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The Russian Occupation of Czechoslovakia鈥搃ts Course Causes and Consequences

On the 21st August, a week after this writer had mailed the manuscript of the 鈥楽urvey鈥� for the last issue of the Triveni, the Soviet and Eastern European troops marched into Czechoslovakia. Obviously, for Moscow, the Czech liberalisation went beyond the point of permissible deviation within the Communist camp. The Czech Communist Party Secretary and the main architect of liberalisation, Mr. Alexander Dubcek, disappeared and later it came to be known that the Russians had arrested him and, in manacles, took him to a far off place, presumably, with a view to liquidate him. Meanwhile, the Czech people rose in revolt against the occupying forces and the extent and spontaneity of the upsurge was such that a virtual state of war existed. The outside world expressed concern at this 鈥榬ape鈥� of Czechoslovakia for a second time in thirty years and on the eve of the fiftieth anniversary of the creation of the Czechoslovak State. What is more significant, the Czech resistance seemed to have unnerved Moscow, which immediately announced that it would hold talks with the Czech leaders in Moscow. The Czech President, General Swaboda, appealed to his countrymen to show restraint, while asserting that Czech honour, independence and integrity will not bartered away at the negotiations and asked the people to have faith in him. It was also disclosed then, for the first time since the invasion, that Mr. Dubcek was safe and would be participating in the talks. Apparently, the Czech revolt, the world reaction and their own guilty conscience, made the Russian leaden not to carry out their intention of eliminating him.

The talks commenced on the 23rd August, and lasted for three days. Agreement was reached that foreign troops would vacate Czech soil as soon as conditions returned to normal. The question of a time-table for troop withdrawal was left to decided at another round of talks scheduled to be held in mid-September in Moscow. While the Soviet agreement, in principle, to withdraw, and the participation of the liberal leaders, Dubcek and Cernik (the Prime Minister), can be regarded as gains to the Czechs, yet it was clear that Moscow demanded from them an end to liberalisation, a declaration of their loyalty to communism and Communist unity and the demonstration of their good faith in mending Czech ways before the next round of talks commenced. Obviously, Moscow demanded that Prague should avoid projecting an image of a victim of aggression. Since the Moscow talks, Prague has shown an over-Concern in opposing any public debate over the invasion to save the Soviet Union from ernbarrassment. Whereas only a couple of days after the invasion, the erstwhile Czech Foreign Minister rushed to U. N. to let the world know of the 鈥榬ape鈥�, yet since the Moscow negotiations, Prague鈥檚 official representative opposed any U. N. resolution on the situation.

The Czechs returned to Prague receiving a triumphant welcome from their people. But the leaders soon began the unconscionable task of putting a stop to liberalisation. Early September was a period of agony for them. They had to do the almost impossible task of making the top personnel of the regime survive the Russian wrath and at the same time put de-liberalisation into operation. Strong rumours were current that Moscow was still determined to oust Dubcek. But, apparently, its designs were foiled, thanks to the spontaneous support to Dubcek by the people, in general and the Czech and Slovak Communist parties in particular. At subsequent meetings, the executives of the Czech and Slovak Communist parties declared that there was no question of any change in their leadership, and indeed, at one of these, they alleged that the Russians attempted to secure the ouster, one by one, of Mr. Dubcek and his supporters, and their replacement by more pliable party men like Mr. Joseph Smrkovsky, the President of the Czech National Assembly. While this illustrates the massive support available to Dubcek, the events also highlight how insecure and uncertain seem to be his tenure against Moscow鈥檚 pressures.

Meanwhile, preparations were afoot for the despatch of the Czech delegation to the crucial second round of talks on the proposed treaty with Moscow. This meeting had to be put off twice because the Czechs and the Russians could not agree about the composition of the Czech delegation. It appears that Moscow wanted to see the Prague team include supporters of the Moscow-line while the Czechs stuck to their right to pick their men. The latter had their way, and announced that Mr. Dubcek and Mr. Cernik would lead their team.

The Czech delegation left for Moscow in the first week of October. On the 5th, it was announced that a treaty had been finalised, providing for the immediate withdrawal of the bulk of the occupying forces but permitting the 鈥渢emporary stationing鈥� of some Russian troops (70,000) even after the normalisation in Czechoslovakia. It is evident that the talks marked a substantial climb-down for Czech aspirations. While the immediate withdrawal of the bulk of foreign troops is in the nature of a concession to Czech demands, Moscow prevailed on the prestige issue of the right of Warsaw Pact divisions to stay on Czech soil. The treaty, as finalised at Moscow, was formally signed at a ceremony in Prague by Kosygin and Cernik on the 16th of October, and the withdrawal of Polish and Hungarian troops already commenced.

The Czech gains are, thus, mainly confined to the survival of the leadership that was responsible for the liberalisation. And this in itself is significant. To an extent it indicates a slight softening in the Soviet attitude towards 鈥榙issenters鈥� and 鈥榬enegades鈥� in the camp. But if the liberal leadership managed to survive, liberalisation itself is scotched and, what is worse, the leadership is made to recant and retrace. Since the end of August curbs on free expression reappeared and experimentation by way of economic industrial reorganisation is shelved.

Thus, on the whole, the invasion can be said to have succeeded in curbing reformism and to have browbeaten the Czech leaders to confine the wielding of their independence to lines approved by Moscow. No doubt, Dubcek made repeated assertions that the Czech way to communism will not be traded to buy peace with their ideological mentor. But such assertions, in the light of the subsequent turn-about in the implementation of liberalisation, can only be regarded as attempts to compensate for absence of action by political rhetoric鈥揳 sort of face-saving device for the Czech leaders before an expectant public opinion at home. Here one important point should be appreciated. Moscow recognises that the Czech leadership in reluctantly bowing to Russian demands, has the urgent need to keep up appearances of having stood up to Moscow. This is needed both in order to placate Czech public opinion and also to avoid another popular upsurge against Moscow. This recognition in itself constitutes a notable shift in the Russian attitude. Apart from their anxiety not to ignore the norms of legitimacy in dealing with the countries in their sphere of influence, an equal concern to avoid open confrontations with the native populations is hereby disclosed.

It now remains to enquire why the Soviet Union decided to intervene.

Reasons ranging from Russian fears of counter-revolution in Czechoslovakia and its cancerous spread to other areas to alleged pressures by neo-Stalinist sections among the Russian and other Eastern European leaderships have been suggested. It is difficult to isolate any single cause and identify it as the real one behind the Russian action. In politics, as indeed in human motivation, there never are single causes. The Russian obsession with the idea that behind every dissent there is the devil of heresy cannot lightly be passed over. Howsoever imprecise and unconvincing the charge of counter-revolution might appear to the non-Communist mind, it should be recognised that it is a meaningful reality to the communists. In addition, there is also the point that liberalization in Czechoslovakia, in particular, (with its record of democracy and its committal to individual liberty of the Western 鈥榞enre鈥�, till its communisation in 1948), might always tend to overstep the limits of permissible deviation within the fold of communism and 鈥榙egenerate鈥� into bourgeois individualism. Further, Czechoslovakia鈥檚 demand for the vacation of Warsaw Pact forces from its soil might have caused extra anxiety to the Eastern Block countries. A fall in ideological zeal in a borderline State would to an extent jeopardise military security of the Bloc itself. There is the possible motive of giving a salutary warning to other Communist states like Romania, where ideological deviation seemed to assume the proportions of asserting complete independence in the conduct of foreign policy. It is known that for the past few years Bucharest sought close relations with Western powers and, what is even more surprising at times refused to vote along with Russia in the United Nations. All these considerations could have weighed with Moscow and its allies.And here perhaps the pressures of the 鈥榟awks鈥� in Moscow and in other Eastern European States account for the precipitate nature of theaction which baffled so many outside observers.

To analyse the causes for the Russian action and even to understand them, is not to excuse it. Most certainly, it is an act of aggression. And it is all the more deplorable, because in resorting to it, Moscow has apparently reversed its policy of allowing dissent among its ideological allies or, at least, its policy of dealing with dissent in a humane and less brutal manner.

The action of Moscow has the immediate effect of retarding the growth of 鈥榙etente鈥� between the West and the Russians. Yet, it is encouraging that the Russians seemed to have sensed this, and adopted a more conciliatory tone at the recent session of the General Assembly. While they stuck to their defence in acting inCzechoslovakia, the fact that they played down the allegation of American hand behind the Czech liberalisation, as also their offer of close consultation with the United States on outstanding problems, is indicative of their anxiety to live down the reputation they earned in marching into Czechoslovakia.

Still the feeling of insecurity, among states like Roumania and Yugoslavia, persists. That the latter should fear Russian vengeance, after so long an interval after its drift away from the Soviet Bloc, points to the far reaching implications of the Soviet action. Roumania, no doubt, still asserts its autonomy, but the Czech affair cannot but be regarded as a writing on the wall for Bucharest to pause and ponder.

The Vietnam Talks鈥揈nd of an Impasse

Efforts at peace in Vietnam are heading towards a major breakthrough. The Americans have now announced total halting of the bombing of North Vietnam. Since the North Vietnamese have been insisting, from the start, on such an American initiative as a pre-condition to any efforts at de-escalation in the war on their part, the American offer is indeed a great step forward. With this, the Paris Talks will move from the stage of discussing how to reduce hostilities to that of the most crucial stage of negotiations for a general political settlement in South Vietnam. Hanoi鈥檚 response is awaited and it is to be hoped that it will reciprocate this gesture of peace by preventing guerilla infiltration into the South and also by adopting a reasonable attitude towards the future settlement.

The American offer has been sudden and in it origins, not without a touch of melodrama. For, till the middle of October, the Paris Talks did not make an inch of progress since they began in May. The North Vietnamese kept on to their demand for an unconditional stopping of bombing raids on the North; the Americans on their part stood pat on their position that, since they had already reduced the intensity of bombing from last spring, it was now Hanoi鈥檚 turn to reciprocate with stopping infiltration. And these respective positions remained unchanged till the middle of October. Meanwhile, responsible world leaders like the U. N. Secretary-General, U Thant, reiterated that Washington should stop all bombing raids. President De Gaulle has been even more forthright in condemning Washington for not doing so. A couple of months ago, Mr. Arthur Goldberg, the former American ambassador in the U. N., also expressed the opinion that it was for America to take further initiative. Yet, President Johnson was unmoved and the Paris Talks went on their five-month-old pattern of mutual accusations of war-mongering and of insincerity towards the cause of peace.

Then, suddenly a spurt in diplomatic activity was witnessed in Saigon since the 17th of October, with the American ambassador in Saigon, Mr. Elseworth Bunker, meeting the South Vietnamese President, Nguyen Van Thieu, for a series of talks. This led to speculation that the Americans were prepared to offer to Hanoi a complete bombing halt and that the talks to Saigon were intended to sound Saigon鈥檚 reactions, as also to assure it that South Vietnamese security will under no conditions be sacrificed. Yet, while the world capitals hummed with reports of this new American initiative, Washington itself denied that any policy changes were contemplated. It was only after repeated denials that Washington, at last, came out with the offer. It is obvious that the American reluctance to admit that an offer was being considered was due to their concern for Hanoi鈥檚 relation to the offer. It is certain that Hanoi was sounded by the Americans to ascertain whether in return for the offer the former would assure that they would not take military advantage of the lull in bombing. Presumably, the Americans also informed Hanoi of their wish that the present Saigon Government should be allowed to participate in the future talks and that the National Liberation Front, the political wing of the Vietcong, will also be invited to the talks. It is difficult to know what precise assurances the Americans had obtained from Hanoi before they made their offer public. But It is now known that the Americans conveyed the terms of their offer to Hanoi, through their delegate to the Paris Talks, as far as mid-September, though nothing of this was suggested in the progress of the talks themselves till the end of October. It is not known whether Hanoi will concede to the participation of the Thieu regime and it is equally doubtful whether the South Vietnamese will take well to America鈥檚 offer to seat the N. L. F. at the conference table.

The future prospects for peace depend very much on how Hanoi reacts. If their response is favourable, a major breakthrough will have occurred and the forces of peace further accelerated. Given this, any future American administration would find it impossible not to move further in the direction of a peaceful settlement. If, unfortunately, Hanoi were to reject the American offer, the Paris Talks would become a futile exercise of playing for high stakes with no money even to lay the bets.

The International Year for Human Rights

1968 is being observed as the International Year for Human Rights. Twenty years ago, the U. N. adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, with the ringing words 鈥淎ll human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in the spirit of brotherhood.鈥� Thus was the spirit behind the French Revolution and Thomas 笔补颈苍别鈥檚 Rights of Man, reasserted by humanity. No doubt, the unparalleled obliteration of every facet of human dignity under the Nazi terror shocked the world conscience, and thus provided the immediate cause for the Declaration. There were other causes too. The spirit of liberty, emanating from Europe, was shut off by the Europeans themselves, thanks to colonial greed, and it needed the necromancy of the Nazis to make the Europeans realise that rights have no relation to race and region. The era of colonial liberation, starting with the birth of new India, is also symptomatic of the process of the universalisation of freedom and human dignity.

The Declaration was a mere general statement intended to serve as a rough model for member states to draw upon in incorporating human rights into their constitutional set-ups. The need for more comprehensive and precise draft of the various categories of rights of man was felt from the start. By making members subscribe to such draft conventions, their obligations to human rights can be made direct and identifiable and the extent of the discharge of these obligations verifiable by the world Conscience. It is with this in view that the U. N. Commission on Human Rights toiled for eighteen years and prepared two universal multi-purpose conventions which translate the philosophical and political ideas of the Universal Declaration into legal parlance. These two, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, were adopted on 16th December 1966, by the General Assembly. These two multi-purpose conventions, along with the Declaration itself, constitute the triptych of the noble edifice of human rights. These conventions legally bind the subscribing states to incorporate the Contents into their constitutions. Member states, would not merely be obliged to declare political and civil rights, but also to render them enforceable through impartial tribunals In their respective constitutive process.

However, only the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights has the provision for enforceability against governmental interference, but not so the Covenant on Economics, Social and Cultural Rights. The inability of the states to guarantee work, fair wages and other economic necessities, apart from the recognition of the need to secure these, is, of course, the reason. The same predicament forced the framers of the Indian constitution to make Fundamental Rights representing more the civil and political rights, enforceable, while leaving out from this category, economic and social rights, which find expression in the Directive Principles.

Yet, the very fact that U. N. passed the Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, is significant being a departure from the norms of the Western political tradition, which tends to over-emphasise civil and political rights. This point was singled out for mention by M. Rene Cassin, who had much to do with the drafting of the Universal Declaration and for which services has been awarded the Noble Peace Prize this Year. He says: 鈥淭he most important conclusion that emerges from a comparison of the Declaration with the 18th century declarations and 19th century constitutions is that individual freedoms are not considered by the Universal Declaration to be the fundamental human rights to the exclusion of all others. In the Universal Declaration, these individual freedoms which are inherent in man鈥檚 nature, are accompanied on an equal footing by economic, and cultural rights which man has by virtue of his membership in society.鈥�

It must also be pointed out that in addition to this creditable work of adopting the multi-purpose conventions, the U. N. had also passed single-purpose conventions dealing with a freedom or a particular right. The conventions on genocide (1948), statelessness (1951), forced labour (1957), discrimination in the matter of employment (1958), and all forms of racial discrimination (1965) are notable among these.

The acceptance and implementation of human rights contained in these conventions has so far been less than sincere in many parts of the world. There is no doubt that the under-developed parts of the world are more guilty on this score and the trend towards the erosion of human values is indeed deplorable. Yet, it is also necessary to recognise that there is a correlation between the fact of their economic wardness and the neglect of human rights. Rebellions, revolutions and the consequential repression by the powers that be鈥揳ll indices of the absence of civil and political liberties鈥揳re partly a function of the prevailing poverty, ignorance and despair. Those that off-hand condemn the failure of democracy and the denial of human dignity in these regions, should bear in mind this factor. It is here that the imperative need for the acceptance of responsibility on the part of the richer nations to share their affluence with the impoverished world arises. Thus, while the U. N. should step-up its campaign in urging for the speedy adoption of the Covenants on human rights, in letter and deed, unless a fresh drive for massive financial assistance through international aegis is launched, there is no use bemoaning that human dignity鈥搕he raison detre of the Universal Declaration鈥揾as been humbled. No body need be surprised if the International Year for Human Rights passes off with no appreciable advance in the implementation of these rights over wide areas. For, did not the International Co-operation Year pass off without a single major concerted effort on the part of the richer nations to come to the succour of the weak and the wretched?