Nyayakusumanjali of Udayana (study)
by Sri Ramen Bhadra | 2014 | 37,777 words
This page relates ‘Locus of Adrishta� of the study on the Nyayakusumanjali of Udayana, who belonged to the Nyaya-Vaisheshika School of Indian philosophy and lived in the 10th century. The Nyaya-Kusumanjali is primarily concerned with proving the existence of God but also deals with various other important philosophical problems. The book is presented as an encyclopedia of Nyaya-Vaisesika doctrines.
Go directly to: Footnotes.
Locus of Adṛṣṭa
Even after being forced thus to admit the unseen the opponent may raise an objection by saying that this unseen may very well reside in the objects of enjoyment, but not in the self of the person concerned. 첹 do not accept a distinct self, but consider the material body itself as the self. But ⲹ does not accept this position. According to it, the self is an entity different from the body etc. and qualities like knowledge, desire etc. belong to it. The unseen also inheres in the self. Giving the arguments for this position, Udayana says that if the self itself is not characterized by the unseen it would not be able to enjoy pleasure or pain. The unseen is the cause and the experience of pleasure or pain is the effect. The effect and the cause must be present in the same locus. If two things are located in different things one cannot be a cause of the other. A contact with fire is present in the finger and the sensation of burning is also present there. Therefore, the unseen also must share the same location with the experiences.[1]
The opponent may still oppose by saying that even if it is admitted that the unseen resides in the body it can be shown that the cause and the effect share the same locus. Sometimes a relation is direct and sometimes it is indirect. This is admitted even by ⲹ. The presence of the unseen and the experience in a single locus may be explained through an indirect relation. In their view the unseen is present in the body which again is conjoined with the self. Since the unseen is present in a thing conjoined with the self it may be said that it is also present in the self through an indirect relation. Udayana says that such an explanation also will lead to a difficulty. A particular body which is the locus of a particular unseen is conjoined with not only the particular self, but also all the other selves, because every self is all-pervading (vibhu). Thus it may be said that the cause, a particular unseen, is indirectly present in all the selves. As a result, the experiences of pleasure and pain also will be produced not only in one particular self but in all the other selves also. But this is quite illogical and contrary to facts. A particular person performs a particular action, a particular unseen is produced only in that particular person’s self and only he gets an experience. This is the logical position. The pleasure or pain of one person is never shared by another person. The experiences of pleasure and pain are always restricted to particular selves only. If the particular unseen also is restricted to a particular self, then such an absurdity will not occur.[2]
Next Udayana takes up the view of the īṃs첹 who try to show that even if the unseen is located in the objects of enjoyment there can be restriction with reference to the experience of pleasure and pain by a particular self. It may be said that in the objects there is some particular potency which will regulate the experiences. Actually, Udayana here refutes two important īṃs views. One is the admission of potency as a separate category and the other is that negation cannot be accepted as a cause.[3]
Footnotes and references:
[1]:
Ibid.
[2]:
Ibid.
[3]:
ⲹkusumāñjali 1.10.