Mimamsa interpretation of Vedic Injunctions (Vidhi)
by Shreebas Debnath | 2018 | 68,763 words
This page relates ‘According to the ‘Samkshepashariraka’� of the study on the Mimamsa theory of interpretation of Vedic Injunctions (vidhi). The Mimamsakas (such as Jaimini, Shabara, etc.) and the Mimamsa philosophy emphasizes on the Karmakanda (the ritualistic aspect of the Veda). Accordingly to Mimamsa, a careful study of the Veda is necessary in order to properly understand dharma (religious and spiritual achievement—the ideal of human life).
Go directly to: Footnotes.
Chapter 9.3k - According to the ‘ṃkṣe貹śī첹�
[Full title: Niyamavidhi in Śṇa according to the ‘ṃkṣe貹śī첹’]
ñٳܲԾ composed �ṃkṣe貹śī첹�. The followers of this composition say that śṇa means that kind of mental disposition or state of the mind (ٳٲṛtپ which is of the form of logical consideration. This mental disposition is favourable to the production of certain knowledge—‘all the upaniṣadic sentences convey the meaning of the non-dual Brahman�. By the word �ٳٲṛtپ � we must understand the action caused by effort; for knowledge can not be accomplished by action and it can not be enjoined also. When Brahman is reflected upon the mind (Գٲḥkṇa), the mind gets transformed. This transformation (貹ṇām) is the �ٳٲṛtپ �. It is a mental action. The unchangable eternal Brahman does not change. Its transformation is imposed because of illusion.
We have understood the meaning of śṇa (a kind of ٳٲṛtپ). Now, this śṇa does not produce direct or indirect knowledge regarding Brahman; for that knowledge is produced from the verbal testimony, perception etc. Śṇa means logical consideration () and it is not included in the six proofs i.e. perception, inference, analogy, verbal testimony, implication and non-recognition. So, it can not produce any knowledge.
Objection: Such meaning of śṇa can not be accepted. Rather it means the verbal understanding characterized by the purport or meaning obtained from logical consideration of the Upaniṣadic sentences. This śṇa verily leads to ñԲ.
Reply: No. Śṇa does not mean any knowledge. It means consideration. If śṇa were to mean knowledge, then there would not be any injunction regarding śṇa. There is no scope of injunction with regard to knowledge. Knowledge depends on its object. It is not subject to any person or any injunction. It can not be done, nor it can be a matter which is undone, nor it can be done otherwise.
So, Śṃk �
�ٲ� ñԲ� kartum, akartum, Բⲹٳ vā kartum aśkakya�, 𱹲� vastutantram eva tat; na codanātantram, nāpi puruṣatantram�.[1]
So, knowledge can not be enjoined by any injunction. For this reason, śṇa can not mean knowledge.
Moreover, it is accepted that the śṇavidhi is the base of the aphorism �athāto brahmajijñāsa� which sanctions the obligation of consideration. The word �ᾱñ� means logical consideration. This consideration is not a kind of knowledge. It is a kind of action.
It is a mental activity consisting of:
- �ū� (showing a complete argument or syllogism) and
- �apoha� (wiping out of the semblance of syllogism—�ԲԾ첹ṇa).
This is the meaning of śṇa.
Objection: Let consideration () produce a result which can be the producer of ñԲ through the ascertainement of the purport or meaning of the upanisadic sentences or through eradicating the sins like delusion regarding the purport (ٱ貹ⲹ) etc. produced from that consideration. The sentences of �ԻDzDZ貹Ծṣa ’starting from �sadeva somya�[2] give the meaning of the non-dual Brahman. Here consideration leads to the ascertainment of the purport of sentences thorugh destroying the obstructing factors like �ٱ貹ⲹ� etc. This is the direct result of consideration. If the obstructing factors (pratibandhakas) are destroyed, then the upaniṣadic sentences directly causes the knowledge of the non-dual Brahman. So, consideration can indirectly result in ñԲ. If the obstructing factors are absent, then a person gets the direct knowledge (貹ǰṣañԲ) of Brahman from �tattvamasi � etc. directly.
Reply: This objection also does not stand. Because the ascertainment of the purport of sentences is not accepted as the cause of verbal understanding. The absence of impeding factors is not also said to be the cause of any action.
�ٱ貹ⲹ� (purport) means the intention of the speaker. It is not the cause of verbal understanding; for though there is not any intension in the words uttered by a parrot or uttered by a boy, yet a person can understand the meaning of that words. In fact, expectation (ṃkṣ�), capability to be connected with another word (Dzⲹ) and proximity (sannidhi) are the causes of verbal undestanding. But if impeding factors are there, then consideration plays its role. So, consideration is not the cause of understanding the purport, but it destroys the impeding factors. Consideration can not be the cause of verbal understanding through the destruction of the impeding factors. Because the absence of the impeding factors is not the cause of any action. The ⾱첹 admit the absesnce of pratibandhakas as the cause. But the question is—what is the nature of pratibandhaka ? If it is said that pratibandhaka is different from cause, then there will arise the fallacy of �ԲDzԲśⲹ� (reciprocal dependence). Again, if it is said that the defectiveness of the assemblage of causes (ṇa峾ī) is pratibandhaka, then there will also arise the previous fallacy. In both cases the causes are included in the definition.
The defectiveness of the assemblage of causes can not be regarded as pratibandhaka. The paddies stored in the corn-bin do not transfer into sprout, because there is the absence of the assemblage of causes (ṇaū屹) i.e. there is the defectiveness of the assemblage of causes (ṇa峾ī ) in those paddies. But no one says that the coriander (īᲹԲⲹ) is the impeding factor of sprout. Actually, the absence of pratibandhaka is �Բⲹٳsiddha� (an unessential cause or a concomitant circumstance) to an effect like �岹ṇḍٱ� (the state of being a stick) to a pot.
From this discussion, it is proved that the knowledge of the purport of sentences or the absence of the obstructing factors produced from the consideration of the purport, can not be the cause of effect.
If it is accepted that the ñԲ is produced from consideration which is different from the varbal testimony and which is of the form of inference, then the validity of that ñԲ will depend on another cause. It will lead to parٲḥprāmāṇyavāda. But the Advaitins and the ʰ첹Բ admit the �svٲḥprāmāṇyavāda� with reference to validity of knowledge. According to them, the authencity of knowledge is produced with that knowledge and it is realised at the time of acquiring of that knowledge. There is no necessity of admitting a seperate cause for the validity of knowledge.
Therefore, according to the followers of �ṃkṣe貹śī첹�, ñԲ is not produced from consideration. Consideration only helps in the ascertainment of the purport of sentences and through this it eradicates the obtructing factors. For the eradication of the obstructing factors like sins, niyamavidhi is accepted in śṇa i.e. . The word �ṣṭⲹ�� in the injunction is also meant for the praise of the soul. It is used for instigating the striver in the realization of the soul or Brahman. The result of śṇa is not mentioned here by the word �ṣṭⲹ��.
Footnotes and references:
[1]:
Śāṃkarabhāṣyam on Brahmasūtra�1.1.4.
[2]:
ԻDzDZ貹Ծṣa 6.2.1.
[???] to �tat satya� sa ātmā tattvamasi � [Ibid 6.8.7.]