 办补谤补峁嘺 or instrument of knowledge. 碍补谤补峁嘺 is the most efficacious condition. That is called the most efficacious condition, the existence of which entails the production of the effect and the non-existence of which results in the non production of the effect. But in case of 蝉补苍苍颈办补谤峁�a this is not noticed. Even though there is 蝉补苍苍颈办补谤峁�a, sometimes knowledge does not arise. For an example, a jar is perceived by the eye when it has 蝉补峁儁辞驳补-蝉补苍苍颈办补谤峁�a with the eye. But 腻办腻艣补 (ether) is not perceived by the eye even though there is 蝉补峁儁辞驳补鈥�蝉补苍苍颈办补谤峁�a between the eyes and the 腻办腻艣补. Hence, even though there is the existence of 蝉补苍苍颈办补谤峁�a, resultant knowledge does not arise. Similarly there is 蝉补峁儁耻办迟补蝉补尘补惫腻测补蝉补苍苍颈办补谤峁�a between eyes and the colour of the jar, and as such the eyes apprehend the colour of the jar. But there is no perception of sound and taste by the eyes even though there is 蝉补峁儁耻办迟补蝉补尘补惫腻测补蝉补苍苍颈办补谤峁�a. By 蝉补峁儁耻办迟补蝉补尘补惫别迟补蝉补尘补惫腻测补蝉补苍苍颈办补谤峁�a, the eye cannot apprehend the rasatva of the rasa belonging to a mango. By 蝉补尘补惫腻测补蝉补苍苍颈办补谤峁�a, the eye cannot apprehend the 艣补产诲补 of 腻办腻艣补. By samaveta蝉补尘补惫腻测补蝉补苍苍颈办补谤峁�a, the eye cannot apprehend the 艣补产诲补tva of the 艣补产诲补 of 腻办腻艣补. By 惫颈艣别峁�a峁嘺惫颈艣别峁�y补产丑腻惫补, the eye cannot apprehend the absence of ether. Thus, all these 蝉补苍苍颈办补谤峁�asdo not produce knowledge. Hence, 蝉补苍苍颈办补谤峁�a cannot be the 办补谤补峁嘺 of 辫谤补尘腻. The Ny膩ya-Vai艣e峁�ikas here try to contradict the Jaina objection by pointing out that the sense-object contact or 蝉补苍苍颈办补谤峁�a can produce knowledge only when it has the capacity to produce it. But Prabh膩candra counters that if it is the 测辞驳测补迟腻 which produces knowledge, and then what is the necessity to accept this sense-object-contact as the 办补谤补峁嘺 of 辫谤补尘腻? So, 蝉补苍苍颈办补谤峁�a is not the 办补谤补峁嘺 of 辫谤补尘腻峁嘺.