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NYAYA THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE
It is just what it is immediately sensed to be. Words and
concepts express such aspects of things as are general or com-
mon to many things. But a thing is an individual in so far as
it excludes all other things from within itself. Hence what is
individual is to be directly felt or intuited, but not expressed
by words or concepts. From this it follows that perception is
just the cognition of an immediately given datum and is com-
pletely free from all subjective or conceptual determinations.
It is a pure sensation which cannot be properly described or
embodied in verbal judgments.'
胁 胁
The Buddhist definition of perception has been criticised
and rejected by the Naiy膩yikas. It has been pointed out by
them that Vasubandhu's definition of perception is too wide.
If by perception we are to mean a cognition which is objective-
ly determined (tato'rth膩dvij帽膩nam), all true knowledge will
have to be regarded as perception. As Bosanquet has rightly
pointed out, reality is operative in truth." Thus a true
inference has an objective basis in so far as the conclusion
expresses a real relation between two things. So we may say
that what is validly inferred is an objective fact which is causally
efficient towards the inferential cognition. Similar is the case
with the other kinds of valid knowledge. Even the wrong cog-
nition of silver in a shell is not without some objective basis.
The wrong judgment, 'that is silver,' is based on the 'that' as
an objective fact. Further, on the Bauddha view of universal
momentariness (k峁�a峁噄kav膩da), we do not see how perception
can have an objective basis. The object being the cause of
perception must be antecedent to it. So when the perception is
or appears its momentary cause, namely, the object, must cease
to exist. The object cannot therefore be the cause of percep-
tion. But if perception be not directly produced by the object,
we cannot call it perception at all."
1 NBT., PP. 7-12.
2 Logic, Vol. II,
P. 289.
3 NV. & NVT., 1. 1. 4.