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Nonapprehension is admitted by the 叠丑腻峁�峁�补 惭墨尘腻峁僺补办补蝉 to explain the cognition of nonexistence. The main argument is that nonexistence cannot be known by perception. For perception a contact between the sense and the object is necessary. But no such contact is possible between a sense and nonexistence. Therefore it is necessary to admit a separate 辫谤补尘腻峁嘺. 狈测腻测补 claims that nonexistence can be known by perception and the contact in that case will be qualifier-ness (vi艣e峁�a峁嘺t膩). But it cannot be called a relation at all, because a relation is defined as something which is different from both the relate, located in both and also one and the same. It is said that nonexistence is perceived by a sense. But the perception of nonexistence is not possible without the perception of the locus. So the sense becomes powerless after giving the awareness of the locus itself and cannot reach nonexistence.

Udayana gives many arguments to show that the above position is not logical.^[1] First, the awareness of nonexistence is a direct one, it is not a kind of mediated knowledge. Such knowledge can be produced only by the sense. Hence it is to be accepted as a kind of perception. It has been objected that the sense loses its power by producing the awareness of the locus. But it is illogical. When a sense produces cognition it acts through some intermediate function (惫测腻辫腻谤补). The knowledge of the locus is actually such a function in the case of perception of nonexistence. An instrument does not become powerless by such a function. If it is not admitted, then, it may be argued that in the case of the perception of a jar the sense becomes powerless when it gets conjoined with the object and the visual sense cannot produce the perception of the jar. But the fact is that the sense-object contact is the intermediate function and through it the visual sense produces the perception of the jar. Moreover every kind of indirect knowledge is produced by some kind of a specific knowledge, e.g. inference by the knowledge of pervasion, comparison by the knowledge of similarity etc. But the knowledge of nonexistence does not require any kind of knowledge for its knowledge. So it must be a kind of direct knowledge. Direct knowledge is always perceptual.

Some other arguments for the 狈测腻测补 view are also given.^[2] In the case of 辫谤补尘腻峁嘺s other than perception it is found that the nonexistence and its negatum are both cognized by the same 辫谤补尘腻峁嘺. For example, a jar and its nonexistence. Are both known by a inference? The same rule should apply in the case of perception also. Just as a sense can perceive the negatum it should also be able to perceive the nonexistence. Moreover, in the case of false knowledge, the cause or the defect is always found to be located in the instrument of knowledge. If it is admitted that non-existence can be perceived, the instrument will be a sense. A defect can be located in a sense. But if it is admitted that non apprehension is the instrument for the knowledge of nonexistence, it cannot be said that the defect is located there. Thus if the 惭墨尘腻峁僺腻 view is accepted there can be no explanation for a wrong awareness of nonexistence. There will be another difficulty also. The knowledge of nonexistence is an awareness of one thing qualified by another. For example, when no jar is present on the ground we have an awareness of nonexistence in the form 鈥淭he ground as qualified by the absence of jar鈥�. In this awareness there are two things鈥搊ne is the ground and the other is absence or nonexistence. The opponent says that a positive category is known by perception and absence is known by non-apprehension. Thus perception will be applicable to only the ground and non-apprehension to the absence of a jar only. But the awareness of nonexistence is a single knowledge involving both a positive and a negative category. So there will be a problem. But in the 狈测腻测补 view both categories can be known by perception and then there will be no difficulty. Udayana concludes the discussion by pointing out some peculiarities of the perception of nonexistence. For example, generally in the case of a qualified knowledge, the knowledge of the qualifier is of the nature of an indeterminate knowledge, as in the case of the knowledge of a jar qualified by jar-ness. But in the case of the perception of nonexistence, the knowledge of the qualifier, i.e. absence is produced by a determinate knowledge. It is also to be noted that the relation between nonexistence and its locus is svrar奴pa, and not 惫补颈艣颈峁ａ弓测补, a special kind of relation admitted for the case of nonexistence only by the 惭墨尘腻峁僺补办补蝉. As usual Udayana ends the third stavaka with a verse describing the glory of God, which also indirectly points out that no source of knowledge is capable of disproving God and there can be no question of denying God鈥檚 existence and supreme validity.