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Lastly, Appaya 顿墨办峁�i迟补 tried to refute any injunction in 艣谤补惫补峁嘺. He presented the views of the followers of V膩caspati Mi艣ra鈥攖he author of 鈥�叠丑腻尘补迟颈 鈥� on 艢腻峁僰补谤补产丑腻峁�y补, in this regard. The followers of 叠丑腻尘补迟颈 say that the word 鈥�艣谤辞迟补惫测补鈥� in the sentence, 鈥�腻迟尘腻 v膩 are...鈥� denotes knowledge. According to them 鈥�manana鈥� and 鈥�苍颈诲颈诲丑测腻蝉补苍补鈥� also denote knowledge. These three words do not denote any activity or function. The object of this knowledge is soul. This knowledge is obtained from sacred treatise and from the teaching of a teacher. So, 艣谤补惫补峁嘺 does not mean any action like consideration. The relation between soul and 艣谤补惫补峁嘺 is 鈥�惫颈峁�a测补-惫颈峁�a测颈-sambandha.鈥� Here 鈥�惫颈峁�a测补鈥� means the object of knowledge and 鈥�惫颈峁�a测颈苍鈥� means the knowledge on that object. But if 鈥�艣谤补惫补峁嘺鈥� means an action in the form of consideration, then the soul can not be its object. Because the inactive soul does not have any relation with the act of consideration. So, the soul can not be the object of the act of 艣谤补惫补峁嘺 in the form of consideration. But it is also true that the soul is regarded as the object of 鈥�manana鈥� (reflection) and 鈥�苍颈诲颈诲丑测腻蝉补苍补鈥� (meditation). So, it must be the object of 艣谤补惫补峁嘺 also, for if a sentence conveys two different meanings, it causes the fallacy of splitting of sentence. According to this theory, 鈥�manana鈥� is not an activity, but it is one kind of knowledge in the form of inferential knowledge. The 鈥�痴腻谤迟颈办补鈥� also says that manana i.e. reasoning is mentioned in the 艣谤耻迟颈 to make its meaning firmly established. This reasoning is not contradictory to Veda. The object of this reasoning is the entity indicated by the word 鈥�tat鈥� and 鈥�tvam鈥�. This reasoning is nothing but an inferential knowledge.

狈颈诲颈诲丑测腻蝉补苍补 is also one kind of knowledge. Because after the very 艣谤补惫补峁嘺vidhi, the mother Veda herself says,

鈥�膩tmano v膩 are dar艣anena 艣rava峁噀na maty膩 vij帽膩nena鈥�.^[1]

In another place Veda declares,

鈥�膧tmani khalvare d峁泂te 艣rute mate 惫颈箩帽腻迟补 颈诲补峁� 蝉补谤惫补峁� viditam.鈥�^[2]

In these two places 鈥�苍颈诲颈诲丑测腻蝉补苍补鈥� is declared as 鈥�惫颈箩帽腻苍补鈥� (knowledge). So, if 鈥�manana鈥� and 鈥�苍颈诲颈诲丑测腻蝉补苍补鈥� refer to knowledge, then the word 鈥�艣谤补惫补峁嘺鈥� used in the same sentence, must also indicate knowledge, but not any action.

If 鈥�艣谤补惫补峁嘺鈥� does not express any action, then it is unnecessary to admit any injunction in 鈥�艣谤补惫补峁嘺鈥�. In the section IX. 3.10 of this thesis, it was mentioned and discussed that knowledge depends on its object. It is not subject to any person or any injunction. So, the knowledge of identity of the individual soul with the Supreme Soul or Brahman, is not also subject to any injunction. Though there are 尝颈峁� suffixes or 鈥�tavya鈥� etc. expressing the potential mood in the sentences like 鈥�腻迟尘腻na峁� pa艣yet鈥� (One should know the soul), 鈥�腻迟尘腻 v膩 are dra峁ａ弓avya岣�...鈥� etc., yet these suffixes become fruitless as the sharpness of a razor used on a stone becomes fruitless. The reason behind this is that these suffixes are used to express knowledge which is not a matter of effort of a person. The object of the knowledge of the sentences, 鈥�腻迟尘腻na峁� pa艣yet鈥� etc. is Brahman which is obtained at all times. Brahman can not be rejected or it can not be accepted. Thus the possibility of injunction in the knowledge regarding soul is refuted by

艢a峁僰ar膩c膩rya is his commentary. Then he questioned about the utility of the sentences. 鈥�腻迟尘腻 v膩...鈥� etc. which appear like injunctions.

He himself gave the answer,

鈥�sv膩bh膩vikaprav峁泃ti惫颈峁�a测补vimukh墨kar峁嚹乺th膩ni iti br奴ma岣�鈥�^[3]

(We say that these sentences are for turning away [the striver] from the object of natural inclination).

艢补峁僰补谤补 explained this sentence in this way:

A person of outward attitude may wish,

鈥楳ay there be good fortune to me and may not there be any evil or misfortune to me鈥�.

But he does not get the absolute or supreme object of human being (腻迟测补苍迟颈办补辫耻谤耻峁Ｄ乺迟丑补). The sentences 鈥�腻迟尘腻 v膩...鈥� etc. dissuade that person who wants the supreme object of human life, from natural inclination. By following these instructions he is dissuaded from the natural inclination to colour, taste, smell etc. Those sentences create a flow of mental disposition in that person about his individual soul (辫谤补迟测补驳腻迟尘补苍) and engage him in the means of knowledge, like 艣谤补惫补峁嘺, manana etc.^[4]

So, the sentences like 鈥�腻迟尘腻 v膩...鈥� are not 鈥�vidhis鈥�, but they are 鈥�惫颈诲丑颈肠肠丑腻测补蝉鈥� (appearing like injunctions) according to 艢补峁僰补谤补.

If 艣谤补惫补峁嘺 is not regarded as knowledge and if it is regarded as an activity of consideration of 痴别诲腻苍迟补, then it will only eradicate the obstructing factors like errors, doubts etc. regarding the purport of 痴别诲腻苍迟补. But it will not eradicate sins or it will not produce the knowledge of Brahman. The eradication of errors etc. is a perceptible result of 艣谤补惫补峁嘺. It is known from our worldly life. So, it is meaningless to admit 补辫奴谤惫补惫颈诲丑颈 in 艣谤补惫补峁嘺 for getting an invisible result. There is no other means of 产谤补丑尘箩帽腻苍补, obtained alternatively or collectively with 艣谤补惫补峁嘺, manana and 鈥�苍颈诲颈诲丑测腻蝉补苍补鈥�. So, there is not niyamavidhi or 辫补谤颈蝉补峁僰丑测腻惫颈诲丑颈 in 艣谤补惫补峁嘺 etc. Consequently, none of the three injunctions can be traced in 艣谤补惫补峁嘺.

Though there is not any injunction in consideration or discussion of Vedanta, yet the very 驳耻谤奴辫补蝉补诲补苍补惫颈诲丑颈 (鈥�tadvij帽膩n膩rtha峁� sa gurum ev膩bhigacchet鈥�^[5]) will produce the knowledge of soul by the help of discussion subject to a teacher. Because it is illogical to postulate an invisible result when there is a visible result. Not only that, the consideration of a person made by his own effort is also eliminated by the 驳耻谤奴辫补蝉补诲补苍补惫颈诲丑颈. So it is meaningless to admit niyamavidhi in 艣谤补惫补峁嘺 for the prevention of one鈥檚 own effort with reference to 产谤补丑尘箩帽腻苍补.

In the absence of the adhyayanavidhi, the 驳耻谤奴辫补蝉补诲补苍补惫颈诲丑颈 can not be regarded for 鈥�补办峁�a谤补辫谤腻辫迟颈 鈥� (learning by heart according to the pronunciation of a teacher). So, the later injunction will not wait for the study under a teacher. But it will wait for consideration. For this reason, niyamavidhi is accepted in the adhyayanavidhi.

Objection: The 驳耻谤奴辫补蝉补诲补苍补惫颈诲丑颈 is a subservient injunction to the 艣谤补惫补峁嘺vidhi. At first, a person listens to 鈥溑況otavyo mantavya岣�...鈥�. Then for the fulfilment of this injunction, he goes to a teacher. So the gur奴pasada-navidhi can not exist in the absence of 艣谤补惫补峁嘺vidhi.

Reply: Going to a teacher (驳耻谤奴辫补蝉补诲补苍补) is a part of acquiring knowledge as discussion. So, 驳耻谤奴辫补蝉补诲补苍补惫颈诲丑颈 is subsidiary to adhyayana-vidhi. Moreover, if it is asked, 鈥榃hat will a person do after going to a teacher for attaining the 产谤补丑尘补箩帽腻苍补 ?鈥�, then the answer will be 鈥榙iscussion under the teacher.鈥� It is established by our worldly experience. We need not take shelter to the 艣谤补惫补峁嘺vidhi to explain the answer of this question.

Objection: If the injunction in 驳耻谤奴辫补蝉补诲补苍补 is accepted as independent of discussion, then the reading from the written manuscript is prohibited by the very 驳耻谤奴辫补蝉补诲补苍补惫颈诲丑颈. So, it is fruitless to admit niyamavidhi in 鈥�sv膩dhy膩ho dhyetavya岣�鈥�.

Reply: It is not known from the 驳耻谤奴辫补蝉补诲补苍补惫颈诲丑颈 or from any other injunction that learning of the 痴别诲腻苍迟补 must be performed under a teacher. So, niyamavidhi is meaningful in adhyayana (study).

Objection: For the eradication of delusion a person may engage himself in any sacred treatise which establishes dualism. The upani峁�adic sentences are also discussed in the schools of philosophy which establish dualism. So, niyamavidhi must be accepted in the consideration of 痴别诲腻苍迟补.

Reply: It can not be said. Because the dualistic treatise itself causes delusion regarding the purport of 痴别诲腻苍迟补. So, it can not eradicate delusion. As a result of this, the niyamavidhi can not be acknowledged in 艣谤补惫补峁嘺 because of the absence of any other means to be prohibited.

Objection: One may mistakenly think that the dualistic philosophy eradicates delusion regarding the puport of 痴别诲腻苍迟补. He may engage himself in that philosophy prompted by that thinking. To prevent this means of dualistic philosophy obtained by mistake, niyamavidhi is to be accepted in 艣谤补惫补峁嘺.

Reply: It is not also true. Because the person having no respect to 鈥�补诲惫补颈迟补艣腻蝉迟谤补鈥� may mistakenly think that the 艣谤补惫补峁嘺v膩kya also enjoins the consideration about the soul possessed of qualities. He can not be restrained from his activities even by hundred injunctions.

Objection: Let 辫补谤颈蝉补峁僰丑测腻惫颈诲丑颈 be accepted to prevent the actions other than the consideration of 痴别诲腻苍迟补.

Reply: This objection also does not stand. Who is to be prevented? A house-holder or an ascetic? A house-holder can not restrain himself from other actions. Many duties are enjoined by many vedic sentences for a house-holder. He can not reject them following only the 艣谤补惫补峁嘺vidhi.

With regard to an ascetic, the other actions had been prevented by the vedic sentence,

鈥�brahmasa峁僺tho鈥檓峁泃atvam eti 鈥�^[6]

(The person firmly established in Brahman attains immortality).

This sentence also enjoins renunciation for the person who wants salvation. So, the 艣谤补惫补峁嘺vidhi depends on this sentence of 颁丑腻苍诲辞驳测辞辫补苍颈峁�a诲. So, it is unnecessary to prevent actions other than consideration with the help of 艣谤补惫补峁嘺vidhi. Accepting 辫补谤颈蝉补峁僰丑测腻惫颈诲丑颈 in 艣谤补惫补峁嘺 results in profitless repetition of the same matter (辫颈峁ａ弓补辫别峁�a峁嘺).

Objection: Though injunction is impossible in consideration, yet niyamavidhi must be accepted with regard to the subject of consideration i.e. 痴别诲腻苍迟补. If consideration is to be performed, then it must be performed about 痴别诲腻苍迟补 only. By this regulation, the essays composed in vernacular languages regarding the theory of Brahman, can be prevented.

Reply: That prevention can be made by the proximity of 痴别诲腻苍迟补. The person who has acquired the general knowledge about Brahman through the study of the Veda with its six organs, wants to have particular knowledge about Brahman. He wants to wipe out his doubts regarding Brahman. Then he starts discussion with his teacher. Now, what will be the subject of his discussion? This question arises in his mind. At that time, the theory of 痴别诲腻苍迟补 which just has been read by that person arises in his mind. This is the proximity. Then he starts consideration as his duty and the reading of compositions composed in vernacular languages (产丑腻峁Ｄ乸谤补产补苍诲丑补) is automatically prevented. Moreover, it is known from the adhyayanavidhi that the knowledge obtained from the study of the Veda under the guidance of a teacher, results in salvation. So, the 鈥�产丑腻峁Ｄ乸谤补产补苍诲丑补鈥� is not obtained with regard to Brahman.

Objection: Then why did the commentator admit injunction in 艣谤补惫补峁嘺, manana and 惫颈诲颈诲丑测腻蝉补苍补 denoted respectively by the words 辫腻峁囜笉颈迟测补, 产腻濒测补 and mauna ?

Reply: This question also does not stand. Because it is proved from our worldly experience that consideration leads to the pure knowledge about the subject of consideration. Manana means memorising the arguments which establish the object. 狈颈诲颈诲丑测腻蝉补苍补 means the practice of the mental disposition identified with the object. So, these manana and 苍颈诲颈诲丑测腻蝉补苍补 eradicate the obstdacles of the knowledge of object. So, there is no injunction in 艣谤补惫补峁嘺 etc. But the sentence 鈥�腻迟尘腻 v膩...鈥� is used as injunction to increase the interest of a person in 艣谤补惫补峁嘺 etc. in the manner of eulogy. As there is no injunction in 艣谤补惫补峁嘺 etc., the discussion of the brahma-办腻峁嘾补 or 箩帽腻苍补办腻峁囜笉补 is obtained from the very adhyayanavidhi as the discussion of the 办补谤尘补办腻峁囜笉补 of Veda.

Footnotes and references:

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[1]:

叠峁沨补诲腻谤补峁噛补办辞辫补苍颈峁�a诲鈥�2.4.5.

[2]:

叠峁沨补诲腻谤补峁噛补办辞辫补苍颈峁�a诲鈥�4.5.6.

[3]:

艢腻峁僰补谤补产丑腻峁�y补 on Brahmas奴tra鈥�1.1.4.

[4]:

艢腻峁僰补谤补产丑腻峁�y补 on Brahmas奴tra鈥�1.1.4.

[5]:

惭耻峁嘾补办辞辫补苍颈峁�a诲鈥�1.2.12.

[6]:

颁丑腻苍诲辞驳测辞辫补苍颈峁�a诲鈥�2.23.1.