Essay name: The Nyaya theory of Knowledge
Author:
Satischandra Chatterjee
Affiliation: University of Calcutta / Department of Philosophy
This essay studies the Nyaya theory of Knowledge and examines the contributions of the this system to Indian and Western philosophy, specifically focusing on its epistemology. Nyaya represents a realist approach, providing a critical evaluation of knowledge.
Page 141 of: The Nyaya theory of Knowledge
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External source: Shodhganga (Repository of Indian theses)
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122
NY脛YA THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE
3. The Jaina, Pr膩bh膩kara and Vedanta definitions of
Perception
It is customary to define perception in terms of sense-
functioning. The ordinary idea is that perception as a form
of knowledge is essentially dependent for its origin and distinct-
ive character on the stimulation of the sense-organs. There
is a departure from this common usage in the definition of
pratyak峁 or perception given by the Advaita Ved膩nta, the
Pr膩bh膩kara M墨m膩峁僺膩 and the Jaina system. According to the
Pr膩bh膩karas, perception is the direct cognition of an object.
It is the intuitive or immediate knowledge that we may have of
the subject and object of knowledge or of knowledge itself.'
For the Jainas too, pratyak峁 is the direct and immediate
knowledge of objects. It is of two kinds: mukhya or the
primary and samvyavah膩rika or the practical. The first is
quite independent of the mind and the senses. While the
origin of the second is conditioned by the mind and the senses,
its essence lies in the direct cognition of some object. Hence
perception is in its essential nature a direct knowledge of
objects."
In the Advaita Ved膩nta, perception as a pram膩峁嘺 is the
unique cause (kara峁嘺) of perception as a form of valid knowledge
(pram膩). In this sense, the sense organs constitute the kara峁嘺
or the unique cause of perceptual cognition. The latter (i.e.
pratyak峁 pram膩), however, is defined as immediate and time- .
less knowledge (caitanya). Such immediate knowledge is the self
itself, because it is only in the self that there is pure immediacy
of knowledge. The senses are the kara峁嘺 or the unique cause
of perception as immediate knowledge in so far as the mental
modification (anta岣ara峁嘺v峁泃ti), which manifests it (i.e.
caitanya), is due to the function of the sense organs. What takes
place in perception is this. The anta岣ara峁嘺 or mind goes out
笔谤补办补谤补峁嘺辫补帽肠颈办腻,
] S膩k峁Ｄ乼pratiti岣� pratyak峁峁� meyam膩t峁沺ram膩su s膩,
PP. 51-52.
2 Vi艣adaj帽膩nasvabh膩va峁兡�
pratyak峁m, avyavadh膩nena pram膩峁嚹乶tara-
nirapeksatay膩 pratibhasana峁� vastuno'nubhavo vai艣adyam vij帽膩nasyeti, etc.,
Prameyakamala-marta峁囜笉a, pp. 57-67.
