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The function of the senses is to produce perception of objects. For a sense organ, to function is to give us immediate

knowledge about certain objects. How, then, do the senses. function to give us perception of objects? Is the activity of the senses conditioned by their contact with the objects of perception? Or, do they give us perception of objects without any contact with them? " According to the Buddhists, the senses function without direct contact with the objects of perception. They are all "distance receptors (aprapyakari), and do not require immediate contact with their objects. This is especially seen in the case of the senses of sight and hearing. We see far-off objects that cannot have any direct or approximate contact with the eyes. We hear sound produced at a long distance from our ears. Similarly, the eye perceives objects much larger than itself and so incapable of being covered by it. Again, the eye and the ear can perceive the distance and direction of sights and sounds respectively. This they could not, if, like the senses of smell, taste, and touch, they were in immediate contact with their objects. Lastly, many of us can, at the same time, see the same object or hear the same sound from different places. Conversely, one man can, almost at the same time, see two things or hear two sounds, fairly apart from each other. This shows that the senses of sight and hearing may function without actual contact with their respective objects." According to the Nyaya, Sankhya, Mimamsa and Vedanta systems, the senses can perceive only such objects as are in direct or indirect contact with them (prapyakari). This is obvious in the case of the so-called lower senses, namely, touch, taste and smell. Sensations of touch and taste arise only when the sense organs are in immediate contact with their respective objects. To taste a thing is to place it in direct contact with the tongue. To touch a thing is to bring it in contact with the skin. Sense-object contact as a condition of olfactory sensation is no less real, although it may sometimes be less obvious. If the smelling object be in our immediate 1 Nyaya-varttika and Nyaya-varttika-tatparya-tika, 1. 1. 4.

surrounding, there is obvious contact of it with the olfactory organ. If it be at a distance from us, then the odorous particles given off by the object are brought in actual contact with the sense organ by currents of air.' In the case of the lower senses, all systems of philosophy admit a direct sense-object contact. It is also admitted that the senses of smell, taste and touch remain passive in their end-organs where they are met by their respective stimuli. The remaining two senses of sight and hearing also act in contact with their objects, although not quite as directly as the rest. According to the Vedanta, the sense of hearing travels to the sounding objects and gives us sensations of sound. The Nyaya, however, agrees with modern science in holding that sound-waves sent by the object are received into the ear-passage and there perceived as sound." According to both the Nyaya and the Vedanta, the visual sense reaches out to its object and gives us colour-sensations. This is why the eye and the ear can perceive the distance and direction of their respective objects. While in modern science visual sensation is believed to be due to the transmission of light-waves from the object to the eye, in Indian philosophy it is explained by the emanation of light-rays from the eye to the object. Ordinarily the colour-rays are not visible, but are inferred as the medium of sense-object contact in visual perception. Still we may perceive them under certain special circumstances, as when they emanate from the eyes of cats and other animals in a dark night. The uninformed and the uncultured may not admit sense-object contact in the perception of distant objects, because the medium of such contact is imperceptible. But that there cannot be any perception without sense-object contact is implied in all cases of obstructed sense-activity (avaranopapatti). We cannot see things hidden behind and opaque body. Again, what seems to be a simultaneous perception of objects occupying different places, is really 1 Nyayamanjari, p. 479. 2 Vedanta-paribhasa, Ch. I. ³ Bhasapariccheda, 165-66.

a case of different perceptions occurring in quick succession. We perceive a near object earlier than a remote one, because our senses take a longer time to reach the latter. Hence senseobject contact is a condition of all perceptions.' According to all the Naiyayikas, sense-object contact (indriyarthasannikarsa), which is the cause of perception, is of six kinds. First, we have a case of direct contact which consists in the conjunction (samyoga) between sense and its object. In the visual perception of a substance like the jar, there is an immediate contact of the eyes with the object. The visual sense finds its way to the jar and becomes conjoined with it. Secondly, there may be an indirect contact of sense with its object through the mediation of a third term that is related to both. When we see the colour of the jar, our eyes come in contact with the colour through the medium of the jar. The jar is conjoined with the eyes on the one hand, and contains the colour as an inherent quality of it, on the other. Here the contact between sense and object is due to the object's (here colour) inseparable relation to what is conjoined with sense. Hence this sense-object contact is called samyuktasamavaya or a relation of inherence in what is conjoined to sense. Thirdly, sense-object contact may be more indirect than what we find in the preceding case. It may be due to the mediation of two terms which, by their relation, connect sense with its object. When by means of the eyes we perceive a universal like 'colourness' (rupatvadisamanya) inhering in the jar's colour, there is contact of the eyes with the object 'colourness' through the medium of the two terms 'jar' and 'colour.' This sense-object contact is called samyukta-samaveta-samavaya, since it is due to the object's inherence (samavaya) in something (here colour) which is inseparably related to (samaveta) what (here jar) is conjoined (samyukta) to sense. The fourth case of indirect sense-object contact is called samavaya or inherence. Here the sense is in contact with its 1 Nyaya-varttika and Nyaya-varttika-tatparya-tika, 1. 1. 4; Nyayamanjari, PP. 479 f.

object in so far as the object inheres as a quality in the sense itself. This is illustrated in the auditory perception of sound. The ear's contact with sound is due simply to the latter's inherence as a quality in its own substance, akasa, which constitutes the auditory sense. In the fifth case sense-object contact is called samaveta-samavaya or the relation of inherence in that which inheres in sense. Here the sense is in contact with its object through the medium of a third term that is inseparably related to both. Thus in the auditory perception of the universal' soundness' (sabdatva), the ear is in contact with the object soundness,' because it inheres in sound which, in its turn, inheres as a quality in the ear. The last type of sense-object contact is called visesanata or viscsyavisesanabhava. In it the sense is in contact with its object in so far as the object is a qualification (visesana) of another term connected with sense. It is by means of such sense-object contact that the Naiyayikas explain the perceptions of non-existence (abhava) and the relation of inherence (samavaya).' It takes different forms according to the different ways in which the mediating term is related to sense. Thus it is called samyukta-visesanata when the object is adjectival (visesana) to that which is conjoined (samyukta) to the sense organ. This is illustrated by the visual perception of the non-existence of a jar in a certain place. Here the eye is in contact with non-existence as a qualification (visesana) of the place which is in conjunction (samyukta) with the eye. Similarly, it is called samyukta-samavetavisesanata when the sense is related to an object that is adjectival (visesana) to what inheres (samaveta) in that which is conjoined (samyukta) to sense. Thus in the perception of the nonexistence of sound in the odour of the earth, our sense is in contact with the non-existence as a qualification of odour which inheres in the earth as conjoined to the sense. Or, it may be called samavetavisesanata when the object of perception is a qualification (visesana) of that which inheres (samaveta) in 1 Bhasapariccheda & Siddhanta-muktavali, 59-02.

sense. Thus when we perceive that there is no odour in sound, our sense is in contact with the non-existence of odour as a qualification of sound which inheres in the auditory organ. So too with regard to the other forms of this kind of sense-object contact. These have been collectively called visesanata or the contact of sense with that which is adjectival to another term connected with sense.' The Vedantins also recognise these six kinds of sense-object contact. But they do not admit the perception of non-existence abhava and inherence (samavaya). We shall discuss this point afterwards. 3 With regard to perception, it has been asked: What is the karana or the unique cause of perception? Is it sense or sense-object contact or something else? According to the older Naiyayikas, sense-object contact (sannikarsa) is the karana of perception, since it is the immediate antecedent to the appearance of the phenomenon of perception. The contact of sense with its appropriate object does not normally fail to produce a perception of it. Hence it is that sense-function or sense-contact should be recognised as the karana or specific cause of perception. Modern Naiyayikas, however, hold that the sense organ is the karana of perception.* A karana is the unique operative cause of an effect (vyaparavadasadharunakarana). It is something that produces the effect by its operation and not the operation itself. The senses are such causes as produce perception by their activity or contact with the objects. As such, it is the sense (indriya) that should be called the karana of perception. Kesava Misra reconciles these views by reference to the different kinds of perception. He thinks that sense and sense-object contact are the karanas of nirvikalpaka and savikalpaka perceptions respectively. Even nirvikalpaka cognition may be taken as karana in relation to cognitions of the values of objects for us (hanopadanopeksabudSM., 61. 2 Vedanta-paribhasa, Chaps. I & VI. 3 Nyaya-Bhasya, Nyaya-varttika & Nyaya-varttika-tatparya-tika, I. I. 3-4. 4 * Bhasapariccheda & Siddhanta-muktavali, 58.

dhayah). Others, however, think that sense is the karana of all kinds of perception.*