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NOTES: CHAPTER SEVEN 476 113 The argument will show that one thing, such as
good deeds, can be a means to more than one end.
Since they
are conducive to purity of mind, good works can be a factor
in any of these results.
114 I have not been able to find the source of these
precise quotations, but similar expressions are common in
the Br膩hma峁嘺s and the literature of the P奴rva M墨m膩峁噑膩.
1 115 The samyogap峁泃haktvany膩ya.
Writers on Ved膩nta
often seek to substantiate their arguments by reference to
rules of interpretation established by the P奴rva M墨m膩峁噑膩.
This is such a case, based on P奴rvam墨m膩ms膩s奴tra 4.3.5-7 and
the Sabarabh膩峁�ya thereon. The ritual texts prescribe the
offering of a single substance in two different types of
sacrifices, each leading to different results. According to
the maxim of separate connection, the relation of the
substance with its result in one case is quite distinct from
that in the other, because the injunctions prescribing the
acts are themselves distinct and separate. Hence the
relation between a good deed (in this case the new or full
moon sacrifice) and the result (heaven) mentioned in one
injunction will be an entirely separate affair from its
relation to a result (the desire for knowledge) specified in
another text. The same will apply to any connection between
good deeds and results, such as devotion or the knowledge of
Brahman, that may be mentioned in other texts. So a single
means may lead to different results, and the fact of having
common means, such as good works, does not necessitate that
any two results be identical. See Pandit Mohanlal Sandal,
trans., The M墨m膩ms膩 S奴tras of Jaimin墨, Vol. XXVI of the
Sacred Books of the Hindus (Allahabad: The Panini Office,
1923-25). pp. 228-229.
116 See BSSB 3.4.26.
117 There would be atiprasanga ("undesired
consequences"). All things, for example, that happened to
have clay as a common cause would have to be identical. The
simple distinction between the clay pot and the clay doll
would require special explanation.
118 parinativirasena, literally "tasteless (without
delight or disagreeable) in the end," because they lead to
pain. This is a common estimation of all sense-pleasures in
the ascetic spirituality of Advaita Ved膩nta. Compare this
with the Buddhist teaching "All is suffering" (sarvam
du岣�kham). Even the joys of heaven (sv盲rga) are not much
valued in the impersonalist traditions of India because such
celestial "pleasures," like everything else in the realm of
phenomenality, are ultimately perishable, contingent, and
therefore painful.