Nyaya-Vaisheshika categories (Study)
by Diptimani Goswami | 2014 | 61,072 words
This page relates ‘Nature of Abhava� of the study on the Nyaya-Vaisheshika categories with special reference to the Tarkasangraha by Annambhatta. Both Nyaya and Vaisesika are schools of ancient Indian Philosophy, and accepted in their system various padarthas or objects of valid knowledge. This study investigates how the Tarkasamgraha reflects these categories in the combined Nyayavaisesika school.
Go directly to: Footnotes.
Nature of A屹
It has already been mentioned that according to the ⲹ-ղśṣi첹, 屹 or no-existence is real category. Jayanta ṭṭ maintains that non-existence is also capable of producing knowledge.[1] It is not devoid of all capabilities. It is the object of knowledge in the form of ‘it is not� (پ). The ⲹ-ղśṣi첹s also hold that 屹 is not without any essence. It is determined by its پDzī (counter-correlate). In case of negation, there is an object whose non-existence is experienced and there is a locus and which this non-existence is based. The object of non-existence is called its پDzī and the locus is called ԳܲDzī. For example, in case of ‘there is no jar on the ground�, the jar is the پDzī and the ground is the ԳܲDzī. Negation is always determined by its پDzī. That means its knowledge depends on the knowledge of its counter-correlate. If we do not know a jar, we cannot also know its non-existence. That is why Śivāditya says that negation is that whose knowledge depends on the knowledge of its پDzī.[2] Jayanta ṭṭ also says that there are two kinds of reals, viz., sat and asat.[3] Sat is that which is known as existent and asat is that which is known as non-existent. Vācaspati Miśra maintains that 屹 is known as ‘does not exist� (nasti).[4]
վśٳ defines 屹 in his ѳܰ屹ī thus: non-existence is that which is possessed of the mutual non-existence in respect of the six categories beginning with substance.[5] But this definition is defective, because here the nonexistence is defined as possessing mutual non-existence. But without explaining mutual non-existence it is not possible to define non-existence. Again mutual nonexistence being a variety of non-existence, it depends on the knowledge of nonexistence. Thus, this definition involves the defect of ԲDzԲśⲹ (mutual dependence).
The definition given by վśٳ ultimately leads to the conclusion that non-existence is different from existence. This is expressed by Mahadeva thus: negation is that which is different from existence.[6] But this definition is also not free from defects. The Advaita Vedāntins like Citsukha, Madhusūdana Sarasvatī etc. have criticized this definition vehemently. To defend this definition Ramarudra says that the differences of the six categories belong to negation by the relation of 貹پ. This means that in case of negation the difference of six categories collectively belong to it. The difference of six categories collectively does not belong to any one of these six categories.[7]
Mādhavācārya in his 岹śԲṃg has forwarded another definition of 屹. In his view, non-existence is that which does not possess ⲹ and at the same time which is different from ⲹ (a⾱tve styaⲹ�).[8] Dravya, ṇa, karma, 峾Բⲹ, and śṣa are related by ⲹ, so they are ⾱. ⲹ is not different from ⲹ itself. In this way this definition also implies that 屹 is different from dravya etc.
The ⾱첹 themselves have pointed out some defects in the definition of 屹 in the form of ‘different from 屹�. They point that a person who has no knowledge of the six positive categories experiences negation. Hence, 鲹ܲٳ Śdzṇi has offered a better definition of negation. He defines negation as a relation. Thus negation is the ū貹 relation which is found both in positive and negative objects which determines the cognitions in the form ‘it is not here�, ‘it is not that� etc.[9] Hence, 屹 is also defined that which is the object of knowledge generated by the words like Man etc.[10]
In this way an exact definition of 屹 could not be given by the ⲹղśṣi첹. Bhattacharyya points out,
“According to the ղśṣi첹 it is different to maintain the ontological status of negation. If it depends upon positive being for its very existence then it becomes only an article of faith to believe in their assertion that it has metaphysical existence.�[11]
Hence, Śivāditya’s definition ‘negation is that which depends on the knowledge of its pratiyogi� is more appropriate as it has shifted the dependent nature of negation from the side of existence to the side of awareness. This definition is also accepted by Gangeśopādhyāya.[12]
Footnotes and references:
[3]:
sadasatī tattvam. ⲹñᲹī, p. 51
[6]:
Vide, ѳܰ屹īsaṃgraha on ⲹԳٲܰ屹ī, p. 80
[7]:
Negation, p. 12
[8]:
岹śԲṃg, p. 249
[10]:
cf. ⲹ岹śԲṣa, p. 77
[12]:
Vide, Ibid.