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[Full title: 2. The Pr膩cina-Naiy膩yika Theory of Perception鈥擯erception according to Gautama]

Gautama, the founder of Pr膩cina-狈测腻测补 system defines perception as the non-erroneous cognition produced by the intercourse of the sense-organs with the objects, not associated with any name and well-defined (Indriy膩rthasannikar峁�otpannam J帽膩nam avyapadeshyam avyabhich膩ri 惫测补惫补蝉腻测腻迟尘补办补m 辫谤补迟测补办峁�am).^[1]

There are some important factors in this definition which need to be considered:

1. Perception is a kind of cognition (箩帽腻苍补).
2. It produces from the sense object contact which is the particular defining character according to Gautama.
3. It is invariable connected with/to the object that is, it is non-erroneous (补惫测补产丑颈肠腻谤颈).
4. It is not expressible in words (补惫测补辫补诲别艣测补尘).
5. It is well defined (惫测补惫补蝉腻测腻迟尘补办补).

In the first part of Gautama鈥檚 definition, the expression, 鈥減erception is a kind of cognition鈥� signifies the knowledge of an object. The object here includes substance (dravya), like a chair, a pot, a lamp etc. It also means quality (guna) like colour (谤奴辫补), touch (蝉辫补谤艣补), taste (rasa), smell (sukha) as well as pain (dukha). Thus the statement, 鈥減erception is a kind of cognition鈥�, also means the knowledge of pleasure or pain. The knowledge of substance like a chair and of quality like red colour is a kind of external perception while the knowledge of pleasure and pain is a kind of internal or mental perception.^[2]

The second part of Gautama鈥檚 definition indicates the etymological meaning of the term 辫谤补迟测补办峁�a which means the functioning of the sense-organs, with regard to each specific object.^[3] Perception is a kind of knowledge which is produced by the association of the soul with the mind, the association of the mind with the senses and the intercourse of the senses with their particular object. In Gautama鈥檚 definition of perception it is not mentioned that there is contact of the soul with the mind and the contact of the mind with the senses because he believes it is common to cognition generated by all the means of knowledge. The definition talks only about the distinctive cause of perceptual knowledge. The unique feature of Gautama鈥檚 definition is the contact of senses with the object, which is admitted by other philosophical systems too.

In the third part of Gautama鈥檚 definition, the term 鈥�补惫测补产丑颈肠腻谤颈鈥�, which means nonerroneous cognition, describes the logical conditions of valid perception i.e., it should uncontradicted with the real nature of the object. For instance, it is seen that in summers, the beams of the sun combines with the heat-beams radiating from the surface of the earth and hence the two jointly emerging at same distance come in contact with the sight of spectator who seems to have a direct perception of water producing from the sense-organ and the object-contact. In order to ignore such mistakes the term 补惫测补产丑颈肠腻谤颈 has been included to the definition.^[4]

The fourth and fifth parts of Gautama鈥檚 definition mentions about two stages of perception: (i) 补惫测补辫补诲别艣测补尘, i.e. which is not associated with a name and (ii) 惫测补惫补蝉腻测腻迟尘补办补m, i.e. which is well-defined. It is also known as indeterminate perception (nirvikalpa) and the other as determinate (savikalpaka).

In Gautama鈥檚 definition of perception, the word artha is rendered as 鈥渙bject鈥� which means 鈥渁 real thing鈥�, but it does not include anything of which one may know without the contact of senses. So, the term artha is taken in the sense of merely perceptible thing. No perception is possible without a contact between such an object and the senses. In the 狈测腻测补s奴tra, the word artha signifies the five qualities that belongs to the five elements i.e. earth (辫峁泃丑颈惫墨), fire (tejas), water (ap), air (惫腻测耻) and space (腻办腻艣补) from which the senses originate.^[5]

For Naiy膩yikas, Perception is relying upon the contact of the senses (indriya) with the object (artha). This connection is called 蝉补苍苍颈办补谤峁�a which is the 鈥渙perative relation鈥�. Gautama used the word 蝉补苍苍颈办补谤峁�a which includes both the entities (i.e. object and sense-organ).^[6]

Some would argue that the Gautama鈥檚 definition of perception is defective. Because in the process of perception, there is a contact between object and sense-organ which is associated with mind which is again associated with 腻迟尘补苍 or self. So, the soul and mind are essential causes of perception which cannot be refused, but the role of soul and mind is not given in Gautama鈥檚 definition.^[7]

The Naiy膩yikas reply to the argument that in the definition of perception, the specific cause of it has been given. 碍补谤补峁嘺 is defined as vy膩p膩ravad as膩dh膩ra峁嘺k膩ra峁嘺峁� 办补谤补峁嘺峁� (i.e. the uncommon cause along with intermediary is called a 办补谤补峁嘺峁�).^[8] But soul, mind etc. are not the specific causes but the common causes of perception. Also they are common in other 辫谤补尘腻峁嘺蝉 i.e. inference, comparison and testimony. Thus, it is important to state the features of perceptual knowledge which are distinct from other means of valid knowledge. It is not at all important to state the role played by the 腻迟尘补苍 and mind in the definition. Gautama鈥檚 definition was further discussed by his successors like 痴腻迟蝉测腻测补苍补, Uddyotakara, V膩caspati Mi艣ra and Jayanta Bha峁�峁璦 in detail.

Footnotes and references:

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[1]:

狈测腻测补s奴tra , 1.1.4.

[2]:

G.N. Jha, Indian Thought, vol.I, p.39.

[3]:

ak峁�asy膩k峁�asya prativi峁�aya峁� 惫峁泃迟颈岣� 辫谤补迟测补办峁�am. 狈测腻测补bh膩峁�ya , 1.1.3.

[4]:

痴腻迟蝉测腻测补苍补-bh膩峁�ya , 1.1.4.

[5]:

P峁泃hivy膩pastejo 惫腻测耻r腻办腻艣补miti bh奴t膩ni. 狈测腻测补s奴tra , 1.1.13.

[6]:

C.D. Bijalwan, op.cit., P.70.

[7]:

na tarh墨d膩n墨mida峁� bhavati, 腻迟尘腻 尘补苍补蝉腻 蝉补峁儁耻箩测补迟别, mana indriye峁嘺鈥漬dryamarthene鈥� iti. 狈测腻测补bh膩峁�ya , 1.1.4.

[8]:

S. Chatterjee, op.cit., p.156.