Tattvasangraha [with commentary]
by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588
This page contains verse 1990-1992 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 1990-1992.
Verse 1990-1992
Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:
संयुक्तं दूरदेशस्थं नैरन्तर्यव्यवस्थितम् �
एकाण्वभिमुखं रूपं यदणोर्मध्यवर्त्तिन� � १९९० �
अण्वन्तराभिमुख्येन तदेव यद� कल्प्यते �
प्रचयो भूधरादीनामेवं सत� � युज्यत� � १९९१ �
अण्वन्तराभिमुख्येन रूपं चेदन्यदिष्यत� �
कथ� ना� भवेदेक� परमाणुस्तथासति � १९९२ �saṃyukta� dūradeśastha� nairantaryavyavasthitam |
In every object, if the form of the atom at the centre,—which is in conjunction with, or distinct from, or lying contiguously with, the front part of another atom,—is regarded as also facing a third atom,—then, in that case, there would be no aggregation in the form of the hill and other things.—If, on the other hand, the idea is that what is in front of the other atom is another form: of the first atom,—then, in that case, how could such an atom be one?�(1990-1992)
ekāṇvabhimukha� rūpa� yadaṇormadhyavarttina� || 1990 ||
aṇvantarābhimukhyena tadeva yadi kalpyate |
pracayo bhūdharādīnāmeva� sati na yujyate || 1991 ||
aṇvantarābhimukhyena rūpa� cedanyadiṣyate |
katha� nāma bhavedeka� paramāṇustathāsati || 1992 ||
Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):
The argument may be formulated as follows:—That which is devoid of the form of one or many is ñt for being regarded as non-existent,—as the ‘sky-lotus�;—the Atoms postulated by the other party are devoid of the form of one or many;—hence this is a Reason based upon the nature of things.
It cannot be said that the Reason here adduced is ‘inadmissible�; because that the Atom is one cannot be admitted; because in the Hill and other things which are aggregates of Atoms, there is diversity of facings towards various directions.
This ‘diversity of facings in various directions� must be present in the Atoms also, otherwise it could not be possible in the aggregates of Atoms, like the Hill and other things;—this is what is set forth in the words—�If the assumption is, etc. etc.
Some people hold that in every Object, the Atoms are in close conjunction with one another;—others hold that they remain there separate from each other, always, without touching one another;—others again hold that there is no intervening space between atoms, hence they are said to be in contact.—Under all these three views, when the Atom in the middle is surrounded by many other Atoms, if there were no diversity in its facings towards various directions, then,—as in the case of the Mind and Mental entities,—no aggregation would be possible, as Atoms have no parts. For instance, that form in which the central Atom would be facing one Atom,—if in that same form, it also faced other Atoms,—then, it would imply that all the surrounding Atoms occupy the same point in space, and no aggregation of them would be possible.
The argument may be formulated as follows:—Whatever faces the Atom of one form must occupy the same point in space,—as for example, the Atom lying in space behind the said Atom,—or the House that stands facing another House;—and all the Atoms surrounding the central Atom stand facing that central Atom which has only one form;—hence this is a Reason based on the nature of things. As a consequence of this, there could be no aggregation (of Atoms).
If, on the other hand, the central Atom faces the other Atom in another form, then as the diverse facings would be there, the Atom could not be one,—being just like the Jar and other things.
Bhadanta-Śܱܲٲ has offered the following explanation:—“In the case of an entity, as differentiated from the ‘non-existent� and the ‘non-entity�, several Universals are assumed, but not in reality; similarly in the case in question, as Atoms exist in several things, they are assumed to be many, but not in reality. Because there is no distinct Category in the shape of Space (or Direction) as posited by ṇād and others; because if this Space were one only, then the diverse notions of ‘East�, ‘West� and the rest, would not be possible. It is only the Atoms that lie there one after the other which come to be spoken of as ‘Space� or ‘Direction�; hence when it is said ‘because there is diversity of facings in Space�, all that is meant is that one Atom is surrounded of several Atoms,—and not that the Atom has parts�.
This is not right. Because, if the Atom has no parts, it is like the Mind; and hence there cannot be any such diversity as its ‘upper� or ‘lower� parts; and in that case there could be no ‘surrounding� of the one by the many; just as there is none in the case of the Mind and Mind-products. Thus the ‘surrounding� being, in reality, non-existent,—how could there be any existence (of the Atom) in the middlé of surrounding Atoms;—by virtue of which diversity due to facings could foe assumed?
If, even in the absence of ‘upper� and ‘lower� parts, there were ‘surroundings� by other Atoms,—then there could be such surrounding of Mind and Mental effects also; and in that case, like the Atoms, these latter also would subsist in Space. If not, then the Atoms also could not subsist in Space. Hence it follows that there could be no aggregation of Atoms; this is absolutely certain.
The following might be urged—“In the case of the Present ‘Mind-moment� there is immediate sequence, in time, to the Past and Future ‘Mind-moments�,—and yet the Present Moment has no parts like the various divisions of Time—Seconds, Minutes and so forth;—in the same mariner, in the case of Atoms, even though there is surrounding of one Atom by many Atoms, there would be no parts in the Atom, due to the facings in Space,�
This is not right.- As a matter of fact, there is no real immediate sequence between the Present Moment and the Past and Future Moments; because at that moment, these latter are non-existent; and there can be no real sequence to what is non-existent. All that is possible is that, because there can be no relation of Cause and Effect between things existing at the same moment, therefore through that relation the existence of the Past and Future Momenta is implied and assumed;—just as there is assumption of Prior and Posterior Non-existence. In the case of Atoms however, there cannot be any such assumption of sequence in space; as in that case, no aggregation would be possible.
Then again, it cannot be right to regard things as without cause; for if they were so, they would be always there.
Even the person who admits the ‘illusory� character of things, must regard all things as with cause. And when they are with cause, it is not right that the Cause and Effect should exist at the same moment; nor can the Cause be non-existent before the Effect, as, in that case, it could not have the requisite potency; after the appearance of the Effect, there would be no use for the Cause. Hence it must be admitted that all Causes exist before the Effect. This idea has been thus expressed---4 Previous to the Effect if the Cause is non-existent, it can have no potency; after the Effect, there is no use for it; hence all causes must have existence prior to the Effect; hence no Object can exist along with its cognition
Thus, even when all things are without parts, the existence of some sort of sequence in time stands to reason; but how could there be any sequence in space, if there were no parts? This is the point that is urged.
If, even in the absence of parts, there were sequence in space, then there could be such sequence in the case of Mind and Mental effects also; as there would be no difference between the two cases, as already pointed out above.
“T is difference due to corporeality�.
Not so; as in the absence of parts, there cannot be corporeality also. So this explanation means nothing more than the assertion of the presence of parts. There is no other point of difference. So there is nothing in this.
Thus then, in the case of all things, it is only sequence in time that has some basis in reason; anything more than that,—in the shape of sequence in space,—is not possible except when there are parts. Hence it is a perfectly correct statement that—where there is diversity of facings in Space, the thing cannot be one�.—We desist from further labouring of this point.�(1990-1992)
On this subject, some people argue as follows:—“Under the circumstances, Atoms may be regarded as being minuter points of Space itself; and if parts of these would have to be assumed, those parts again would consist in the still minuter points of Space; even though this may involve an infinite regress. But in no ease does it seem to be justifiable to regard Atoms as mere ideal (subjective) entities, for fear of having to regard them as with parts.—Even if they are mere subjective entities, it is necessary to postulate a cause for that Idea; and. that which is the cause of that Idea would itself be the Atom.—If what you are seeking to prove is that Atoms do not exist at ah,—even so, the Reason adduced�-‘Because there is diversity of facings’—is ‘inadmissible�, Because mere non-entities—like the ‘Horns of the Ass’—do not have the diverse facings towards the East and other directions.—Nor can your argument be treated as a Redactio ad Absurdum; because ‘the diversity of facings� is not admitted by us The answer to this is given in the following—[see verses 1993-1997 next]