365bet

A study of the philosophy of Jainism

by Deepa Baruah | 2017 | 46,858 words

This page describes the Conclusion from the study of the philosophy of Jainism: one of the oldest religions in India having its own metaphysics, philosophy and ethics. Jainism is regarded as an ethical system where non-violence features as an important ethical value.

Chapter VI - Conclusion

From our foregoing discussion it has been clear that Jainism is one of the most important heterodox philosophical systems of India which has emerged in 6 century B.C. It is one of the oldest religions in India having its own dogma, metaphysics, philosophy, mythology, ethics and rituals. It occupies a unique place in the philosophical mileage of India. The Jaina literature has been found in two different languages, mostly in Prākṛt and also in Sanskrit. Most of the early literature is not available now. One of the most famous works of Jaina literature is ʰⲹ첹ٲṇḍ of Prabhācandra. It is a comprehensive Sanskrit commentary on ʲīṣāmܰ󲹲ūٰ which is a work on Jaina logic by Māṇikyanandi. It is an encyclopaedic work on Indian philosophy. It is a specific work on Indian logic. It is the treasure house of Indian philosophical thoughts. It has not only elaborated the Jaina thoughts, but has also systematically presented the opponents� view points. That means, Prabhācandra systematically presents the ū貹ṣa views in a thorough and authentic manner. After that he finally establishes the ܳٳٲ貹ṣa views i.e. the Jaina views. In ʰⲹ첹ٲṇḍ, all the important topics of Jaina philosophy, viz., the concept of knowledge, 貹īٲپ岹 of the Jainas, categories or substance, the concept of matter or pudgala, the doctrine of the self, the theory of karma, liberation, ԱԳٲ岹, 屹岹, Բⲹ岹 etc are discussed. In the following lines we are going to summarise our findings.

1. The date of Prabhācandra is not clearly known. For deciding the date of Prabhācandra we have taken the help of internal and external sources. And from our study it is concluded that Prabhācandra belonged to the later part of 11 century A.D. or earlier part of 12 century A.D.

2. Prabhācandra’s contribution to Jaina theory of knowledge is immense. According to Prabhācandra, knowledge is cetana (conscious) and different from its object. It is cetana. It is self-revealing as well as object-revealing. It is not known by another knowledge. In determining the nature of knowledge Prabhācandra has refuted the views of different philosophers, viz., the Buddhists, the ṃkⲹ, the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas, the Nyayāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas. He has refuted the Buddhists view that knowledge possesses the form of object and established that knowledge and its objects are different from each other. Refuting the ṃkⲹ and the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas view, Prabhācandra points out that knowledge is selfrevealing and as well as object-revealing. He also rejects the Mīmāṃsakas view that knowledge is 貹ǰṣa. In his view, knowledge is directly perceived. Against the Nyayāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas, Prabhācandra’s rejoinder is that knowledge is not known by any other knowledge.

ʰṇa in Jaina philosophy means that determinate knowledge which reveals itself as also a new object. Explaining the ūٰ giving the definition of ṇa, Prabhācandra refutes different theories of ṇa also. He has refuted the 첹첹ⲹ岹 of Jayanta ṭṭ, ԲԾ첹ṣa岹 of the Nyayāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas.

The Jainas do not agree with other Indian philosophers regarding the number of ṇas. They accept only two ṇas, viz., ٲⲹṣa and 貹ǰṣa. There are again many sub-varieties of these two ṇas. Following Māṇikyanandi Prabhācandra has established that ٲⲹṣa is that knowledge of an object which does not require any other knowledge to reveal it. That is what is said as clear knowledge. Prabhācandra has also established that perception or ٲⲹṣa does not arise from sense-object-contact as held by other philosophers. It is divided into two categoris, viz., ṃvⲹ첹 and mukhya.

Prabhācandra has discussed about 貹ǰṣa-ṇa and said that it is unclear knowledge. It is divided into five categories, viz., ṛt, pratyabhijñāna, tarka, ԳܳԲ and . He has explained the definitions of all these types of knowledge refuting the opponents� views. The ԳܳԲ-ṇa of the Nyayāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas is included by the Jainas in 貹ǰṣa-ṇa. Prabhācandra has discussed about this ṇa more or less in the line of the Nyayāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas. However, regarding the avayavas of ԳܳԲ, Prabhācandra points out that the five avayavas are not necessary and only two, viz., 貹ṣa or پñ and hetu will serve the purpose.

Following all the Jaina philosophers, Prabhācandra has also accepted 貹īٲپ as the theory of error. In this context he has refuted the other theories forwarded by different philosophers about the nature of error. վ貹īٲپ岹 means an illusory experience which is not a complex web of perception and memory, but it is a single perception. It is the apprehension of an object of its opposite nature.

The theory of ԱԳٲ岹 is the heart of Jainism, and 屹岹 and Բⲹ岹 are its two wings. ԱԳٲ岹 propounds that reality is many-sided and complex, i.e. an object has infinite number of attributes. Nothing can be said to possess a character or characters absolutely. It does not regard the one sided point of view of a thing. 屹岹 holds a unique position in Jainism. It is a synthetic method of sevenfold judgment or steps to define the nature of a thing positively and negatively. ⲹ岹 means the particular standpoint about an object which knows only one part. Prabhācandra has discussed all these things elaborately.

3. According to the Jainas, a reality consists of substance and its modes. The Jaina categories or substances are divided into two classes, viz., پⲹ and anپⲹ. پⲹ substances are sub-divided into five classes, viz., ī, pudgala, ś, dharma and adharma. These are called 貹ñپ첹ⲹ. Anپⲹ substance is . Prabhācandra has explained the different types of categories in the line of other Jaina philosophers. He has maintained that a category or substance can possess many characters at the same time. Substance possesses the characteristics of origination, decay and permanence. In this context Prabhācandra has refuted the theory of the momentariness of the Buddhists. He proved that substance is not momentary but possesses permanence.

The pudgala is used in the sense of matter in Jainism. Prabhācandra points out that material substance can combine together to form larger and larger wholes and can also break up into smaller and smaller parts. The smallest parts of matter are called or atoms. Prabhācandra rejects the Vaiśeṣikas view about avayava and ⲹī as two different things and holds that they are not totally distinct nor totally identical with one another.

4. As regards the concept of self Prabhācandra does not differ from his predecessors and upholds the view in the line of other Jaina philosophers. According to Jainism, the ī or self is an eternal substance, which is 屹ⲹ, is the knower, enjoyer and active agent. The most important quality of the self is consciousness, which is manifested in two ways, viz., vision and knowledge, which are jointly called upayoga. The self is naturally perfect and is endowed with four infinite qualities, viz., infinite vision, infinite power, infinite bliss and infinite knowledge.

In ʰⲹ첹ٲṇḍ, Prabhācandra has vehemently refuted the Buddhist theory of not self. The Buddhists do not accept any eternal substance called self other than some particular modes of joy, sorrow etc. Refuting this view Prabhācandra has established that the existence of the self is directly perceived through self cognition.

One of the most controversial views of the Jainas refers to the size of the self. Whereas all other philosophical schools of Indian uphold either all-pervasive size or atomic size of the self, the Jainas postulate that the self is of the size of the body which it occupies. Prabhācandra, in ʰⲹ첹ٲṇḍ, has critisized all the views of the opponents� and pointed out that the self cannot be all- pervasive and partless. He also establishes that the self is not of any definite size; it is subject to change due to changing circumstances. It contracts and expands according to the size of the body in which it resides.

5. According to the Jainas, karman is the root cause of the bondage of the self. One of the peculiar views of the Jainas is that karman is the subtle particle of matter called pudgala. Because of this karma-pudgala the ī gets bondage and liberation. The bondage of the self is caused by its contact with the karma-pudgala and self attains liberation for its complete stoppage and dissociation from karmicmatter. The self comes under bondage of karma-pudgala because of and bandha and becomes free from all the karma-pudgalas through samvara and ԾᲹ. This general view of the Jainas is shared by Prabhācandra also and he has provided brief discussions on these topics in ʰⲹ첹ٲṇḍ.

To safeguard the above mentioned unique view of karman of the Jainas Prabhācandra has categorically refuted the view of the Vaiśeṣikas regarding karman as separate category.

He also refuted the views of the Buddhists and the ṃkⲹ in order to establish the Jaina view that the pure knowledge of the self is not revealed because of the 屹ṇa of 첹ܻ岵. The Buddhists regard karman as a quality of the self and not a pudgala. Similarly the ṃkⲹ maintain that the karman is an evolute of ʰṛt. Prabhācandra has critically examined both these views and rejected them.

When the self is fully freed from these karma-particles, it possesses boundless happiness, because consciousness is the essential quality of the self, then it realizes its own nature, i.e. infinite bliss, infinite vision, infinite knowledge and infinite power. According to Prabhācandra, the four infinite qualities i.e. sendless vision, endless knowledge, endless power and endless bliss are the nature of liberation. Because, these four qualities are the real nature of the self attainment of which leads the self to liberation.

There is a difference between the two sects of Jainism regarding the concept of liberation between men and women. According to the Ś峾, women also have the capability to attain liberation. According to Digambaras, women cannot attain liberation. Prabhācandra sides with the Digambaras and gives arguments to establish that women are not capable of attaining liberation. For the attainment of liberation, the Jainas prescribe that right-faith (ⲹ-岹śԲ), right-knowledge (ⲹ-ñԲ) and right-conduct (ⲹ-ٰ). These three together constitute the way to liberation. These three are called the three jewels in Jainism. Prabhācandra also admits that there are three means for the attainment of liberation, these are: right-faith, right-knowledge and right-conduct, which are called three jewels.

In this way, we find that the Jaina concept of the theory of knowledge, ԱԳٲ岹, 屹岹, Բⲹ岹, the self and its size, karma-pudgala etc. are elaborately discussed by Prabhācandra in ʰⲹ첹ٲṇḍ. The Jaina philosophy holds a unique position in Indian philosophy with its material karman and intermediary size of the self.

Let's grow together!

I humbly request your help to keep doing what I do best: provide the world with unbiased sources, definitions and images. Your donation direclty influences the quality and quantity of knowledge, wisdom and spiritual insight the world is exposed to.

Let's make the world a better place together!

Like what you read? Help to become even better: