A study of the philosophy of Jainism
by Deepa Baruah | 2017 | 46,858 words
This page describes the The doctrine of Anekantavada (the theory of manifoldness) from the study of the philosophy of Jainism: one of the oldest religions in India having its own metaphysics, philosophy and ethics. Jainism is regarded as an ethical system where non-violence features as an important ethical value.
Chapter II.e - The doctrine of ԱԳٲ岹 (the theory of manifoldness)
ԱԳٲ岹 is the heart of Jainism; and Բⲹ岹 and 屹岹 are its two wings. The word ԱԳٲ岹 consists of three words, viz., aneka, anta and 岹. Here aneka means many, anta signifies attributes and 岹 means description. Therefore etymologically the whole word means the description of manifold attributes. That means, it is the theory of manifoldness of reality. According to ԱԳٲ岹, reality is pluralistic which expresses itself in multiple forms. A thing is neither an absolute unity nor an absolute plurality. It is both unity and plurality all the time.
The Jainas hold that a particular object can be viewed from different points of view. It can be existent, non-existent, one, many, different and the like. It possesses infinite characters. The term ԱԳٲ indicates the ontological nature of reality through which every object possesses infinite number of qualities (ԲԳٲٳ첹 vastu), each of which can only be affirmed in a particular sense. The Jainas further hold that all things are ԱԳٲ, i.e., Բ-Գٲ which means nothing can be affirmed and negated absolutely, because all affirmations and negations are true only under certain conditions and limitations.
To define the nature of categories like ī, matter, space etc., the theory of ԱԳٲ岹 is applied. According to the Jainas, atoms are of one kind and each atom possesses innumerable aspects of its own. The nature of the self or ī is conscious, yet it is endowed with the quality of consciousness. Matter or pudgala is that substance or category which undergoes modifications by combinations and dissociations. Āś or space is one, formless, all-pervasive and also divisible in innumerable parts. So, it is not possible for all to know all the qualities of a thing. If one can know all the qualities of a thing, then he becomes omniscient. That means one who can know all the qualities of one thing, become the knower of all the qualities of all things, and also one who can know all the qualities of all things, becomes the knower of all the qualities of one thing. But, human knowledge is limited and so, all our judgments are also limited. This logical theory is known as 屹岹. As a matter of fact, both ԱԳٲ岹 and 屹岹 are realistic and relativistic pluralism. They are the two sides of the same coin. From the metaphysical point of view, ԱԳٲ岹 is that where reality has innumerable characters, while the logical point of view, 屹岹 means probable, may be. That means, 屹岹 is that where one can know only some aspects of reality. Therefore, the Jainas apply this theory of ԱԳٲ岹 in order to describe the nature of a thing.
According to some other philosophers, there are eight types of doṣas which are connected with the Jaina concept of reality. The Jainas hold that reality is both of identity-cum-difference. Reality has two aspects, viz., ṇa and 貹ⲹ. Substance or reality and quality are inseparable. There is a relation between them. In the same way, there is a relation between substance or reality with mode. On the other hand, there is a difference between quality and its mode. The Jainas also mention three different views with regard to the relation of quality and mode with a substance. These views are�bheda岹, abheda岹 and bhedābheda岹. Bheda岹 view is upheld by Kundakunda, Umāsvāmī and Pujyapāda. Abheda岹 view is upheld by Siddhasena پ첹, Haribhadra, Hemacandra etc.; while bhedābheda岹 view is uphold by Akalaṅka and Prabhācandra.
According to the Jainas, the nature of ǰṣa is known through the knowledge of ԱԳٲ. But the Vaiśeṣikas hold that knowledge of ԱԳٲ is a false-knowledge. So, the false-knowledge is not the reason of ǰṣa. They also hold eight types of doṣas like that virodha, ⲹ첹ṇy etc. doṣas are found in ԱԳٲ岹. They argue that the Jainas accept both sattva and asattva in one thing simultaneously, so these types of doṣas are found. The eight kinds of doṣas are�ǻṣa, ⲹ첹ṇydoṣa, Բٳṣa, ṅkdoṣa, vyatikaradoṣa, ṃśaⲹdoṣa, apratipattidoṣa and a屹doṣa. Virodhadoṣa is a state of mutual opposition. It means that two contradictory characters cannot remain together at the same time, for example cold and heat which cannot remain together at the same time. ղⲹ첹ṇyṣa is an error which arises when two entirely opposite natures of a thing tend to subsist in two different abodes. As for example, nondifference is something which has the character of oneness, while difference is something which has the character of manyness and as such non-difference has a separate locus than difference. Բٳṣa is that in which each of the two aspects of a thing like identity and difference is established by identity and difference respectively. ṅkṣa is that in which both sattva and asattva are described in one thing. ղⲹپ첹ṣa is that in which ekatva is found in anekatva, while anekatva is found in ekatva. ṃśaⲹṣa is that state in which there is doubt about the character of identity and difference of a thing. پ貹ٳپṣa is that state in which the nature of a thing cannot be established. 屹ṣa is that state where the nature of the things becomes non-existent because of its non-establishment.
But, Prabhācandra has put some arguments in his ʰⲹ첹ٲṇḍ about these eight types of doṣas. He says that these eight kinds of doṣas are not found in the Jaina theory of reality and in ԱԳٲ岹. The following are the chief arguments put forward by Prabhācandra:
1. Firstly, Prabhācandra argues that the thing in its own nature is sattva, while in relation to another nature it is asattva. ҳṇa is identical with dravya, while it is separate from 貹ⲹ. Moreover, ǻṣa is of three kinds, viz., Բٳṣaṇa, 貹貹貹ٳپṣaṇa and ⲹٲ첹ū貹. But, none among these three kinds of doṣas can be seen in the Jaina theory of reality and ԱԳٲ岹. There is no virodha in the form of Բٳṣaṇa (not remaining together in one locus). For according to the Jainas difference and nondifference or existence and non-existence can be envisaged in one thing in relation to itself and other things. The second kind of virodha, i.e., 貹貹貹ٳپṣaṇa (to remain in a thing by giving up one another) also is not possible. Just as colour and taste remain in one mango without giving up one another, similarity difference and non-difference can remain in one thing without giving one another. ⲹٲ첹ū貹-ǻ is found in case of snake and mongoose which cannot remain in one place since one is killer and other is the killed. But this type of virodha also is not possible in case of difference and nondifference, as there no such relation between them. Thus, there is neither ǻṣa in the reality nor in ԱԳٲ岹.
2. ղⲹ첹ṇyṣa is not found in the Jaina theory of reality,because bheda and abheda, sattva and asattva can have the same thing as their .
3. Thirdly, Prabhācandra says that there is no possibility of Բٳṣa in the Jaina theory of reality and in ԱԳٲ岹. Because abheda is the ī (substantive), while bheda is the attribute of a substance.
4. Fourthly, Prabhācandra argues that neither ṅk nor vyatikara doṣas would arise between 屹 and a屹. Because, 屹 would be empty without a屹, similarly a屹 would be meaningless without 屹.
5. Lastly, he also says that there is neither ṃśaⲹ nor apratipatti nor a屹 in the Jaina theory of reality and in ԱԳٲ岹. Because, the Jainas have already been mentioned that the things possess many characters, positive as well as negative. ԱԳٲ means many-sided. So, bheda and abheda, sattva and asattva are found in the same things.
So, the Jaina theory of reality and ԱԳٲ岹 are free from all these doṣas.
Types of ԱԳٲ岹:
According to Prabhācandra, ԱԳٲ岹 is of two types, viz., kramaԱԳٲ and akrama-ԱԳٲ. In ʰⲹ첹ٲṇḍ, Prabhācandra says that krama-ԱԳٲ岹 is that where a thing is endowed with different characteristics at different points of time. On the other hand, akrama-ԱԳٲ岹 is that where a thing is endowed with different characteristics at the same time. These two ԱԳٲ岹 is known as 貹ⲹ (mode) and ṇa (quality). ʲⲹ and ṇa are not one in number, but there are various attributes of these two. Hence, a thing which is the combination of ṇa-貹ⲹ is known as ԱԳٲ. Thus, ԱԳٲ岹 propounds that reality is many-sided and complex, i.e. an object has infinite number of attributes. ԱԳٲ岹 does not regard the onesided point of view of a thing.