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In both the waking and the dream states, external objects are seen as being independently existent entities. They are thought to be real because they are seen as being real. Similarly, internal imaginary objects are seen as being internal mental creations. Because they are seen as being imaginary, they are thought to be unreal. In the dream state, the dream illusion imagined within by the mind is unreal. For, it disappears the moment that it is imagined. Further, even in dream that which perceived outside the mind, the perception of jar, etc., by means of the eyes, etc., appears real. Thus, though the entire dream experiences(imagined within and imagined outside the mind) are ultimately known in the waking state to be unreal appearances, yet they have their own distinctions of real and unreal as long as the dream lasts.

According to 骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补 the objects in the waking state are no more real than dream objects. Like dream objects, waking objects have their being only in so far as they are perceived. However, it is not the final objective of the M膩峁囜笉奴kya 碍腻谤颈办腻 to merely prove that the world of the waking state is unreal. The unreality of object is demonstrated only for the purpose of showing where the reality is in our experience. Consequently 骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补 anticipates a question from the opponents in 办腻谤颈办腻 11:

If the objects cognized in both the condition (of dream and of waking) be illusory, who cognizes all these (illusory objects) and who again imagines them?

In his commentary, 艢补峁卥补谤补 explains the import of this question The opponent asks -if the objects of the waking and the dream states are illusory, then who cognizes these objects, those that are imagined as existing 鈥渨ithin the mind鈥� and those that are imagined as existing 鈥渙utside the mind鈥�? Again, who imagines them? In other words what is the substratum for knowledge and memory? Otherwise, there would be no other proof for concluding that there is the Self (the 腻迟尘补苍).

骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补 addresses the questions in 办腻谤颈办腻 12 of the Vaitathya 笔谤补办补谤补峁嘺. He says that: 膧迟尘补苍, the self-luminous, through the power of its own Maya, imagines in himself by himself (all the objects that the subject experiences within or without). He alone is the cognizer of the objects (so created). This is the decision of the 痴别诲腻苍迟补.

骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补鈥檚 replies that, it is the absolute Self, the 罢耻谤墨测补, pure Awareness that imagines, or apparently creates (kalpayati), the waking and dream worlds. He says no illusion takes place without a substratum and that the substratum of illusion is real. The Self which is the substratum of the illusory experience both in dream and waking is real. The eternal and self luminous Self through its own 尘腻测腻/补惫颈诲测腻 (蝉惫腻尘腻测补测腻) in the empirical realm projects the dream phenomena as well as the external world. In dream as well as in the waking it can be said that the principle of mind becomes operative. One may consider 尘腻测腻 functioning as the mind which due to its unceasing movement projects the plurality.

骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补 explains that the very fact that there is the perception of an appearance immediately tells us that there must be the perceiver. When we examine our experience carefully, we can see that every act of perception does not establish the object. Rather, it establishes the perceiver. If we look for the source of perception in the world of objects, we will never find it. It is not the object that is necessary for perception. It is the perceiver that is essential. The reality in any experience is with the subject, the perceiver. The real value and purpose of perception and knowledge is that it presupposes that there must to the perceiver. For, as 艢补峁卥补谤补 says 鈥渙therwise there would be no other proof for concluding the existence of 腻迟尘补苍 or the Self鈥�.

The perceiver is one鈥檚 own self. When I see and recognize an object, I know that the seeing and recognition are not in the object but in myself. The 腻迟尘补苍 is that inner self who is the seer. The 办腻谤颈办腻 12 characterizes the 腻迟尘补苍 as 鈥�腻迟尘补 诲别惫补岣�鈥� or the 鈥淒ivine 膧迟尘补苍鈥�. That is, the Self, who is the seer, is beyond the individual body and mind because, being the seer it is the one who sees the body and mind. The body and mind are only objects seen by one鈥檚 own innermost Self. This Self who sees the body and mind can never itself be seen. It is this divine 腻迟尘补苍, one鈥檚 innermost self who is the seer of all objects. The seer is the only reality.

There are no external objects for the seer to see. He projects/creates his own objects for Himself. He imagines them. As the 办腻谤颈办腻 12 says, 鈥渢he Divine 腻迟尘补苍 by means of his own 尘腻测腻 imagines Himself by Himself鈥�. Since the only reality is the 腻迟尘补苍, when He imagines the objects He can only be imagining Himself as the objects. And, the power or means for imagining the objects only can come from Him.

It has been shown that the seer, the 腻迟尘补苍, is the only reality and the world of plurality appears as though it were real. How is this possible? 艢补峁卥补谤补 says: it is the Self that imagines the Self through the Self. He imagines Himself as the world through His 尘腻测腻. The different objects are imagined in the Self as one would imagine a snake in the rope. It is the Self itself that cognises these objects. The Self alone is the support of memory and of cognition.

艢补峁卥补谤补 in his explanation says that the Self appearing as the world is like the rope appearing as a snake. The rope, the 补诲丑颈蝉迟腻苍补, never changes. The rope is never affected by the distorted perception of the snake on it. It is merely one thing appearing as though it were another. The Self (the 腻迟尘补苍) merely appears as though it were the world. But in this appearance 腻迟尘补苍 itself never undergoes any change nor is the world ever actually created.

骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补 continues to discuss the apparent (尘颈迟丑测腻) nature of the creation, and in doing so he makes a clear distinction between the waking and dream states. In 办腻谤颈办腻 13 he says:

The Lord (腻迟尘补苍), with his mind turned outward, variously imagines the objects (such as sound etc.), which are already in his mind (in the form of 惫腻蝉补苍腻蝉 or 蝉补峁卥补濒辫补蝉 or desires). The 腻迟尘补苍 again (with his mind turned within), imagines in his mind various (objects of) ideas.

Here, the reference to the mind (citta) as being either 鈥榚xternal鈥� or 鈥榠nternal鈥� is reminiscent of the statement in M膩峁囜笉奴kya 鲍辫补苍颈峁�a诲 3 and 4 mantras, where the waker is spoken of as one 鈥渨hose consciousness is external鈥� (产补岣�i峁�p谤补箩帽补) and the dreamer as one 鈥榳hose consciousness is internal, (补苍迟补岣�p谤补箩帽补). 骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补 says that the Lord 鈥榗reates鈥� (kalpayate) the things of the dream world and the things of the waking world. 鈥楬e first thinks鈥� of the objects to be 鈥榗reated鈥� in his mind and then becomes out ward minded and 鈥榝ixes鈥� them up outside, just as a speaker first thinks about what he is going to speak and then speaks out.

艢补峁卥补谤补 gives reply to the question: In what manner does the imagining Self imagine Himself? This is being stated. The Self imagines the worldly objects such as sound etc., He also imagines other non-manifest things in the form of impressions (惫腻蝉补苍腻蝉) arranged in his mind. He turns his mind outward and imagines steady objects like the earth and impermanent objects like the lightening which remains only for a moment. Similarly, he turns his mind inward and imagines fanciful ideas. The Lord, the Self, imagines Himself this way. The potter or weaver desirous of making a pot or cloth first produces in his mind the idea (or image) of the object and then creates it externally fit for worldly dealings. Similarly here the objects are first thought out and then projected for practical purposes.

The conclusion that waking objects are unreal just as dream objects are unreal is reiterated in a different way in the following 办腻谤颈办腻. 碍腻谤颈办腻 14 appears to make a distinction between the duration of these two orders of bhavas or objects of consciousness: the inward/internal is subject to the temporal order of mind (肠颈迟迟补办腻濒补蝉) whereas the outward is subject to the temporal order of the two (诲惫补测补办腻濒补蝉). This 办腻谤颈办腻 asserts that objects/entities in both these orders of reality viz., the outward and the inward are all imagined (kalpita eva te sarve) and that no fundamental difference between the so鈥揷alled outer and inner worlds can be argued on any other ground (viseso nanyahetukah)^[1].

According to 骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补, the objects of both waking and dream states are 鈥渁ll mere imaginations鈥� and there is no real difference between internal and external objects.

The difference that is seen between them is a difference in the way that they are imagined. Internal objects are imagined as being 鈥渋nternal and limited to the time of thought鈥�. External objects are imagined as being 鈥渆xternal and extended over two points of time.鈥� As 艢补峁卥补谤补 says, the distinction of objects being external and extended over time is not due to any cause except that they are imaginations. In this way they are like the internal objects seen in dream. The distinctions (between dream and waking) are only in the way that they are imagined. But the objects of both states are fundamentally alike because they are all merely products of the imagination.

The opponent may raise the following objection, that the waking state cannot be considered to be an imagination (kalpita) like that of dream. The objects imagined within the mind, have their existence only for a short period of time (肠颈迟迟补办腻濒补) for they are imagined. On the other hand the objects perceived by senses externally in the waking state remain related to a larger duration of time i.e. by two points in time (诲惫补测补办腻濒补) and become objects of recognition (辫谤补迟测补产丑颈箩帽补) later on. But this objection is countered in the following way.

According to 艢补峁卥补谤补 the special feature of objects perceived externally and becoming objects of recognition are no grounds for regarding them to be real. 颁颈迟迟补办腻濒腻岣� means objects perceived within the mind and exist so long as the thought regarding them exists. It means that they are found to exist only till the time they are imagined. 顿惫补测补办腻濒腻岣� are objects related to two points of time, i.e., they are 叠丑别诲补办腻濒腻岣�, i.e., there is another distinct time also determining their period of existence (办腻濒补蝉测补 产丑别诲补岣�) or they may be called anyonya-辫补谤颈肠肠丑别诲测腻岣�i. e. time that is limited by mutually determined time. 艢补峁卥补谤补 gives an example of a man watching the milking of a cow.The cow is milked till the man observes it or the man observes the cow till it is milked. Thus there is kind of mutual determination of one act by the other act. 艢补峁卥补谤补 says that the special feature of the objects perceived externally by senses and their being called 诲惫补测补办腻濒腻岣� is not due any other cause except their being imagined by the mind.

骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补, in 办腻谤颈办腻 15, renames the subjective (internal) and objective (external) realms as the unmanifest (avyakta) and the manifest (sphuta), and once more stating that they are both simply imagined (kalpita eva te sarve) by the mind. But he is adding that there is a difference in our way of experiencing them due to the fact that the manifest or outer world is perceived through the sense organs while the inner world is imagined directly through mind. 艢补峁卥补谤补 says that, whereas the objects that are internal (尘补苍辞惫腻蝉补苍腻尘腻迟谤补) are indistinct, the objects that are external are clearly evident. They are all apparently created by the Self. This means in dream there is the operation only of the mind, whereas in the waking there is the mind functioning together with the various sense-organs such as eyes etc. Looking at dream and waking experiences from the standpoint of the waking state, 骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补 distinguishes between them while maintaining both equally as mental construction or imagination.

骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补, now provides more details about the process of creation. In 办腻谤颈办腻 16 he describes the process of imagination as beginning with the construction or projection of the notion of an individual self (箩墨惫补峁僰补濒辫补测补迟别 辫奴谤惫补峁�) and expanding from that basis into the cognition of the various external and internal objects (tato bh膩v膩n p峁泃hagvidh膩n b膩hy膩n膩dhy膩tmik膩峁兣�) ^[2] . It means that due to 尘腻测腻, the 腻迟尘补苍 imagines /constructs everything. He says that, first of all, is imagined the 闯墨惫补 (the embodied being) and then are imagined the various entities, objective and subjective, that are perceived. As is (one鈥檚) knowledge show is (one鈥檚) memory of it.

艢补峁卥补谤补 explains that in asking the question, what is the source of the imagination of various objects, subjective and objective, which appear to be related to each other as cause and effect?

The 箩墨惫补 (individuality) is of the nature of cause and effect (hetuphal腻迟尘补ka峁� [hetuphal腻迟尘补ka]) and is characterised by such misconceived notion as: 鈥淚 am performing; happiness and misery are mine鈥�. The actions of 箩墨惫补s are causes, for pleasure, pain, knowledge, attachment etc., which are the effects. The 箩墨惫补 imagines himself a doer, as well as the enjoyer. The Self which is pure does not possess action etc., and is not attached to this sequence of cause and effect. However, there is a distorted perception of Himself as an individual like a misperception of a snake on the rope. Thus when the individuality is projected, the Self attaches and identifies itself with its own creation like the body, breath, mind and senses etc.

Again, what is the cause of this imagination? It is thus stated: this 箩墨惫补tva or individuality imagined by the Self is now competent to make further imaginations. As the 箩墨惫补 understands its projection so is its memory. In other words the 箩墨惫补鈥檚 memory is determined by its knowledge of objects. Hence, from the knowledge of the imagination of cause there is the knowledge of the result (effect). This is followed by the memory of both cause and effect. Memory is again followed by knowledge, which is of the nature of action, actor and the effect to fulfill that purpose. So continues the cycle. In this way the 箩墨惫补 imagines external and internal objects as mutually related to each other in terms of cause and effect. This can be explained in this way: If there is food and drink, there is satisfaction. From the idea of knowledge of food etc., which is the cause, follows the idea of the knowledge of satisfaction which is the effect. Next day, we get the memory of this cause and effect experienced on the previous day. Then there is the knowledge of the desirability of having that result and again we look for the means of achieving it. Accordingly for that intended satisfaction we begin the act of cooking etc., with the help of rice, fuel etc. These kinds of knowledge arise, then their memory, then acting accordingly, then its effect. In this order, imaginations are made which are the cause and effect of one another.

Karmarkar remarks that 骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补 does not dilate upon this topic further as he is mainly interested in the 补箩腻迟颈惫腻诲补^[3]. 骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补 says that the 箩墨惫补, being ignorant of its own true nature, the 腻迟尘补苍 that is its substratum (补诲丑颈蝉迟丑腻苍补), proceeds to develop a number of mistaken views of reality. He, in 办腻谤颈办腻 17, gives the famous example of the rope and the snake to show how the 腻迟尘补苍 appears as the world of objects. It is said:

As the rope, whose nature is not really known, is imagined in the dark to be a snake, a water-line etc., so also is the 腻迟尘补苍 imagined (in various ways).

In every experience, it is the seer who is the only reality. Objects appear only as they are seen by the seer. Yet, in perception our attention does not go to the seer, the perceiver. Our attention generally goes to the object and we think that it is the object that is real. We are ignorant of the seer, even though it is the source and background of every experience. The Self is evident but not understood.

The analogy of rope-snake is an appropriate one to show how this happens. It is only because of the presence of the rope that it is even possible to see the illusory snake. The rope is the substratum and foundation for the apparent snake; it is the reality behind the appearance. But, when we see the snake, our attention goes entirely to the appearance and we are unaware of what it really is.

In his commentary, 艢补峁卥补谤补 makes it clear that the illusory perception of the world is the result of our ignorance of the true nature of 腻迟尘补苍. He says:

What is the cause of the imagination of the individual self and the world associated with it? This is explained by means of an illustration. It is just as in the world a rope whose own form has not been well ascertained, is imagined in hazy darkness to be a snake, a water line, or a stick, or many other things. All this is due to the previous absence of knowledge regarding the real nature of the rope. If previously the rope had been known in its real nature, then the imagination of snake etc., would not have been possible, as in the example of the fingers of one鈥檚 own hand. One does not misapprehend one鈥檚 own fingers this way because one knows very well what they are.

Similarly, 腻迟尘补苍 has been variously imagined as 箩墨惫补 (individuals), 辫谤腻峁嘺 (breath) and other phenomena of the world, phenomena limitless in number. This happens when one does not ascertain for certain what it鈥檚 true nature is; when one does not know, that it is of the nature of pure Consciousness and that it is non-dual and has nothing to do with the characteristics of the world, characteristics like cause and effect. In the absence of this knowledge (i.e. the true nature of 腻迟尘补苍 is not known), the 腻迟尘补苍 is imagined with individuality; with breath and all kinds of phenomena one can neither count nor mention. This is verily the established conclusion of all the 鲍辫补苍颈峁�a诲蝉.

All appearances require a perceiver. This 鈥榮eer鈥� goes unrecognized when the attention is directed towards the object. Only when the Self is known, the felt object becomes a mere appearance. We do not recognize the fact that in order for the appearance to appear, it must be seen by the seer. According to 痴别诲腻苍迟补 if we are to free ourselves from the illusion of objects we must turn our attention from the seen to the seer, from the appearance to the reality. As 骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补 in 办腻谤颈办腻 18 says:

When the real nature of the rope is ascertained all illusions about it disappear and there arises the conviction that it is the one (unchanged) rope and nothing else; even so is the nature of the conviction regarding 腻迟尘补苍.

When it is ascertained that there is only a rope and that the appearance of the snake is illusory, the realization that 鈥渢his is only a rope and nothing else (advaitam [advaita])鈥� dawns. Similar is the case with the 腻迟尘补苍. The scriptures propound the Self (腻迟尘补苍) as devoid of all worldly attributes as is vouched by such texts as neti, neti: not this, not this (叠峁沨补诲腻谤补峁噛补办补 鲍辫补苍颈峁�a诲 IV.4.22)^[4]. By eliminating every possible thought about the Self through the process of elimination prescribed in such texts, the scriptures give rise to the knowledge of the Self that removes all ignorance as the light of the sun removes all darkness. Again, One also come to know with certainly that all that exists is nothing else other than the Self as many 鈥�艢谤耻迟颈 texts鈥� declare: 鈥淭he Self, indeed, is all this (world)鈥� (Ch膩ndogya 鲍辫补苍颈峁�a诲 VII.25.2.)^[5]. 鈥淭his Brahman is without an earlier and without a later, without an inside, without an outside鈥�(叠峁沨补诲腻谤补峁噛补办补 鲍辫补苍颈峁�a诲 II.5.19)^[6]. 鈥業t is without and within, unborn, without breath鈥�.鈥�(惭耻峁囜笉 II.1.2)^[7].鈥淭his is that great unborn Self who is undecaying, undying, immortal, fearless Brahman....鈥� (叠峁沨补诲腻谤补峁噛补办补 鲍辫补苍颈峁�a诲 IV.4.25)^[8], and 鈥渋t is one only without a second鈥� (Ch膩ndogya 鲍辫补苍颈峁�a诲 VI.2.1)^[9].

The ignorance regarding the true nature of the rope can only be overcome when one鈥檚 attention goes from the snake to the rope. When the attention is directed to the rope, then the true nature of the rope can be seen and the illusion ceases 鈥渟o also is the conviction regarding 腻迟尘补苍.鈥� (办腻谤颈办腻 18). The ignorance regarding the real nature of 腻迟尘补苍 will be removed only when we turn our attention from the world of objects to the light of experience.

This rope-snake illustration shows that when we turn our attention from the appearance to the reality, we do not destroy anything. When we see the rope we do not destroy the snake. Rather, we realize that the snake was merely an appearance and we are no longer deluded by it. Similarly, when we realize the 腻迟尘补苍, the Self, the world does not get destroyed.In the light of this reality we can no longer be deluded by the world of appearance.

It is important here to mention that it is through this illustration 骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补 is able to show how the 腻迟尘补苍 appears as the world. It is also through this rope-snake analogy, 骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补 has shown how one can go from the appearance back to the reality. There is no idea of claiming a real change for the rope into a snake, and in the same way no real change can be claimed for 腻迟尘补苍 when perceived as the world. Brahman / 腻迟尘补苍 presents itself as the world, and apart from Brahman, there would be no world. Therefore, Brahman is called the material cause of the world. Brahman is the material cause in the sense that it is the source, support and the point of resolution of the world like water is the source etc., for the waves. The apparent and illusory existence of a material world requires a real substratum, which is 腻迟尘补苍/ Brahman, just as the appearance of the snake requires the real substratum of a rope. So, the analogy of the snake and the rope expresses a unique insight of 痴别诲腻苍迟补.

If the established conclusion is that 腻迟尘补苍 is one and the sole reality, how is it that it comes to be imagined as 辫谤腻峁嘺 (breath) and other innumerable phenomena that constitute the phenomenal world? This is being replied by 骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补 in 办腻谤颈办腻 19 as: The 腻迟尘补苍 is imagined as 辫谤腻峁嘺 and other endless objects. This is due to 尘腻测腻 (ignorance) of the luminous (腻迟尘补苍 itself) by which It is (as it were) deluded.

艢补峁卥补谤补 explains that just as a juggler conjures up an illusion and makes the very clear sky appear covered with trees, blooming with flowers and leaves, so does the 尘腻测腻 of this luminous one make the formless 腻迟尘补苍 appear as though endowed with forms. This 尘腻测腻 seems to delude the 腻迟尘补苍, makes it look like as though deluded.

Footnotes and references:

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[1]:

惭腻峁囜笉奴办测辞辫补苍颈峁�a诲 Gau岣峚p膩diya办腻谤颈办腻 (with Hindi trans.), 95.

[2]:

Ibid., 97.

[3]:

Karmarkar, 骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补 碍腻谤颈办腻, 77.

[4]:

S. Radhakrishnan, trans. The Principal 鲍辫补苍颈峁�a诲蝉, (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1991), 279.

[5]:

9 Ibid., 488.

[6]:

Ibid., 208.

[7]:

Ibid., 680.

[8]:

Ibid., 281.

[9]:

Ibid., 447-8.