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As against the above Udayana first points out that just like a positive category an absence also can be a cause. There is no invariable rule that a cause is always a positive category. Actually a causal relation is established between two things through agreements in presence and in absence. In many instances it is found that there are such agreements with an absence. So it can be accepted as a cause. It cannot be said that absence has no reality. All the things of the world may be divided into two classes, positive and negative. An absence is as real as a positive category. It is not non-existent and also not identical with its locus.^[1]

The opponent may raise an objection in a different way. 狈测腻测补 says, for example, that a spell in the case of fire is a preventive factor (pratibandhaka). But the question is, does this spell do anything? If it does not do anything, it cannot be called a preventive. It can be so called only if it is admitted that this spell obstructs the production of fire by destroying the potency for burning. In reply, Udayana says that the 惭墨尘腻峁僺补办补蝉 has derived the word pratibandhaka in a wrong way. It is not to be taken as a word formed by the addition of a suffix in the sense of an agent. It is rather formed by adding the suffix ka to the word pratibandha (obstruction). This spell is only a pratibandha and not a pratibandhaka. Actually the pratibandhka is the person who makes use of the pratibandha. Thus, even though it is not admitted that the spell destroys potency, the person, since he performs a special function, may be accepted as the pratibandhaka.^[2]

Udayana further claims that the 惭墨尘腻峁僺补办补 cannot justify the use of the word pratibandhaka in the sense he himself desires, even by admitting potency as a category. Thus, it may be asked, how does a pratibandhaka really play its role: Does it destroy the potency itself or does it destroy some property of the potency, or does it produce some different property or does it simply remain without doing anything? The last alternative cannot be accepted simply because a preventive can be called a preventive only by performing some function. If the third alternative is admitted, it will follow that since the presence of this different property renders the production of the effect impossible, its absence must be accepted as one of the causes for the effect. In other words, the opponent will have to admit that absence also is a cause. The first two alternatives also are not acceptable. Since the effect is not produced when the preventive is there, it may be assumed that it has destroyed the potency or some of its properties. But since the effect is produced when there is the addition of a counteracting factor, it has to be assumed that the potency or its property has been produced again by that factor. This will lead to the absurd position that there is no fixed cause for an effect because in one case it is produced by a thing having the potency and in the other it is produced by a counter-acting factor.^[3]