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There is much difference of opinion among Indian thinkers as to what the ultimate sources of human knowledge are. For the Carvakas, who are radical empiricists, perception is the only valid source of our knowledge and all true knowledge comes from perception. The Buddhists hold that perception and inference are the two ultimate sources of true knowledge, which include other sources like upamana and sabda. According to the Sankhya and the Yoga system, sabda or verbal testimony also should be recognised as an independent source of knowledge like perception and inference. The Sankhya includes upamana, arthapatti and sambhava under inference, and abhava under perception.' The Naiyayikas are in favour of the view that there are four independent sources of knowledge, namely, perception, inference, testimony and upamana or comparison. According to them, the other sources of knowledge may be included within these four and so need not be taken as ultimate or independent sources of knowledge. According to the Vaisesikas, there are four kinds of vidya or truc knowledge, namely, perception, inference, memory and intuitive experience (arsajnana). They include sabda, upamana, arthapatti, abhava, sambhava and aitihya within inference." But there is some difference of opinion as to whether all the four kinds of vidya or knowledge are independent sources of knowledge or not. It will follow from the definition of vidya as definite knowledge which is free from doubt and contradiction 1 Tattvakaumudi, kar. 5; Yoga-sutra, 1. 7. 2 Nyayakandali, pp. 213-31.

that all kinds of vidya are pramana or independent sources of knowledge. Sridhara in his Nyayakandali at first tells us that perception, inference and smrti or memory are treated first because they are laukika pramana or ordinary sources of knowledge, and then arsa because it is an extraordinary source of knowledge. But in the course of the discussion on smrti he observes that it is not a pramana because it depends on previous experience to give us knowledge of past objects. The Nyayalilavati," a compendium of the Vaisesika philosophy, establishes the view that smrti or memory is an independent source of knowledge like perception, inference and intuitive knowledge. In the later works of the Nyaya-Vaisesika philosophy, however, it is generally maintained that the Vaisesikas accept only perception and inference as two independent sources of knowledge." According to the Jainas, perception, both ordinary and extraordinary, inference, testimony, pratyabhijna or recognition and smrti or memory are all independent sources of knowledge, although they may be classified under the two heads of pratyaksa and paroksa, immediate and mediate knowledge.* The Prabhakaras hold that arthapatti or postulation should be accepted as a separate source of knowledge like perception, inference, testimony and comparison. The Bhattas and the Vedantins add anupalabdhi or non-perception to these five and maintain that there are six distinct sources of knowledge. The Pauranikas go further than this in holding that sambhava or probability and aitihya or tradition also are to be recognised as separate sources of knowledge like the six pramanas admitted by the Bhattas and the Vedantins." Now the question is this: How many independent sources of knowledge are we to accept? The Naiyayikas accept only four sources of knowledge as distinct and independent. These are perception, inference, comparison and testimony as explained 1 Vide pp. 186, 257. 2 Smrtirapi manantarameva, etc., Nyayalilavati, p. 67 (Bombay Edn.). 3 Vide Tarkikaraksa, p. 56; Tarkakaumudi, P. 7. 4 Vide Tattvarthadhigama-Sutra, I, 10-13. 禄Vide Tarkikaraksa, p. 56.

and discussed before. What then are they to say with regard to such alleged sources of knowledge as aitihya, sambhava. abhava or anupalabdhi, arthapatti, smrti, pratyabhijna and arsajnana? According to them, arsajnana or intuitive knowledge is a kind of extraordinary (alaukika) perception, while pratyabhijna is only a kind of qualified perception.' These two come under perception as an ultimate source of knowledge and are not themselves separate sources of knowledge. As regards aitihya or tradition, the Naiyayikas hold that it is a kind of testimony, of which the source is not definitely known." Tradition means the continuous communication of a body of ideas and beliefs from one generation to another. It has its origin in no living individual, but is enjoyed by all individuals as the common property of the race. Now the body of ideas and beliefs constituting a particular tradition is accepted as true on the authority of some person or persons, whoever they may be. We believe in tradition because we are pretty confident that it must have originally emanated from some reliable persons. As such, tradition is a form of vague testimony, in which we know certain things on the authority of some unknown persons. Similarly, sambhava may be included within inference. It may be taken to mean either probable knowledge or the knowledge of numerical inclusion. In the first sense it is illustrated when we expect rain from the appearance of clouds in the sky. Here we think that there will probably be rainfall because we know that clouds are generally followed by rain. But such probable knowledge is not prama or valid knowledge and so requires no pramana or source of knowledge to explain it. In the second sense, however, sambhava means the knowledge of the part from that of the whole within which it is included. Thus we know that there is a hundred within a 1 Vide Chaps. IX & X ante. Anirdistapravaktrkam pravada paramparyam aitihyam, Nyaya-Bhasya, 2. 2. 1. 3 Pracurasahacaryasamvedanat buddhirabadhita sambhavah, etc., P. 57. 4 Sambhavo nama avinabhavino 'rthasya sattagrahanadanyasya grahanam...tadapyanumanameva, Nyaya-Bhasya, 2. 2. 1-2. NI... satta-

thousand, a seer within a maund. Such knowledge is really inferential in character, since it depends on the knowledge of vyapti or invariable concomitance between the part and the whole. Hence sambhava need not be taken as a separate source of knowledge other than anumana or inference. The question as to whether arthapatti, abhava or anupalabdhi, and smrti should be recognised as separate sources of knowledge or not will be separately considered in the following sections.