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Essay name: The Nyaya theory of Knowledge

Author: Satischandra Chatterjee
Affiliation: University of Calcutta / Department of Philosophy

This essay studies the Nyaya theory of Knowledge and examines the contributions of the this system to Indian and Western philosophy, specifically focusing on its epistemology. Nyaya represents a realist approach, providing a critical evaluation of knowledge.

Page 122 of: The Nyaya theory of Knowledge

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122 (of 404)


External source: Shodhganga (Repository of Indian theses)


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102
NYAYA THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE
function of knowledge, but not as inherent and self-evident in
all knowledge. In the theory of intuitionism, we find a close
approach to the view of self-evident validity. To the question
'How do we know that a belief is true or valid?' intuitionism
has a simple answer to give, namely, that we know it imme-
diately to be such. As Hobhouse puts the matter: "Intuition-
ism has a royal way of cutting this, and indeed most other
knots for it has but to appeal to a perceived necessity, to a
clear idea, to the inconceivability of the opposite, all of which
may be known by simply attending to our own judgment, and
its task is done." Among intuitionists, Lossky has made an
elaborate attempt to show that truth and falsity are known
through an immediate consciousness of their objectivity and
subjectivity respectively. For him, truth is the objective and
falsity the subjective appearance of the object. But how do
we know that the one is objective and the other is subjective?
The answer given by Lossky as also by Lipps is that we have
"an immediate consciousness of subjectivity" and "an imme-
diate consciousness of objectivity." To quote Lossky's own
words: "It is in this consciousness of objectivity and sub-
jectivity, and not. . . in the laws of identity, contradiction, and
excluded middle, that our thought has a real and immediate
guide in its search for truth."
It should be remarked here that the above theories of self-
evident truth or intrinsic validity give us a rather jejune and
untenable solution of the logical problem of truth. They leave
no room for the facts of doubt and falschood in the sphere of
knowledge. But any theory of truth which fails to explain its
correlate, namely, falsehood, becomes so far inadequate.
Further, it makes a confusion between psychological belief and
logical certainty. Psychologically a wrong belief may be as
firm as a right one. But this does not mean that there is no
distinction between the two. Subjective certitude, as such, can-
not be accepted as a test of truth. It is true that the theory of
1 Hobhouse, Theory of Knowledge, p. 488.
2 Lossky, The Intuitive Basis of Knowledge, pp. 227-29.

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