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The opponent may contend that even if God鈥檚 absence is not established by non-apprehension, it may be proved by an inference. 狈测腻测补 claims that God is the agent who produces the world. It is observed that every effect must have an agent, e.g. a jar is produced by the potter, a cloth is produced by the weaver and so on. This world also is an effect and it also should be produced by an agent. This agent is none other than God. It is pointed out that this argument does not stand logically. It is proved that every effect has an agent but it is also found that every agent has a physical body. An agent without a physical body is never possible. But a physical body for God is not admitted by 狈测腻测补. Thus an inference disproving God is possible. Whoever is an agent is a thing with a physical body. But God has no physical body. Therefore God does not exist. The same can be proved from another viewpoint also. An agent always produces an effect to fulfill some purpose of his own. An agent does not act without any purpose, if there is no gain he does not put any effort. But God is admitted to be a person who is in need of nothing. God has attained everything and all prosperity belongs to him. In fact, there is no purpose on the part of God which may be satisfied by the creation of the world. Hence God cannot be an agent, because God has no purpose to be fulfilled. As against this position Udayana says that the opponent tries to prove by inference that there can be no agent-hood in God. The inferable property here is absence of agent-hood and the subject of inference (辫补办峁�a) is God. But the opponent does not admit the existence of God. In his view God is nonexistent. But the nonexistent can never be the subject of an inference. If the nonexistent is offered as the subject the inference becomes invalid. For example, one cannot offer an inference proving hardness in a hare鈥檚 horn. So the inference for God鈥檚 absence will become invalid. On the other hand, if the opponent claims that he admits God, but does not admit the presence of agent-hood in it, then, there will be contradiction. Actually the existence of God is proved as an agent. If at all God is accepted, it is to be accepted as the agent producing the world. Thus agent-hood in God is already established by the very 辫谤补尘腻峁嘺 which establishes its existence. So the opponent has either to concede that his inference is invalid or that his inference is contradicted by a 辫谤补尘腻峁嘺.^[1]

The opponent may try to disprove God in a different way. According to 狈测腻测补, God is included in the category of substance and specifically it belongs to the substance called 腻迟尘补苍. The opponent says that if we examine the nature of self, then we find that God cannot be admitted. 狈测腻测补 says that God is a self and it is omniscient. But this is not possible. Our experience shows that every self has limited knowledge. There is no self which can know all the things in the world. Moreover, 狈测腻测补 admits that God is the creator of the world. But we find that there is no self which can create the world. We find that every self has very limited power and it can perform only some specific functions. In short, a self in the form of God who is omniscient and all-powerful does not exist.

To this, Udayana says that if the opponent is trying to prove that no individual self can be so, then there is no contradiction with the 狈测腻测补 position. 狈测腻测补 also does not claim that an individual self is all-powerful and all-knowing. The opponent may say that he is referring to the supreme self which is supposed to be God. His point is that even such a supreme self cannot be all-powerful or all-knowing. Udayana replies that this is an absurd position. If the opponent does not admit any supreme self, he cannot also say anything about its nature. If he admits such a self and then tries to determine its nature, he will contradict his own view because he has to admit God itself.^[2]

Arguing further, the opponent may say that he does not admit God. But 狈测腻测补 claims that the existence of a supreme self is established by the scripture. The opponent is only trying to show that even the so called supreme self cannot be all knowing or allpowerful, because it also belongs to the class of self and hence must share its general properties. Udayana points out that such a claim also is not justified. The question is: does the opponent really admit the validity of the scripture? If the answer is positive, he cannot deny the existence of God. The scripture clearly speaks of the existence of God. If the opponent tries to offer an inference to disprove God it will be contradicted by the scripture and rejected. On the other hand, if the opponent does not accept the validity of the scripture there will be nothing called God in his view. So he cannot speak of the absence of certain properties in God. His argument will suffer from the fallacy of the unproved subject.^[3]

The main purpose of Udayana in the third stavaka is to show that no 辫谤补尘腻峁嘺 can establish the nonexistence of God. But incidentally Udayana also makes a general discussion on the nature of the different 辫谤补尘腻峁嘺s admitted by the different systems of Indian philosophy. He defends the Nyaya view that there are four 辫谤补尘腻峁嘺s only. He refutes the views of those who admit additional number of 辫谤补尘腻峁嘺s and also the view of others who claim that it is not necessary to admit all the four kinds of 辫谤补尘腻峁嘺s. So after showing that the existence of God cannot be disproved by inference, he goes on to establish the validity of inference which is rejected by the 颁腻谤惫腻办补.

Footnotes and references:

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[1]:

Ibid.

[2]:

狈测腻测补kusum膩帽jali 3.4.

[3]:

狈测腻测补kusum膩帽jali 3.5.