Nyayakusumanjali of Udayana (study)
by Sri Ramen Bhadra | 2014 | 37,777 words
This page relates ‘Samkhya view of cause� of the study on the Nyayakusumanjali of Udayana, who belonged to the Nyaya-Vaisheshika School of Indian philosophy and lived in the 10th century. The Nyaya-Kusumanjali is primarily concerned with proving the existence of God but also deals with various other important philosophical problems. The book is presented as an encyclopedia of Nyaya-Vaisesika doctrines.
Go directly to: Footnotes.
³§Äåṃk³ó²â²¹ view of cause
The °äÄå°ù±¹Äå°ì²¹ may still try to oppose the ±·²âÄå²â²¹ in a slightly different way. They may say that effects are produced not from a single cause but from causes which are of the same nature. There also Udayana does not give any name of the opponent, but some commentators think that Udayana is referring to the ³§Äåṃk³ó²â²¹ view. According to ³§Äåṃk³ó²â²¹, everything is of the nature of three qualities, sattva, rajas and tamas. Although there are different entities in the world they are all composed of these three qualities.
The basic or root cause of the things is avyakta which also is of the nature of the three qualities. Udayana shows that this view also is not logical. It is found that different effects have different nature. For example, a pot can carry water, but a cloth cannot do so. But a cloth can cover the body, but a pot cannot do so. If the cause be of the same nature the effects also cannot be different. One effect becomes different from another effect because each is produced from causes of different nature. Difference of nature in the effect is dependent upon difference of nature in the cause.[1]
As against the above it may be contended that even if the cause is a single one or of the same nature different kinds of effects may be produced from it, because it has different kinds of potency (Å›²¹°ì³Ù¾±). The cause is one and the same, but it is endowed with various kinds of potency and different effects are produced from different potencies. The nature of the effects becomes different because there is difference in the nature of the particular potencies producing them. Udayana rejects this view on the following ground. He asks: Are the potencies identical with the cause, they are not actually different, they are of the same nature with the cause? Or, are they totally different from the causes and do not share the same nature with the cause? Neither of the alternatives can be accepted. If the first alternative is admitted it will be as good as admitting that effects are produced from a single cause or a cause of the same nature. Each potency is ultimately identical with the cause and the same charge of every effect sharing the same nature will be applicable. If the second alternative is accepted it will mean the acceptance of the view that different effects have different causes. The potencies are actually different from one another and the effects are produced by them. Though they may reside in a single substance they are themselves different. So one has to admit that different potencies produce different effects. In short, this is also the ±·²âÄå²â²¹ position and the opponent also accepts the same.[2]
The opponent may still try to continue his attack on the ±·²âÄå²â²¹. It may be argued that it is the very nature of the cause that it produces effects in succession or produces effects which are of different nature. There cannot be any question about the nature of a thing. It cannot be asked, why does fire burn or why does water cool? Similarly, it cannot be asked, why should a cause produce effects in such a manner? In answer, Udayana raises alternatives. If the opponent’s view is accepted, it will have to be accepted that the cause is by nature endowed with the capacity to produce both fire and nonfire. When it is producing fire, does its capacity to produce non-fire remain? If it remains non-fire also should be produced at the same time. Moreover, since the nature producing every effect is there in the cause, everything again will be of the same nature. Thus the claim is not justified. As to the example of a lamp producing many effects, it may be pointed out that actually the cause is not the same. There are different co-operating factors and due to their difference there is difference in the set of causes. So actually the causes for every effect are different ones.[3]
Footnotes and references:
[1]:
Ibid.
[2]:
Ibid.
[3]:
Ibid.