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艢补产诲补 or word is regarded as a separate means of proof by most of the recognized Indian systems of thought excepting the Jaina, Buddhist, 颁腻谤惫腻办补 and 痴补颈艣别峁�i办补. A discussion on this topic however has but little philosophical value and I have therefore omitted to give any attention to it in connection with the 狈测腻测补, and the 厂腻峁僰丑测补-Yoga systems. The validity and authority of the Vedas were acknowledged by all Hindu writers and they had wordy battles over it with the Buddhists who denied it. Some sought to establish this authority on the supposition that they were the word of God, while others, particularly the M墨m膩msists strove to prove that they were not written by anyone, and had no beginning in time nor end and were eternal. Their authority was not derived from the authority of any trustworthy person or God. Their words are valid in themselves. Evidently a discussion on these matters has but little value with us, though it was a very favourite theme of debate in the old days of India. It was in fact the most important subject for 惭墨尘腻峁僺腻, for the 惭墨尘腻峁僺腻 s奴tras were written for the purpose of laying down canons for a right interpretation of the Vedas.

The slight extent to which it has dealt with its own epistemological doctrines has been due solely to their laying the foundation of its structure of interpretative maxims, and not to writing philosophy for its own sake. It does not dwell so much upon salvation as other systems do, but seeks to serve as a rational compendium of maxims with the help of which the Vedas may be rightly understood and the sacrifices rightly performed. But a brief examination of the doctrine of word (艣补产诲补) as a means of proof cannot be dispensed with in connection with 惭墨尘腻峁僺腻 as it is its very soul.

艢补产诲补 (word) as a 辫谤补尘腻峁嘺 means the knowledge that we get about things (not within the purview of our perception) from relevant sentences by understanding the meaning of the words of which they are made up. These sentences may be of two kinds, viz. those uttered by men and those which belong to the Vedas. The first becomes a valid means of knowledge when it is not uttered by untrustworthy persons and the second is valid in itself. The meanings of words are of course known to us before, and cannot therefore be counted as a means of proof; but the meanings of sentences involving a knowledge of the relations of words cannot be known by any other acknowledged means of proof, and it is for this that we have to accept 艣abda as a separate means of proof. Even if it is admitted that the validity of any sentence may be inferred on the ground of its being uttered by a trustworthy person, yet that would not explain how we understand the meanings of sentences, for when even the name or person of a writer or speaker is not known, we have no difficulty in understanding the meaning of any sentence.

笔谤补产丑腻办补谤补 thinks that all sounds are in the form of letters, or are understandable as combinations of letters. The constituent letters of a word however cannot yield any meaning, and are thus to be regarded as elements of auditory perception which serve as a means for understanding the meaning of a word. The reason of our apprehension of the meaning of any word is to be found in a separate potency existing in the letters by which the denotation of the word may be comprehended. The perception of each letter-sound vanishes the moment it is uttered, but leaves behind an impression which combines with the impressions of the successively dying perceptions of letters, and this brings about the whole word which contains the potency of bringing about the comprehension of a certain meaning. If even on hearing a word the meaning cannot be comprehended, it has to be admitted that the hearer lacks certain auxiliaries necessary for the purpose. As the potency of the word originates from the separate potencies of the letters, it has to be admitted that the latter is the direct cause of verbal cognition. Both 笔谤补产丑腻办补谤补 and 碍耻尘腻谤颈濒补 agree on this point.

Another peculiar doctrine expounded here is that all words have natural denotative powers by which they themselves out of their own nature refer to certain objects irrespective of their comprehension or non-comprehension by the hearer. The hearer will not understand the meaning unless it is known to him that the word in question is expressive of such and such a meaning, but the word was all along competent to denote that meaning and it is the hearer鈥檚 knowledge of that fact that helps him to understand the meaning of a word. 惭墨尘腻峁僺腻 does not think that the association of a particular meaning with a word is due to conventions among people who introduce and give meanings to the words^[1].

Words are thus acknowledged to be denotative of themselves. It is only about proper names that convention is admitted to be the cause of denotation. It is easy to see the bearing of this doctrine on the self-validity of the Vedic commandments, by the performance of which such results would arise as could not have been predicted by any other person. Again all words are believed to be eternally existent; but though they are ever present some manifestive agency is required by which they are manifested to us. This manifestive agency consists of the effort put forth by the man who pronounces the word. 狈测腻测补 thinks that this effort of pronouncing is the cause that produces the word while 惭墨尘腻峁僺腻 thinks that it only manifests to the hearer the ever-existing word.

The process by which according to 笔谤补产丑腻办补谤补 the meanings of words are acquired may be exemplified thus: a senior commands a junior to bring a cow and to bind a horse, and the child on noticing the action of the junior in obedience to the senior鈥檚 commands comes to understand the meaning of 鈥渃ow鈥� and 鈥渉orse.鈥� Thus according to him the meanings of words can only be known from words occuring in injunctive sentences; he deduces from this the conclusion that words must denote things only as related to the other factors of the injunction (补苍惫颈迟腻产丑颈诲 - 丑腻苍补 惫腻诲补), and no word can be comprehended as having any denotation when taken apart from such a sentence. This doctrine holds that each word yields its meaning only as being generally related to other factors or only as a part of an injunctive sentence, thus the word 驳腻尘 accusative case of go (cow) means that it is intended that something is to be done with the cow or the bovine genus, and it appears only as connected with a specific kind of action, viz. bringing in the sentence 驳腻尘 腻苍补测补 鈥攂ring the cow.

碍耻尘腻谤颈濒补 however thinks that words independently express separate meanings which are subsequently combined into a sentence expressing one connected idea (abhihit膩nvaya惫腻诲补). Thus in 驳腻尘 腻苍补测补, according to 碍耻尘腻谤颈濒补, 驳腻尘 means the bovine class in the accusative character and 腻苍补测补 independently means bring; these two are then combined into the meaning 鈥渂ring the cow.鈥� But on the former theory the word 驳腻尘 means that it is connected with some kind of action, and the particular sentence only shows what the special kind of action is, as in the above sentence it appears as associated with bringing, but it cannot have any meaning separately by itself. This theory of 碍耻尘腻谤颈濒补 which is also the 狈测腻测补 theory is called abhihit膩nvaya惫腻诲补^[2].

Lastly according to 笔谤补产丑腻办补谤补 it is only the Veda that can be called 艣abda-辫谤补尘腻峁嘺, and only those sentences of it which contain injunctions (such as, perform this sacrifice in this way with these things). In all other cases the validity of words is only inferred on the ground of the trustworthy character of the speaker. But 碍耻尘腻谤颈濒补 considers the words of all trustworthy persons as 艣abda-辫谤补尘腻峁嘺.

Footnotes and references:

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[1]:

According to 狈测腻测补 God created all words and associated them with their meanings.

[2]:

See 笔谤补产丑腻办补谤补m墨m膩峁僺膩 by Dr Ga峁単膩n膩tha Jh膩 and S. N. Dasgupta鈥檚 Study of Patanjali , appendix. It may be noted in this connection that 惭墨尘腻峁僺腻 did not favour the Sphota doctrine of sound which consists in the belief that apart from the momentary sounds of letters composing a word, there was a complete word form which was manifested (sphota) but not created by the passing sounds of the syllables. The work of the syllable sounds is only to project this word-manifestation. See V膩caspati鈥檚 Tattvabindu, 艢lokav膩rttika and 笔谤补办补谤补峁嘺辫补帽肠颈办腻. For the doctrine of 补苍惫颈迟腻产丑颈诲丑腻苍补 see S膩likan膩tha鈥檚 痴腻办测腻谤迟丑补尘腻迟峁沰腻惫峁泃迟颈.