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NOTES: CHAPTER SEVEN 489 independent principle. As an atom, it is ultimate and
impartite. Rather than being a product of something else,
it is one of the nine independent, eternal substances
(dravya), along with the five elements, time, space, and
soul.
198 That is, it is a composite formed from the five
elements in the pure, subtle form in which they exist before
each of the five elements is alloyed with fractions of the
other four in the process of "making five-fold" (pa帽c茂-
karana), which precedes production of material creation.
This is the view of Advaita.
199 The nature of the luminous quality (sattvaguna)
has been briefly described in note 177. It is the principle
associated with clarity, intelligence, happiness, and
tranquillity. Although each of the gunas is present in
every aspect of creation, they appear in different
proportions in different situations. Mind has a
predominance of sattva; stones, of tamas, the principle of
inertia and ignorance.
200 The Naiy膩yika bases his doctrine that the mind is
atomic on his belief in the impossibility of the occurrence
of simultaneous cognitions. At Ny膩ya S奴tra 1.1.16 we read:
"The non-occurrence of simultaneous cognitions is the
grounds for [the inference of] the mind" (yugapaj-
j帽膩n膩nutpattir manaso li峁単am, Gangopadhyaya, Ny膩ya-S奴tra, p.
424). Although the several senses are more or less
constantly in contact with their various objects,
simultaneous cognitions do not occur. Therefore there must
be some other factor necessary for perception over and above
the contact of the senses with their objects. The mind is
said to be an "extra auxiliary cause" (sahak膩rinimitt膩ntara)
in this respect, and contact of the mind with the senses is
taken as the necessary additional factor in perception. It
follows, moreover, that the mind must be atomic in size
because otherwise it could be in contact with more than one
sense organ at the same time, simultaneous cognitions being
the result. To the objection that we often do have the
impression of experiencing different cognitions through
different senses at the same time, the Naiy膩yika would
respond that this feeling is only an illusion created by the
mind's capacity for extremely rapid movement. This ability
enables it to have contact with several sense organs in
quick succession.
The Ved膩ntins would agree with the Naiy膩yikas only
to the extent of admitting that it is impossible to have
more than one cognition at a time through one sense. For
them, as we shall see, the mind is of such a size and, being
partite, is in possession of sufficient flexibility, as to